This NYT report on a compromise being floated by the British is consistent with the analysis I’ve been pushing for some time. The difficulty is of course that the US Administration will do its best to rule out any compromise in the form of a clearly stated final demand “Do this, or else”, no matter how stringent the conditions, for fear that Saddam will actually do it. By contrast, the French want a compromise of this form, but would prefer one with conditions that have a fair probability of being met (unrestricted interviews, production of documents etc).

But game-theoretic reasoning helps us here. If the French believe that the US will reject any compromise in the form of a clearly stated final demand, they have no reason to quibble about the precise wording of the demand. This in turn increases the likelihood that any compromise proposed by the British will be accepted, with the result that the US will be forced to veto (or kill with the threat of veto) a British proposal.

Two possible inferences. The first is that the British government is prepared to pull out of war if necessary. The alternative is that they think they can persuade the US to accept a “final demand” compromise. The second seems more likely as a statement about British beliefs, but Bush has disappointed them before, and is likely to do so again.

Update The Guardian also has this story, supporting the second interpretation

The British government, which expects to secure the backing of the US for the change, is to offer a reworked resolution that would give Iraq “a little more time” and set a deadline on which most of the UN security council could agree.