The Slate Saddameterhas had the odds of war at 98 per cent for the past few days, despite a series of events that have substantially reduced its likelihood. These include
(i) Iraq’s promise to destroy missiles
(ii) The revolt against Blair by Labour MPs
(iii) Repeated delays in Turkish acceptance of a deal to allow US troops to use bases in Turkey
(iv) Sharon’s repudiation of any possible peace deal with the Palestinians, immediately following Bush’s commitment to a viable Palestinian state

All of this reflects the near-total isolation of Americans from world public opinion. With the exception of the Iraqi missiles, the events I’ve mentioned have barely reported in the US and what reporting there has been has been thoroughly misleading in all cases. Dan Rather’s interview with Saddam was grossly misreported, so that the decision to destroy the missiles, which was, as I’ve pointed out, a forced move, came as a surprise. The assumption that the Turks would be bought off has been so ingrained in US commentary that the possibility that the Parliament there might respond to (overwhelmingly anti-war) public opinion has not even been considered. Sharon has got a free pass as usual. But it’s the failure to understand (or in most cases even report) the British revolt that’s most striking. The number of Labour backbenchers crossing the floor was the biggest in a century, that is, the biggest since the Liberal party began breaking into pieces over Irish Home Rule. And that was on a motion which was according to its backers, specifically not the last chance to vote against war.

The most probable path leading away from war is as follows:
(a) Iraq destroys missiles at a steady pace for the next two weeks
(b) The UN-UK resolution fails, either because of multiple vetos or because it can’t muster nine votes in the UNSC
(c) Blair (or the Labour Party) decides not to participate in an invasion without a second resolution
(d) Bush decides not to go without Blair

At this point (a) and (b) are close to certain. On (c), Blair has said in the past that he might ignore an ‘unreasonable’ veto (the presumption was that this would be cast by France with only one or two others in the minority), but at this point it looks unlikely that a veto will even be necessary. And a look at the British Parliamentary vote shows how limited Blair’s options are. The Ministerial vote (Ministers, Parliamentary secretaries etc) was rock-solid for Blair last time, but an attempt to go to war without a resolution will almost certainly bring about a significant number of resignations. Once this happens, all bets are off. Blair could lose the Prime Ministership, the Tories could change sides to defeat the government on the floor of the House etc etc. It’s been suggested that Blair could order the troops in, then allow Parliament to vote, relying on the ‘rally round the flag’ effect. It’s clear now that this would only sharpen the opposition. In summary, without a second resolution, British participation is at best a 50-50 proposition.

Finally, a pullout by Britain would produce huge political and logistic difficulties for Bush. Given the complexity of the buildup, it’s hard to believe that the withdrawal of 25000 troops, 100 planes etc would not derail war planning to an extent requiring weeks of rearrangement. And politically, a ‘coalition of the willing’ consisting of the US, Kuwait and Australia will not seem convincing to anyone. So again, I think the likelihood of Bush going ahead without Blair is at most 50-50.

So, whereas Slate is implicitly suggesting 50-1 odds against peace (98-2 or 49-1 to be exact) my analysis suggests that 3-1 (ie 75 per cent to 25 per cent) would be generous. This appears to be what economists call an arbitrage opportunity. As far as I can tell, though, there are no markets for betting for or against war, which is probably a good thing.