Over the course of the Iraq war, a lot of opponents of the war have made a big noise about corruption among US contractors, the most common target being Halliburton. More recently, the pro-war blogosphere has been in an uproar over the ‘discovery’ that Saddam bribed a range of officials, including some in the UN, so that he could get kickbacks from the sale of oil, which was supposed to be used solely for the purchase of food and other essential imports. There has been a sense of baffled rage that no-one is much interested in pursuing these ‘discoveries’.

The scare quotes around ‘discovery’ reflect the fact that everyone who was paying any attention knew about this all along, and, indeed could deduce it from first principles. For example, in a piece on financing the reconstruction of Iraq written in May 2003, I observed

A return to normal output would yield gross income of around $US 20 billion per year at current prices, but most of this money was already being spent under the Food-for-oil program and most of it be needed for the same purpose in future. About 25 per cent of the money was taken to pay interest on debts associated with reparations for the 1991 War. If these were forgiven, some additional money would become available. In addition, it appears that Saddam managed to cream off $1 billion to $2 billion per year. If this were returned to the Iraqi people in general, it would make a small but positive contribution.

I didn’t bother to point it out, but it was obvious that Saddam could only get his cut by bribing those on the other side of the deal, that is, employees of the UN, the oil companies and the governments involved.

In the same piece, I made the point that the US contractors doing the work in Iraq were bound to charge a lot and deliver little, so that the cost of reconstruction would be far beyond the minuscule amounts that had then been budgeted. The appropriate response was not to complain about corruption but to accept reality and the need to spend a lot more money.

Iin both cases, it was, or ought to have been, obvious that the policy in question would produce corruption. That was why the US and UK initially tried to keep sanctions much tighter, with the result that thousands of Iraqi children died of starvation or inadequate medical treatment. Those who supported the Oil-for-Food program, knew, or ought to have known, that Saddam would take a large cut, and supported it anyway. Those who supported large-scale expenditure on reconstruction after the war knew, or ought to have known, that unscrupulous contractors would make a fortune, and supported it anywar. I’m happy to admit to supporting both policies, and to accepting corruption as one of the inevitable costs.

Having said all that, corruption is a crime and those guilty of it should be punished. But, unless you favor starving Iraqi children or doing nothing about reconstruction, trying to use either Halliburton or ‘UNSCAM’ to score points regarding the desirability or otherwise of the war is just silly.
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This NYT story gives a pretty clear indication of how the Bush Administration’s abhorrence of abuse and torture will be manifested:

* A short spell in jail for those silly enough to be caught on camera or caught holding one
* A reprimand and no future promotion[1] for their immediate superiors
* No consequences for those who set up the system
* A new coat of paint for Abu Ghraib

I hope the Muslim world is more favourably impressed than I am.

fn1. As far as I can tell, this is what is meant by the NYT description of the reprimands as ‘career-ending’.

Like most commentators, I’ve made some correct predictions about Iraq and some incorrect ones. In my case, I’ve mostly erred on the side of pessimism, which I think is appropriate with regard to war – more disasters have been caused by excessive eagerness to go to war than by excessive reluctance. This prediction, made about a week into the Iraq war, seemed a bit over the top in the subsequent months, during which very little evidence emerged to support it. In retrospect, however, it turns out to be almost[1] entirely accurate.

Given the increasing frequency of references to Northern Ireland and Guantanamo Bay it’s reasonable to assume that torture of prisoners classed as ‘terrorist suspects’ will begin within the next few weeks, if it hasn’t started already. This will be denied with great vehemence, then, when it comes out, defended as an inevitable response to Saddam’s evil methods.

fn1. To be fair, while the response of the Bush Administration has been pretty much as expected (I forgot to mention the standard intermediate step of blaming it all on ‘a few bad apples’), and plenty of right-wing commentators have treated the whole thing as good dirty fun, some supporters of the war have been genuinely horrified. Sgt Stryker, (following correspondent BruceR) makes the same suggestion as I have previously, to “level Abu Ghraib, as the Bastille of the modern world that it is, send any prisoners worth keeping to other facilities, release the rest, and then offer substantial recompense for Iraqis, one and all, who claim to have been wrongfully imprisoned/abused in custody while there” . Sgt Stryker also proposes dissolving the army units involved.

The other day, I saw in the list of WashPost Oped pieces one by James Dobbins entitled Time to Deal with Iran. No sooner had I seen the headline than I had my refutation ready, wondering what kind of neocon fruitcake would advocate compounding the problems we already have by taking on the Iranians. Didn’t Dobbin know, I wondered, that the US had already exhausted its reserves of troops, money and political credit? Being cautious, though, I decided I might as well read the article before writing my riposte.

It turns out that Dobbin means “Time to Cut a Deal with iran”. He makes a very strong case that this is the sensible course of action and that Iranian good offices with the Shiites would help build support for an interim government. But it struck me as a curious inversion of the domino theory that was one of the justifications for the war. The idea was that 100 000 or more US troops in the Middle East would scare neighbouring governments, particularly those of Iran and Syria, into good behavior. Instead, the help of the Iranians is needed to discourage attacks on the troops.

Coming to Syria, it was initially assumed that US complaints about “foreign fighters”[1] coming into Iraq from Syria were sabre-rattling, creating an implicit pretext for a subsequent invasion. It now seems more likely that Syria has been handed a bargaining chip – if the Syrian government seals its borders effectively, there’ll be no more complaints from the US about Assad junior’s unlovely regime.

fn1. There’s no evidence of large numbers of foreign fighters. But the classic role of a country like Syria in this context would be that of a safe haven for domestic Iraqi insurgents when the pressure gets too heavy inside Iraq.
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