Monday Message Board

It’s Monday again, and time for the Monday Message Board. Post your thoughts on any topic (civilised discussion and no coarse language[1]).

fn1. Readers are welcome to consider how the norms of this blog, which I think work quite well, relate to “political correctness” and “civility”.

11 thoughts on “Monday Message Board

  1. As there is no chance now that the AFR will print the letter I sent in about JQ’s article three odd weeks ago, I’ll paste the body of it in here for further comment:-

    In his article of 18.6.04 John Quiggin is mistaken on a number of particulars, mostly about Algeria.

    There was no insuperable economic problem with Algerians getting full French citizenship, done incrementally, and indeed this genuinely was open to them. However they had to go through assimilation first, giving up polygamy and other unFrench customs. And it did turn out to be empty, since the French people themselves – democratically – marginalised the elite that tried, so driving them into supporting revolt.

    Colonialism was NOT a “costly philanthropy”, even by 1939, since it operated colonies as cost centres for the mother country – they weren’t simple outgoings. This only became unworkable for existing colonies after 1945; it was just that it didn’t pay to invest in a whole war to get colonies, even by the Boer War of 1899-1902.

    The key issue leading to French failure in Algeria was NOT the Army’s routine reliance on torture and atrocity with its impact on French opinion. That had become standard operating procedure during the original 19th century pacification, and because it seemed to work France had become accustomed to it – it was still effective during an unpublicised minor revolt in the late 1940s when my parents were there. No, a large part of French objection to the handling of the late 1950s crisis was to the ineffectiveness of the practitioners, not to their methods.

    De Gaulle was brought in to save France by reforming the approach, and much of his support came from those who wanted success in Algeria, not a pullout. Ultimately, then, the French pullout was not a triumph for democracy but for De Gaulle’s leadership in facing reality and drawing French opinion after him. It was certainly no response to French popular opinion, which had a large emotional investment in a country where so many family members had been conscripts.

  2. Surely ‘cost centre’ vs ‘costly philanthropy’ is mere quibbling? France could sustain a colony which was increasingly seen by elites as part of the motherland BEFORE WW2, and it could not sustain the cost after WW2 so they redefined the motherland.

    The FLN’s campaign differed from all previous resistances to French colonialisation in that it was not a spurt, quickly stomped out by a self-reinforcing use of brutal force. The FLN hurt the French for a long period of time. Just as Vietnam wore down the US public from support to opposition after losses continued, so did the FLN undermine French support for the war. Once support falters, critics look for reasons the war effort was failing and torture was the reason selected.

    It was really a combination of tribal alliances and accompanying underground support, plus, the bases in Tunisia that allowed the FLN to continue – and that led to the French withdrawal.

  3. Totally OT the current disposition of the blog – but I was pleased to see that Kevin Rudd had his eyes on the deteriorating situation vis a vis Taiwan/China.

    A greatly weakened and demoralised USA (a consequence of the current follies) is giving the Chinese chutzpah to consider a solution to the ‘Taiwan problem’.

    The cost of the devaluation of democracy by it’s greatest promoter(US) gives heart to authoritarian regimes around the world.

    Any thoughts anyone?

  4. It would be nice if Professor Q would post the AFR article PM Lawrence refers to, which I’m guessing is the rewritten version of his Merom review. Having said that,if JQ does post it on the blog, there will be many lengthy comments, mostly from me, so I wouldn’t blame him for not doing so…

  5. May I suggest all non lemmings read.
    The Secrets of the Federal Reserve by Eustace Mullins.apfn.org on web.
    Committee of 300 by Dr.John Coleman.
    Fourth Reich of the Rich by Des Griffin.
    info@hiddenmysteries.com
    Sorrows of Empire by Chalmers Johnson.
    Philosophy of Dr.Antony C Sutton.
    Also investigate;Bilderbergs,Illuminati,Skull & Bones(Kerry & Busd of same ilk),Trilateral Comn,Tavistock Inst.etc etc.We are mere pawns in the global game. QED

  6. I actually have an economics-related question that I haven’t been able to answer. Any help you could give would be quite welcome.

    I have an intuition that the reductions in the lower marginal tax brackets have exerted downward pressures on lower wage rates. If wage packages are determined based on take-home pay, something I suspect is true given withholding, the lower tax rates would allow employers to offer lower compensation packages to attract the same type of employee – particularly when the labor market is slack.

    I guess my question is: how much benefits do employers get from lower marginal income tax rates? Do they extract a sizable portion of the rents?

    It’s a nagging question, considering I’m in the bottom tax bracket and didn’t notice any extra disposable income.

  7. In partial answer to RoD:-

    “Surely ‘cost centre’ vs ‘costly philanthropy’ is mere quibbling?”

    No, cost centres cause flourishing elsewhere. Colonies always did boost the home economy, and the extent that this made up for the cost matters a great deal. But philanthropy gets no return of a sort that offsets the resources used.

    “France could sustain a colony which was increasingly seen by elites as part of the motherland BEFORE WW2, and it could not sustain the cost after WW2 so they redefined the motherland.”

    You ought to check when Algeria was formally annexed as part of France. It wasn’t a post 1945 mockery to try and retain it.

    “The FLN’s campaign differed from all previous resistances to French colonialisation in that it was not a spurt, quickly stomped out by a self-reinforcing use of brutal force.”

    Incorrect. The first phase of pacification lasted a lot longer, against the likes of Abd El Cader – elcaderism entered the French language as a result. And the distinction made between what happened in the 1950s and the more recent occasions isn’t a distinction about what the resisters did but about what happened as a result. In fact, the resisters didn’t do very much different in the 1950s – like the Irish in the 1920s, they had finally stumbled across enough incremantal changes to tactics and strategy at a time when certain outside things had come right for them (including a more competent elite joining them with a knowledge of tactics and strategy).

    In fact, it was precisely because the natives were mostly doing more of the same that the French did more of the same – to great tactical effect. Continued, it would have worked – which is where outside factors come in. (And they would have continued, because there would have been little additional cost on top of the sunk cost.) But ethnic cleansing and the like were no longer practical for outside reasons.

  8. To Kyan:

    It is a worry. I particularly wonder about the role of North Korea. Given that the place only exists because it is a client of China, which I guess condones the North’s nuclear stance, I presume that there could be a trade in the offing.

    China gets Taiwan in return for accepting the reunification of Korea? Or is that just trash Machiavelli?

  9. David

    Taiwan is at least as much an economic problem for China as a political problem. I’m no expert on China but the obvious social dynamic that is at work is the push for democratic institutions on the mainland especially in Hong Kong. And here I think the collapse of democracy in the US is probably having a substantial negative effect. The economic benefit that China gains from Taiwan is obviously a constraint but is inevitably decreasing in importance.

    North Korea IMHO is purely political and though your Machiavellian trade off might well come to pass it will be because of the loss of influence of the US in the region.

Comments are closed.