Last week there was a lot of triumphalism from parts of the blogosphere regarding anti-Syrian protests in Lebanon, which was cut rather embarrassingly short when the pro-Syrian PM was re-installed following a huge pro-Syrian demonstration. I thought that the likely cause of these developments was internal to Lebanon rather than the inspirational example of GW Bush, though I was too ignorant of recent Lebanese politics too say much more. As usual, many others did not feel constrained by ignorance from drawing firm conclusions.
For those who’d like to inform themselves, The Head Heeb has a lengthy series giving some of the background. One important point is that the withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from South Lebanon back in 2000 set in motion many of the forces that are operating today and, in particular, undermined the legitimacy of the Syrian occupation and the maintenance of a militia by Hezbollah.
The Economist today had quite a measured piece today, I thought, on the degree to which Bush and the neo-cons could legitimately claim credit for what’s been happening in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine.
I think discussions of these issues in an incredibly partisan and exaggerated way (ie Iraq is the new Vietnam, or Bush has brought democracy to Lebanon through the State of the Union speech) on either left or right are equally unhelpful, and as you note, John, have far more to do with scoring political points domestically than any attempt at dispassionate analysis.
The Bushies are claiming credit for the sun shining of its own accord and denying debit for their war-mongering clouds of gloom. Democracy, or populist governmetns, has been evolving throughout Islamic Southern Asia for much of the past generation:
Lebanon (1953-76): ok.
Iran (1979-?): disaster to mediocre
Algeria (1991): disaster
Palestine (1994): mediocre to bad
Turkey (1992): goodish
Indonesia (1999): ok
Malaysia: goodish
Afghanistan (2004): mediocre
Iraq (2005): who knows
The democratic moves made in Saudi and Egypt seem to be purely cosmetic, to keep US financial and martial support coming. Who knows what is going on in the Syrian governement.
The recent changes in political sentiment in Lebanon and Palestine relate to the untimely death of political figures and the alienation of foreign troops rather than any new found sense of constitutionalism.
It should be obvious that the wave of Islamic populism that is radiating throughout SW Asia does not translate into (pro-individual) civic liberalism or (pro-Western) strategic pacifism. It is clearly riding on a wave of sectarian demography rather than secular democracy.
All we do know for sure is that the US’s governements geo-political strategy in the War on Terror has been to disempower anti-Islamist state apparats and empower pro-Islamist mass movements. Whether this amazingly perverse looking policy will moderate the movements or militarise the apparats is an open question.
JS, why not both moderate the movements and militarise the apparats? (Though I would expect it would only ever be in relative terms, if it happened at all – which I doubt for various reasons.)
Is there some reason they are mutually exclusive?
I don’t think that popularly elected Islamic political forces are really all that much to worry about, provided they continue to remain democracies. What becomes fairly clear during open elections in a stable safe envirornment is that people in muslim countries do not in general support Islamic fundamentalists. They always do surprisingly poorly unless they moderate themselves to the point where they are acceptable to more secular muslims (eg Turkey). This has been shown in elections in Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran and Pakistan during the more peaceful times before the recent coup.
It is only in environments where political violence is widespread that Islamists do well. This seems to be because secular political forces cannot survive when either the state (eg Egypt or Iran) or non-state Islamic and nationalist forces (eg Algeria and Iraq) are using political violence.
The caveat is that Islamic political forces are generally quite anti-democratic and are likely to dismantle democracy when they can get away with it. But that is really a reflection of how weak their own popular support is.