How Hegsethian heroes destroyed themselves and their entire civilisation

I haven’t yet seen the Odyssey film[1], but reviews mention a minor obsession of mine, the Late Bronze Age collapse and the ensuing Greek Dark Age. I first encountered this at the end of Ken McLeod’s Intrusion where the character Geena compares modern nihilists to the mysterious “city burners” responsible for the massive destruction of cities in the Eastern Mediterranean around 1200 BCE.

Following this up, I learned that the periodization I was taught in school had been totally abandoned over the second half of the 20th century. In that story, the Bronze Age was succeeded by the technologically superior Iron Age. Progress continued until Roman decadence led to barbarian invasion and the Dark Ages, now more neutrally described as the Early Middle Ages.

Instead, the end of the Bronze Age was followed by a centuries-long Dark Age, with regression much more complete than after the fall of the Western Roman Empire. Greek civilisation, centred on the Mycenaean palace culture, collapsed almost completely, to the extent that writing was completely lost. Homer’s account of the Bronze Age was written centuries after the event, and with nothing but oral tradition to go on.

Obvious candidates for the cause were the mysterious Sea Peoples, whom the Egyptian pharaoh Ramesses III claimed to have defeated around 1187 BCE. This claim was discovered in the 19th century, hadn’t been much discussed outside Egyptology (a point made by Emily Wilson in her highly critical review). In the film, Odysseus admits to his wife that “we are the Sea People” and foreshadows the Bronze Age collapse.

More recent scholarship sees the city burners, whoever they were, as secondary causes of a collapse induced by, and reinforcing, the breakdown of the complex economic structures required by the need for copper and tin to produce bronze. Bronze weapons and armour were the central requirement of the aristocratic warrior class represented by the Acheans at Troy. Climate change, always a suspect in civilisational collapse, also appears as a possible cause.

The eventual emergence of iron as a cheap (though initially inferior) replacement ended the era of the heroic warrior. Iron weaponry produced something analogous to the modern mass army, in which the entire male citizen class was expected to serve (Socrates, for example, was an Athenian hoplite, noted for bravery).

All of this is directly opposite to the pop culture of the American manosphere. Rome wasn’t brought down by the decadence of Nero and Caligula but by the shift of power to what is now Istanbul centuries later. The Hegsethian heroes described by Homer either destroyed their own society (a reading perfectly consistent with the endings of the Iliad and Odyssey) or were brought down by their failure to manage the economy and the environment.

Add in an absurd misreading of Thucydides’ Melian dialogue, and you have the MAGA theory of history.

fn1. I have now, but I wrote this first and saw no need to change it

My son Daniel points me to a piece by Nate Silver which announces the discovery that highly educated workers with low or precarious income are the natural constituency of the Democratic Socialists of America. We’ve been over this at length here and at Crooked Timber, starting as far back as 2012 (and it wasn’t new then). Given that Silver treats the question as new, I thought it might be useful to restate the basic points from this discussion.

• Always and everywhere, controlling for education and other variables, higher income is correlated with rightwing voting
• Nearly always and everywhere, controlling for income and other variables, more education is correlated with leftwing voting<
• Because income and education are positively correlated, these two tend to cancel out
• With the (now only historical) exception of parts of the US, rural voters in developed countries are reliably rightwing
• Because of the history of slavery, civil war and segregation, US, Southern Whites in the US vote like an ethnic bloc, defined in opposition to Blacks. This fact largely accounts for the greater success of Trumpism compared to European far-right parties
• The most important form of identity politics is default identity politics, based on the idea that members of the unmarked category (in the US, white Christian men) are the natural representatives of the country and should therefore run it
• All of these are tendencies rather than uniform rules. There have always been “working class Tories”, “millionaire liberals” and so on

A nearly final observation following from this. As a conceptual tool for analysing voting patterns, the term “working class” is too ambiguous to be useful. It can mean anything from “wage workers in labouring and manual trade occupations” (perhaps 20 per cent of the population) to “below median income” (50 per cent by definition) to “did not complete 4 years of college” (about 60 per cent) to “income not primarily derived from capital ownership” (95 per cent), with only partial overlap between these categories. All of these definitions are useful in some contexts, but in debates over voting patterns they form a hopeless jumble.

And finally a restatement, While I’ve linked all of this to my own posts, I’m not claiming originality for these ideas. Just making the point that Silver is claiming as a discovery something that anyone paying attention could have observed at least a decade ago.

As I observed last year, the statement that “The cemeteries are full of indispensable people.” is just as true of nations, and in particular the US. That was a little controversial at the time, but now it’s become sufficiently conventional wisdom to be restated in the New York Times. I’ve been working on an update. and that seems like a signal to get it out

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Some brief notes written in response to a request from the Parliamentary Select Committee on Intergenerational Housing Inequity)

Class not cohort

The current crisis reflects the interaction between three main forces

* Changes in the life course meaning that most major stages of life are reached later than in the past. These include completion of education, entry into the mainstream labour force, family formation, childbirth, retirement and death.

* Growing inequality, particularly in relation to inter-generational transfers of wealth within families

* Decades of misguided public policy which have kept housing prices high

Contrary to the implications of a concept like “intergenerational inequity”, within-family transfers of wealth between generations have increased. These transfers traditionally focused on inheritance, but are now increasingly dominated by “in vivo” gifts and loans (the “Bank of Mum and Dad”) from wealthy parents to their adult children. This is better described as “intergenerational transmission of inequality”

The interaction between these forces has created a large class of young adult renters, in age groups where home ownership was the norm. In the mid-late 20th century, when current social attitudes were formed, renting was, for most young people, a brief transitional stage. The normal expectation was that marriage would be followed in short order by the birth of children and the purchase of a (heavily mortgaged) “home of one’s own”.

Only a small proportion of the population, around 20 per cent of the population, were lifelong renters.

Source: AIHW https://www.aihw.gov.au/reports/australias-welfare/home-ownership-and-housing-tenure

But this is primarily a matter of delay. As in the past, around 80 per cent of Australians are home-owners by the time they retire from the labour market.

Summing up:

* The issue is not one of inequality between different generations, but the transmission of inequality from one generation to the next. The children of well-off homeowners will mostly become well-off homeowners themselves, with a delay reflecting later entry to the labour force

* This delay means that, for many people, renting is no longer a transitory experience between youth and adulthood, but a significant life stage.

*.As in the past most deprived group are the minority of long-term renters.