The other day, I saw in the list of WashPost Oped pieces one by James Dobbins entitled Time to Deal with Iran. No sooner had I seen the headline than I had my refutation ready, wondering what kind of neocon fruitcake would advocate compounding the problems we already have by taking on the Iranians. Didn’t Dobbin know, I wondered, that the US had already exhausted its reserves of troops, money and political credit? Being cautious, though, I decided I might as well read the article before writing my riposte.
It turns out that Dobbin means “Time to Cut a Deal with iran”. He makes a very strong case that this is the sensible course of action and that Iranian good offices with the Shiites would help build support for an interim government. But it struck me as a curious inversion of the domino theory that was one of the justifications for the war. The idea was that 100 000 or more US troops in the Middle East would scare neighbouring governments, particularly those of Iran and Syria, into good behavior. Instead, the help of the Iranians is needed to discourage attacks on the troops.
Coming to Syria, it was initially assumed that US complaints about “foreign fighters”[1] coming into Iraq from Syria were sabre-rattling, creating an implicit pretext for a subsequent invasion. It now seems more likely that Syria has been handed a bargaining chip – if the Syrian government seals its borders effectively, there’ll be no more complaints from the US about Assad junior’s unlovely regime.
fn1. There’s no evidence of large numbers of foreign fighters. But the classic role of a country like Syria in this context would be that of a safe haven for domestic Iraqi insurgents when the pressure gets too heavy inside Iraq.
From this perspective, even the much-touted Libyan deal doesn’t look to good. Qaddafi had caved in on a bunch of issues well before Bush came to office, most notably by handing over the Lockerbie bombers. He had high hopes for rehabilitation then.. But he remained mostly out in the cold – he was, after all, a brutal dictator, if not in the Saddam league, and for that matter, still is. Yet by coming up with some WMDs and handing them over, Qaddafi has become the toast of the Western world. The Coalition of the Willing has led the way, with both Blair and Berlusconi visiting the dictator on his home turf. To be fair, though, when there’s money to be made, Old Europe is usually near the front of the queue and so it is this time.
At this point, my view, which seems (to me) similar to what Anthony Cordesman has been saying, is that the US should be planning to pull out as soon as is reasonably possible. Ideally that means first stabilising the situation in Najaf and Karbala (without doing anything stupid like trying to arrest or kill Sadr), installing a genuinely independent interim government, abandoning detention with trial then holding elections, before the end of 2004 if possible. If some genuine plan for “finishing the job” in the near future is announced, then Australian troops should stay to help. Otherwise, Latham is quite right to say we should pull out.
John Quiggin 
Some kind of editing error there in the sentence ending “and for that matter.”
What if a hasty pull-out by the coalition of the willing leads to the aborting of any kind of hope for civil rule in Iraq, and perhaps the intitiation of a destabilising sectarian civil war, the establishment of terrorist havens and the return of some sort of militarist war-lord?
Does Pr Q think these events are unlikely or is he just unconcerned about them?
If so then in either case, he would be wrong.
Jack, in a busted-up ‘country’ like that, sectarian conflict is inevitable without a military dictatorship. Democracy is on a hiding to zip, and the coalition oughtn’t kid themselves that staying on in Iraq will improve democracy’s chances. Best hope is a secular dictator without Saddam’s maverick qualities. This would argue for an early pullout (made acceptable by appropriate ‘peace with honour’ windowdressing – there’s your ‘finished job’, Johnny) but then maintaining a credible threat of decisive intervention if the man you don’t want starts getting the upper hand. Stiff cheddar for the Iraqi people, but they were never the main game for Perle and Wolfie.
actually, what paul says is moreover right.
we could pull out completely now, and that little power vacuum would mean the shia and sunni arent bombing americans anymore but they’ll start to bomb each other. when the flare up dies down, all we simply need to do is cut a deal for oil with whoever comes out on top.
needless to say, a gradual handover and offering some training to the iraqi government, police and military will minimise the harm (for the iraqi population)
hmm…thats exactly what we’re doing (even though its costing our troops lives)
Vance, I have now fixed the error and added a link.
Jack, I’ve come to the conclusion that the net contribution of US occupation forces to Iraqi security and order is rapidly declining and would, in the presence of any sort of legitimate government, be negative.
Yes 2
John Quiggan looks at the the US’s strategic position without the rosy glasses: [I]t struck me as a curious inversion…