As I did earlier this week, Tim Blair draws on the successful European fight against leftist terrorists like the Red Brigades in the 1970s and 1980s as a model for the fight against Al-Qaeda. As he notes, similar groups like the Weathermen (later the more PC Weather Underground) and the Japanese Red Army operated in the US and Japan, but on a much smaller scale. There were also right-wing groups who while less prominent were more like Al-Qaeda, going in for indiscriminate attacks like the Bologna railway bombing of 1980 which killed 85 people and injured 200. In nearly all the main cases of terrorism, the perpetrators were eventually caught and brought to trial (A closer look at the European evidence has led me to revise my earlier assessment, that we are unlikely to identify individual perpetrators in most cases).
Blair is right to point to Europe as a model, but I don’t think he’s fully absorbed the implications, and certainly his subeditor hasn’t. Blair says ‘Killing and jailing terrorists wipes out terror’ and his piece is headlined ‘Killing terrorists wipes out terror’.
As a corrective to the kind of nonsense being spouted by people like Bob Ellis this is all well and good. There is no point in being nice to terrorists – they must be hunted down remorselessly and brought to justice.
But the European model has a lot more implications, and Blair doesn’t mention these. Unlike many countries that tried and failed to fight terrorism, such as Argentina and Uruguay, the Europeans stuck to legal strategies. Many more terrorists were tried and jailed than were killed. Suspicions have been raised about the prison suicides of Baader and Meinhof, but there’s no good supporting evidence, and these were isolated instances.
There were, at the time, plenty of calls for a less scrupulous response, and suggestions that what was needed was a ‘man on horseback’. Countries in Latin America and elsewhere that heeded those calls paid a high price. The Europeans, with their annoying legalism succeeded where advocates of ‘direct action’ failed.
Blair is also missing the point when he says:
The only major European terrorist group from that era to survive in any significant way is the IRA, which tells us something: attacking terrorists doesn’t breed terror. Negotiating with them does.
Negotiations with the IRA only began in a serious way when attempts to crush it had clearly failed. For two decades, the British government steadfastly refused negotiation and condoned a wide range of extreme measures, including torture* and internment without trial, aimed at suppressing the IRA by force. The failure to beat the IRA had a number of causes, to which I will return in a later post, but excessive willingness to negotiate was not one.
(* Routine use of sensory deprivation, and illegal but widely-known insances of physical torture as well as a number of assassinations)
I’d like to end on a positive note. The tone of right-wing US commentary on the way to fight terrorism has been anti-European, often venomously so. Particular scorn has been poured on European legalism and hostility to vigilante action. It’s good to see someone like Tim Blair recognising that the European model is the one to follow.