When I first saw this Fox caption capture from Media Matters linked at Surfdom, I thought it was some sort of aberration. But the idea that civil war in Iraq would be a good thing has already made it into the opinion pages of the Oz, propounded by Daniel Pipes. The same from James Joyner and Vodkapundit, though Glenn Reynolds demurs mildly.
Meanwhile, as Tim D notes, doublethink is SOP at Fox. As far as I can tell, the official pro-war position now emerging is
* there is no civil war in Iraq
* there will be no civil war in Iraq
* if civil war comes, it won’t be our fault
* when civil war comes, it will be a good thing
Unfortunately, at this point there’s not much anyone can do. The US and Uk have long since lost control of the situation, and the dynamic has gone beyond the control of any individual or group in Iraq. We’ll just have to hope that the Iraqi leaders (Sistani and Sadr on the Shia side, and the various groups contending to represent the Sunni Arabs and Kurds, among others) can pull something out of the fire between them.
John Quiggin 
SJ,
Of those. only Hawaii became a state, and, in the end, by a vote that was overwhelming even amongst the native Hawaiians. Puerto Rico always has the option of leaving, one they recently voted against; the Philipines were given their independence after WWII without a vote (admittedly, after fighting for it in the period to 1898 to 1913) and Guam also has the option – not one that they seem to want to take.
Complete and utter ignorance seems to be infectious, SJ. A bit of reading would help. Perhaps a good lie down, too.
Don’t be ridiculous, Reynolds. The US didn’t leave any of those places. Nor Germany or Japan either.
The only places I can think of that the US left are North Korea and Vietnam. And those aren’t examples where the US did it exactly voluntarily.
Tell me what you think the US intentions for Iraq are.
Yes one can only agree with avaroo about the impotence of the United Nations in protecting freedom and democracy around the world.
Indeed, Paul Craig Roberts, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Reagan administration has recently expressed the same regret:
“To combat the Republican lock on electronic voting machines, the US is in desperate need of the UN to oversee our elections to prevent Republicans with low approval ratings from winning elections that exit polls show they lost.”
http://www.counterpunch.org/roberts02212006.html
UN scrutiny of US elections would never happen of course, because the UN is full of the representatives of gangster regimes that hate and fear democracy.
Andrew, good response. Hawaii, as you say, voted to become a US state. Puerto Rico is not a state, doesn’t seem to want to be and is probably better off NOT being a state. I spent summers as a child in San Juan, my father worked there a good bit, and Puerto Ricans enjoy all the benefits of statehood without the expense of paying US taxes. Not a bad deal.
The Philipines are often oddly mentioned as the US’ attempt at empire. You’d think the fact that the US made a conscious decision to get out of the Philippines BECAUSE it did not want to have a colony would make people think twice about using the Philippines as an example of American imperial desires, but it never does.
I await your response to the latest idiocy, that “the US didn’t leave any of those places”, as though every American must leave a particular location in order for it NOT to be a US colony, with interest. You so often get it right.
I believe that even at this moment there are Americans IN Australia. Another example of US imperial activity?
avaroo says: “It seems that many people, for reasons unfathomable to me, actually believe that the US plans to stay permanently in Iraq, making it our 51st state …”
Who could credit such a thing? After all, it’s not as if the US military is actually building huge, enduring bases in the country. Or that many people, mostly on the right of US politics, argue that the US should stay more or less permanently in Iraq (or at least maintain an “over-the-horizon” capability to support the Iraqi Government, protect vulnerable minorities or ensure developments don’t threaten US interests [depending on your level of cynicism]). No, the only ones spouting this sort of nonsense are wild-eyed lefties like MIT’s Barry Posen. (Not for him any “noble lie” nonsense about beacons of light.)
avaroo also says: “I believe the idea that a head of state can commit acts of atrocity against their own people has been destroyed…”
The people of Burma are dancing in the streets. Libyan women offer up prayers of thanks.
But at least we know there are no more atrocities in Iraq.
Fair enough Warbo, but you’ve got people on this board talking about American military presence in Germany, South Korea and Japan as evidence of empire. I buy that America is an empire and one whose motives are largely self-interest, but this is not to say its actions are not interjected with a sense of morality and values, (albeit subject to its own interpretation of said). This is a country that’s been a pretty benevolent world power and whose record outside of this latest travesty of a government and certain notably deleterious covert operations is one that Americans can be proud of.
Germany, Japan and South Korean societies have all profited handsomely by occupying the space underneath the aegis of American power. South Vietnam probably would have as well, (which, for reasons of political interference, probably wouldn’t have justified the war in any case). Alas, if you think China is going to be as benevolent after it supplants this country following its inexorable decline, be careful what you wish for (and for historical perspective, read up on the change in attitudes of Byzantium’s subjects before and after Ottoman conquest).
Majorajam says: America is an empire and one whose motives are largely self-interest…
Well, yes. This is what empires do. How you can go from that to “a pretty benevolent world power” I don’t quite understand. Sometimes (e.g. World War II) US interests (or at least those of its ruling elite) intersect with “morality and values”. Sometimes (e.g. Iraq 2003 to present) they do not.
Fortunately for America and the rest of us, the kleptomaniac and meglomaniac tendencies of its power elite (as evidenced most spectacularly by, as Majorajam puts it, “this latest travesty of a government”) are restrained, to greater or lesser extent, by the vigour of American democracy and the safeguards of its constitution (a work of dead-set human genius that this administration seems hell-bent on subverting).
Averoo, there is a difference between being a member state of a federation and being a client state. The US doesn’t want Iraq, it wants to be able to dictate certain of the conditions under which its oil is supplied.
“We shall not make Britain’s mistakes. Too wise to try to rule the world, we shall merely own it”. –Ludwell Denny.
For the most part, successive United States administrations have patterned their policies on the first part of this observation very intelligently. The Bush Clique represents a catastrophic case of grand policy amnesia.
The second part of this observation has been problematic for the US for some time. The end of the US thrift culture has necessitated a loosening of the grip of US-based ownership of assets. Moreover, there has occurred with globalisation an eclipse of the identification of corporations with national interests.
The inane bellicosity of the Bush Clique may well be one way the Nationalist Right in the US assuages its faltering sense of self-worth in the face of structural changes in the patterns of ownership and control of the world’s assets.
“The US doesn’t want Iraq, it wants to be able to dictate certain of the conditions under which its oil is supplied.”
So! Isn’t that precisely what ‘we’ all wanted via ‘our’ UN sanctions?
Warbo,
The transition from “self interested empire” to “fairly benevolent world power” is fairly easy to understand if you drop the anti-globalisation / mercantilist hogwash and have a good look at the economics.
Long-term US interests are served by global free trade, which is true for all countries. Short-term they seem to believe that security is more important, in that fighting the GWOT in Iraq is better than having to combat it at home. This is a very expensive option, though, and not one that any US president would want to bear for long – they are looking for an exit that allows reasonably free trade and reduces the security bill.
So, the short-term empire view gives way to a fairly benevolent world power in the long term as the US looks to cut its overhead costs of maintaining an “imperial” system and increasing the benefits, both to itself as the primary driver and to all as a side benefit, of the global trading system. Simple.
Andrew, seeing as I haven’t so much as mentioned globalisation or mercantilism, I’ll ask you to drop the attempted mind-reading hogwash.
As for the rest, your depiction of the US sounds admirable, but is simply at odds with reality. The dauntless promoter of free trade? What about steel? What about any number of agricultural commodities?
In other words, while it may very well be true that “long-term US interests are served by global free trade”, they will generally take a back seat to the perceived short-term interests of the ruling elite.
Warbo, the ‘ruling elite’ analysis is hyperbolic. The US is not a plutocracy. Though the atrocity that is the Bush administration makes some of its policies on that basis, and corruption at epidemic levels has lessened the representativeness of its representative democracy, the country is still a long way from that, (e.g. McCain has a lot of power and so far as I can tell is in no one’s pocket). And as trends go, Nixon pushed executive power and the American people pushed back. Corruption can wane as well as wax. I suspect that the day of reckoning for both of these dynamics is coming, and that right soon.
Your example of steel illustrates my point. Pennsylvania is a swing state- also a steel state. Meanwhile, users of steel are diffuse. The illegal tariffs imposed by the administration were nothing more than populist politics of the type one can observe in most every nation on the planet (in this case, failed populist politics as dubya didn’t carry Pennsylvania).
Lastly, the benevolence of US power is a judgment that follows from the prosperity and degree of sovereignty, (i.e. dignity), of the nations in its orbit. That the US actions favor its interests is a) no secret, (e.g. is explicitly stated in policy manifestos), b) not intended to be a secret and c) does not differentiate it from any other country on this planet, past or present. It’s pretty clear to me then that my acceptance of the status of the US as an empire does not invalidate my judgment of it as benevolent. If there is some contradiction there, then you will need to provide more color on what that is.
PS The desire of the US for permanent military bases in Iraq, etc. does not point to a desire to occupy it anymore than did its massive Saudi airbase or “Centcom” in Qatar (not that any of these were wise moves). It points, rather, to the military’s pathological obsession with projecting power as a means of defense, (i.e. as an ends in and of itself). To the astute, the closing and opening of these bases reveals the trajectory of its frantic post-Cold War search for adversaries.
Majorajam we must be using different definitions of benevolent.
I’m not sure that I’d be happy using to describe a country that is happy to topple democratically elected governments, supports authoritarian regimes, turn a blind eye to humans rights abuses of its allies and indeed commits themselves by kidnapping, putting people in a legal limbo, kangaroo courts, uses torture as is defined under the Geneva convention, not to mention start illegal wars. Oh BTW I nearly forgot a country that the World Court has said in the past supported/linked to terrorism.
I suppose it is benevolent if you are prepared to accept the advantages of supporting this country while turning a blind eye to its abuses.
Free trade is that’s more spin then reality in reality allow access to my goods but my domestic producers come first. The whole Fair trade and ethical business movement is all about countering Free trade and the hypocrisy it promotes.
Free trade that’s more spin then reality allow access to my goods but my domestic producers come first. The whole Fair trade and ethical business movement is all about countering Free trade and the hypocrisy it promotes.
Majorajam’s modulated view of US geopolitical thinking takes a very proper account of the fissures that persist in the political, business, administrative and military elites of the US. This is a truth which non-Americans sometimes fail to perceive.
I would question Majorajam’s use of the word “benevolent” in relation to the dealings of the US and the rest of the world.
Use of the word sets up a false dichomoty: benevolent/ malevolent. It also conflates two different words: benevolent/benign. Moreover, in his discussion of the intersections between US interests and the interests of other nations in the US orbit, Majorajam demonstrates that he need not use the term “benevolent”. Majorajam would be advised to substitute “benign” for “benevolent”.
As Majorajam has shown, mostly the US has persuaded others in its orbit that the relationship is a win/win result. And I believe it can be argued that most of the time, most of the nations in the US orbit would agree that their relationship with the US was to some extent a “win” for them.
This describes a relationship of enlightened self interest. Benign it might be, but benevolent it isn’t.
A benevolent relationship would exist only if the US was determined to do something good for some other nation despite the harm that it would cause its own vital interests. And I’m fairly confident in saying that this thinking has never motivated US relationships with the rest of the world.
I suppose that the semantic issue Katz raises could have some merit, but let me see if I can’t be more specific about what I meant, and what I didn’t. First, I did not mean to say that the US has a flawless record or that we’re a bunch of saints. Rather, I meant to portray the out-of-context judgment of the US as benevolent or malevolent, or if you prefer, benign or malignant, as false. The appropriate context, (one that will be better understood as we are replaced at the top of the food chain by the Pol Pot supporting Chinese), is one in which the realities of human behavior are abstracted, i.e. one in which we accept the impossibility of (and lack of precedent for) altruistic power. And I don’t have to cite the behavior of previous empires to reveal what realities I refer to. Every country in the world has its own track record of shameful actions, even if in some cases these have limited influence.
For America’s part, its shame has been furnished by way of good and bad intentions, (and good and bad people). In particular, we’ve had two administrations over the last 100 years that can only be described as nefarious: the Nixon administration and the present administration. Of the latter, I can unfortunately only agree that Simonjm synopsis:
is accurate. And I can only account for that by saying that the country has gone off the rails since 9/11 (although not entirely as a result of 9/11, but largely to due with problems that have grown and festered over the last 30 years and these largely related to its prosperity). By contrast, the Nixon administration’s evil deeds were not made available for public consumption, and much of its actions were tantamount to treason. In addition, we’ve had the actions of the CIA since its post-war establishment. These are largely regrettable, though, if you think that the KGB was any less active, i.e. that non-involvement was an option, or less committed to ‘win’ by any means necessary, I would characterize that as revisionist history.
In the final analysis, I would say that the world prospered by the majority of US actions, in particular by its holding back of Soviet imperialism, (a far less subtle version than our own), and by its freedom and openness. Does that mean the country can be characterized as benevolent? Why not.
AR, the only reason that Hawaii voted for statehood was that the USA created new facts – remade it in their image, largely by infiltration and its effects over time. They are currently doing the same in Puerto Rico; these votes about Puerto Rican independence come up at intervals, coupled with votes about statehood. Do you suppose that a pro-statehood vote would be followed by any option for independence ever again being presented?
The same thing happened in Vermont, the Floridas, the Pacific Northwest (formerly the southern part of the Oregon territory and now three separate states), California, Texas and Utah – statehood being conferred when most convenient, once the “people were ready”, and after a process to make them ready quite regardless of actual population levels and natural change and so on. Democracy is open to manipulation by selective editing, and in matters of statehood that is just precisely what the USA has always done.
Majorajam, most although not all the US “benevolent” actions were quite well carried out by European empires. The USA can only claim credit for new actions of its own, not any “global policeman” stuff that devolved on it after it stopped others from doing them.
PML,
The case of Hawaii is interesting, as you pointed out. The fact is, however, that the vote for statehood was overwhelming – as stated above, even amongst the “native” (i.e. polynesian) residents.
I do not suppose that an option for independence will ever be submitted – the events of 1861 to 1865 show that it is, at best, highly unlikely. I think this is one of the reasons why Puerto Rico is taking its time over the decision (the other main one is probably the favourable taxation treatment), but, provided this is understood by those taking the vote, I do not see it as a problem.
It would not be the only example of an indigenous population being overwhelmed by later arrivals to create facts on the ground. It seems to have happened twice in Australia already and also in many other places around the world.
Why don’t you just answer the question, Reynolds, instead of prancing around.
Do you think that the US will attempt to maintain a permanent presence in Iraq, or not? If not, why not?
J,
(Since we are only using last names or last part of a nom de plume) I did not see that as the question, but, although you have been rude enough to ask it in that way, I am happy to answer it.
I think they are likely to attempt to maintain a base or two at least, as they did in the Phillipines and Saudi Arabia, but when requested to leave by the legal government they will, as also happened in the Phillipines and Saudi Arabia. They have a history of trying to maintain bases in unstable parts of the world; a logical thing for them to do.
What, you mean like firing Indian mutineers out of Her Majesty’s cannons? Or perhaps you’re referring to the slaughter of three quarters of a million eithiopians in just over five years of trigger time? Yep, I’d say those European’s have demonstrated their benevolence in spades.
I should add that another of America’s benevolent actions was curing it of its addiction to colonialism (the Falklands war notwithstanding). It took some effort, but eventually even the Belgians and Portuguese caught on.
Should have read:
I should add that another of America’s benevolent actions was curing Europe of its addiction to colonialism (the Falklands war notwithstanding). It took some effort, but eventually even the Belgians and Portuguese caught on.
The Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique were taught their lesson by rebels trained and led by Castro’s Cubans. The Cubans had learned some not necessarily “benevolent” lessons from the United States.
The Portuguese in East Timor were taught their lesson by rebels who learned their tactics and techniques from the Viet Cong. In a spirit of “benevolence” the Viet Cong had just taught a lesson in the perils of neo-colonialism to the United States.
Actually, it was the NVA and their Soviet equipment that ‘united’ Vietnam. If the Viet Cong didn’t know it in 1975, the liberating heros would make them well aware in the months and years that followed.
Btw, if the United States engaged in ‘neo-colonialism’, does that make Japan Germany and South Korea our fiefs? If so, somebody was really sleeping at the switch during Shroeder’s tenure.
Hyperbole aside, this is a good read:
INDOCHINA IN U.S. WARTIME POLICY, 1941-1945
Significant misunderstanding has developed concerning U.S. policy towards Indochina in the decade of World War II and its aftermath. A number of historians have held that anti-colonialism governed U.S. policy and actions up until 1950, when containment of communism supervened. For example, Bernard Fall (e.g. in his 1967 postmortem book, Last Reflections on a War) categorized American policy toward Indochina in six periods: “(1) Anti-Vichy, 1940-1945; (2) Pro-Viet Minh, 1945-1946; (3) Non-involvement, 1946-June 1950; (4) Pro-French, 1950-July 1954; (5) Non-military involvement, 1954-November 1961; (6) Direct and full involvement, 1961- .” Commenting that the first four periods are those “least known even to the specialist,” Fall developed the thesis that President Roosevelt was determined “to eliminate the French from Indochina at all costs,” and had pressured the Allies to establish an international trusteeship to administer Indochina until the nations there were ready to assume full independence. This obdurate anti-colonialism, in Fall’s view, led to cold refusal of American aid for French resistance fighters, and to a policy of promoting Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh as the alternative to restoring the French bonds. But, the argument goes, Roosevelt died, and principle faded; by late 1946, anti-colonialism mutated into neutrality. According to Fall: “Whether this was due to a deliberate policy in Washington or, conversely, to an absence of policy, is not quite clear. . . . The United States, preoccupied in Europe, ceased to be a diplomatic factor in Indochina until the outbreak of the Korean War.” In 1950, anti-communism asserted itself, and in a remarkable volte-face, the United States threw its economic and military resources behind France in its war against the Viet Minh. Other commentators, conversely-prominent among them, the historians of the Viet Minh-have described U.S. policy as consistently condoning and assisting the reimposition of French colonial power in Indochina, with a concomitant disregard for the nationalist aspirations of the Vietnamese.
Neither interpretation squares with the record; the United States was less concerned over Indochina, and less purposeful than either assumes. Ambivalence characterized U.S. policy during World War 11, and was the root of much subsequent misunderstanding. On the one hand, the U.S. repeatedly reassured the French that its colonial possessions would be returned to it after the war. On the other band, the U.S. broadly committed itself in the Atlantic Charter to support national self-determination, and President Roosevelt personally and vehemently advocated independence for Indochina. F.D.R. regarded Indochina as a flagrant example of onerous colonialism which should be turned over to a trusteeship rather than returned to France. The President discussed this proposal with the Allies at the Cairo, Teheran, and Yalta Conferences and received the endorsement of Chiang Kai-shek and Stalin; Prime Minister Churchill demurred. At one point, Fall reports, the President offered General de Gaulle Filipino advisers to help France establish a “more progressive policy in Indochina”–which offer the General received in “Pensive Silence.”
Ultimately, U.S. Policy was governed neither by the principle s of the Atlantic Charter, nor by the President’s anti-colonialism but by the dictates of military strategy and by British intransigence on the colonial issue. The United States, concentrating its forces against Japan, accepted British military primacy in Southeast Asia, and divided Indochina at 16th parallel between the British and the Chinese for the purposes of occupation. . U.S. commanders serving with the British and Chinese, while instructed to avoid ostensible alignment with the French, were permitted to conduct operations in Indochina which did not detract from the campaign against Japan. Consistent with F.D.R.’s guidance, U.S. did provide modest aid to French–and Viet Minh–resistance forces in Vietnam after March, 1945, but refused to provide shipping to move Free French troops there. Pressed by both the British and the French for clarification U.S. intentions regarding the political status of Indochina, F.D.R- maintained that “it is a matter for postwar.”
The President’s trusteeship concept foundered as early as March 1943, when the U.S. discovered that the British, concerned over possible prejudice to Commonwealth policy, proved to be unwilling to join in any declaration on trusteeships, and indeed any statement endorsing national independence which went beyond the Atlantic Charter’s vague “respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.” So sensitive were the British on this point that the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of 1944, at which the blueprint for the postwar international system was negotiated, skirted the colonial issue, and avoided trusteeships altogether. At each key decisional point at which the President could have influenced the course of events toward trusteeship–in relations with the U.K., in casting the United Nations Charter, in instructions to allied commanders–he declined to do so; hence, despite his lip service to trusteeship and anti-colonialism, F.D.R. in fact assigned to Indochina a status correlative to Burma, Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia: free territory to be reconquered and returned to its former owners. Non-intervention by the U.S. on behalf of the Vietnamese was tantamount to acceptance of the French return. On April 3, 1945, with President Roosevelt’s approval, Secretary of State Stettinius issued a statement that, as a result of the Yalta talks, the U.S. would look to trusteeship as a postwar arrangement only for “territories taken from the enemy,” and for “territories as might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship.” By context, and by the Secretary of State’s subsequent interpretation, Indochina fell into the latter category. Trusteeship status for Indochina became, then, a matter for French determination.
Shortly following President Truman’s entry into office, the U.S. assured France that it had never questioned, “even by implication, French sovereignty over Indo-China.” The U.S. policy was to press France for progressive measures in Indochina, but to expect France to decide when its peoples would be ready for independence; “such decisions would preclude the establishment of a trusteeship in Indochina except with the consent of the French Government.” These guidelines, established by June, 1945–before the end of the war—remained fundamental to U.S. policy.
With British cooperation, French military forces were reestablished in South Vietnam in September, 1945. The U.S. expressed dismay at the outbreak of guerrilla warfare which followed, and pointed out that while it had no intention of opposing the reestablishment of French control, “it is not the policy of this government to assist the French to reestablish their control over Indochina by force, and the willingness of the U.S. to see French control reestablished assumes that [the] French claim to have the support of the population in Indochina is borne out by future events.” Through the fall and winter of 1945-1946, the U.S. received a series of requests from Ho Chi Minh for intervention in Vietnam; these were, on the record, unanswered. However, the U.S. steadfastly refused to assist the French military effort, e.g., forbidding American flag vessels to carry troops or war materiel to Vietnam. On March 6, 1946, the French and Ho signed an Accord in which Ho acceded to French reentry into North Vietnam in return for recognition of the DRV as a “Free State,” part of the French Union. As of April 1946, allied occupation of Indochina was officially terminated, and the U.S. acknowledged to France that all of Indochina had reverted to French control. Thereafter, the problems of U.S. policy toward Vietnam were dealt with in the context of the U.S. relationship with France.
– the Pentagon Papers
Well Katz, the Iraq glass is half full or half empty depending on how you want to look at it here http://www.news.com.au/story/0,10117,18395055-2,00.html
Note the mooted timetable for troop withdrawals. Basically we can each glean whatever we like from such reports from time to time.
Personally I wouldn’t want to be explaining to an Iraqi govt minister visiting Melbourne this last week, that Bracksland is not the stabbing capital of the world at present. I guess if 3 blokes can be stabbed, one fatally in a Melb park for no reason, among other such incidents, then we might have to be a little understanding of some some payback killings in Iraq after 3 decades of brutal dictatorship.
Majorajam,
“Actually, it was the NVA and their Soviet equipment that ‘united’ Vietnam.”
This happened after the US found pressing engagements elsewhere.
The main reason why the US became so determined to find pressing engagements elsewhere is that the Viet Cong ensured that Vietnamese “hearts and minds” would not be won with US napalm and agent orange.
“Btw, if the United States engaged in ‘neo-colonialism’, does that make Japan Germany and South Korea our fiefs? If so, somebody was really sleeping at the switch during Shroeder’s tenure.”
Not at all Majorajam. If you have been persuing my comments you will remember that I have opined that the US has mostly been a benign (as opposed to benevolent) influence in the world. Vietnam was the result of a hubristic brain explosion not dissimilar to that which detonated to create the Iraq fiasco. The US simply doesn’t do colonialism or neo-colonialism very well. That is meant as a compliment.
Re Observa’s comments about Melbourne. Yes Melbourne is a shocking lawless violent place. The Red Zone North of the Yarra is hell on earth. Why, just last weekend at a Brunswick Street restaurant I was forced to crack my own yabbies. Where might this sort of insightment to mob violence end?
I’d counsel all godfearing folk to stay away from “Baghdad on the Bay”.
Meanwhile back at the ranch of The Lovers of Marxist Martyrdom Garrison, things are picking up in the cement industry
http://africantears.netfirms.com/thisweek.shtml
Or as they say in occupied Iraq- ‘Always look on the bri……..
Katz,
We can agree that America’s Vietnam was folly, but I will disagree that it constituted colonialism or neo-colonialism. There is neither evidence, nor cause to support that claim. On that, this link is particularly instructive:
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/pent1.html
FDR was particularly ardent in his belief that colonialism was backward. On that count, I am particularly fond of:
FDR represented that part of the American body politic whose thinking was well ahead of Europe’s; the later still mired in nostalgia for colonies and influence. Alas the wisdom/foresight/vision thing is well and truly extinguished in this country now, and the Iraq war is there to attest to it. Indeed, that policy can fairly be described as a supernova of stupendous stupitidity, but you shouldn’t conflate now with then. The Vietnamese conflict will beguile anyone foolish enough to try to wrap it in a neat box.
Speaking of, the Viet Cong had some pretty effective ways to win hearts and minds of their own- notably similar tactics to todays insurgency in Iraq. Even so, the VC were decimated after Tet, and no longer a threat to the South Vietnamese government. Had the Soviets had discontinued military support of the North in the same way as the US cut off the South, things could have come out decidedly different.
I only bring all of this up to support my earlier comment that every country has its own record of shame to answer for.
“I only bring all of this up to support my earlier comment that every country has its own record of shame to answer for.”
You’re absolutely right about this one, especially on Vietnam.
The Australian involvement was cynical in intent, irrelevant in its execution, and explosive in its domestic effects.
Here’s a word of advice for Americans: if some US foreign military adventure requires the Australian flag as a figleaf, and a conservative Australian government lends our flag for that purpose, then this foreign military venture is certain to have been misconceived, maladministered and disastrous in its consequences.
It will have been misconceived because said Australian government will have incited US entanglement as a result of paranoia arising from Australia’s regional insecurities.
It will have been maladministered, because Australians will have talked big “all the way with LBJ” but not actually turned up in any numbers to do any fighting. Clark Clifford complained about Australians in 1968. Until then (too late for LBJ) the conservative government of Australia got away with their con-job.
It wil have been catastrophic in consequence because the US will have discovered that they were fighting the latest manifestation of black/brown/yellow johnnies that comprise the bogey man for the Australian conservative mind.
Not a bad take on the nature of the problems faced in ‘a place like many others’ here Katz
http://fallbackbelmont.blogspot.com/
“I will disagree that it [Vietnam] constituted colonialism or neo-colonialism.”
Yes, Kurtz’s “The horror! The horror!” embodies some of the protean singularity of the V-Word in the American psyche.
But at some stages when “The Brightest and the Best” did think that they were Masters of the Universe they did behave uncannily like colonialists or neo-colonialists.
Item: The career of Ngo Dinh Diem, taken from a New Jersey seminary, by a set of curious chances, elevated to President by American fiat and then terminated with extreme prejudice while the Kennedy Administration pretended to look the other way. You don’t get much more colonialist than that.
This was the Original Sin that tainted everything that the US subsequently did in South Vietnam. It was a colonialist sin.
Majorajam, I don’t think you read what I wrote. Did I say that all European actions were benevolent? No, I merely pointed out that there was scarcely a single benevolent US action to be found that it had not also stopped Europeans from doing. You might want to read up how “sunk cost” works, too, before you criticise the Europeans – by and large (unlike the USA) they didn’t create the situations that they found themselves in. The French form something of an exception.
This, by the way, is part of the colonialism you so reflexively condemn. It was by thwarting the upsides of that that the USA did so much to create today’s mess.
AR, there is a great deal of difference between facts changing and people changing in response to that (“tempora mutantur et nos mutamur in illis“) and deliberately creating new facts and crystallising things out by asking questions until the answer comes right, then stopping. Hawaii is a case of the latter rigging, and the fact that it cannot be reversed without doing further harm does not make it right. On the other hand, the experiences of our own ancestors in becoming what they became, losing their own pasts, was often tragic but rarely wicked.
P.M.Lawrence,
This is an interesting take. I don’t remember how the man behind the curtain got 20 some odd million Chinese addicted to opium, but it certainly worked out for the British landlords in East India- talk about benevolence! And it is peculiar how not feeding women and children in concentration camps can have a negative effect on their health. Around 30,000 of those Boers, I think it was, just up and expired. Go figure.
A shame really about circumstances outside of one’s control. They can be a real hazard to those who happen to reside outside of Europe.
Certainly Diem was a tragically incompetent stooge, but it was only for the amazing unanimity with which he was despised in South Vietnam that the US looked the other way as everyone turned against him, (as aptly demonstrated by the comical episode wherein his palace was bombed by his own air force).
My question to you is, what makes any of that ‘colonial’? Does it imply the US was looking to annex South Vietnam, or to draw up special policies for its own enrichment? No, it’s simply not evidence of that- these instances are not at all inconsistent with a nation fighting a proxy war against communism (something that seemed a lot less foolish then it seems today, and for good reason). The US wanted a functioning South Vietnamese state that was not communist and firmly so. Outside of that, the only important characteristic was that its leader be popular and increase the stability of that government (i.e. increase that governement’s effectiveness as a bulwark against communism). Diem, was none of that and the US finally realized the futility of propping him up.
This does not mean that they didn’t approach their Vietnamese misadventure with arrogance, or immoral indifference, or negligence, but none of that makes it a colonial enterprise.
Majorajam,
I’m beginning to suspect that you want to put words into my mouth.
“My question to you is, what makes any of that ‘colonial’? Does it imply the US was looking to annex South Vietnam, or to draw up special policies for its own enrichment?”
There are many different types of colony. The extractive colony is just one of them. The US had little economic use for Vietnam.
I never asserted that the US wished to annex South Vietnam. Such a notion is preposterous, as it is in the case of Iraq.
The British had effective political control of large parts of India long before it was formalised. The British wanted local authority structures to survive because it made the cost of administration less expensive.
Some colonies are created not for direct enrichment but for strategic reasons. The Falkland Islands are a good example of such a colony. The US had strategic motives in Vietnam. They were foolish and misconceived. Nevertheless, Vietnam did fit into a larger geopolitical pattern, when viewed from Washington. (Interestingly, the Soviet Union sealed its support for the Vietnamese communists by building their biggest naval base at Cam Ranh Bay. This was all part of the big geostrategic game.)
One definition of a colony is a polity which does not have sovereignty. The sorry case of Diem siscussed above demonstrated to the Vietnamese and to the world that South Vietnam had no sovereignty.
The problem with the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations was that they used old-fashioned imperialist methods in Vietnam simply as a reflex. The Vietnamese, including Ho Chi Minh, had expected better of the Americans. The Vietnamese have very long memories. Even though the Americans tried to mend their ways after the Diem fiasco, they had lost credibility amongst much of the political nation of Vietnam.
Thus even though the Americans distanced themselves from European colonialism, ironically American minds had been sell and truly colonised by European notions of cultural and racial superiority. And yes, that’s another form of colonialism.
More to the final point above:
General Westmoreland opined in 1969: “Human life is cheap to the Asian. They don’t feel the same way about death that we do.”
It’s one thing to think this.
It’s another thing to speak it in private.
What cultural blinders inspire the Commanding General of an occupying army to look into a camera and then say it?
Mahommed Ali spoke for non-whites everywhere when he said:
“No Viet Cong ever called me Nigger.”
They needed little persuading that the official US vision of the world, as expressed in their actions in Vietnam, was deeply flawed and deeply racist.
Katz,
Feel free to ascribe any meaning to the word colonialism that you feel befits this argument, but you’re going to have to do better than
because neither the Germans nor the Japanese had any sovereignty post WWII and they are not evidence of American colonialism. Er- maybe I should qualify that- they were not colonies according to most known definitions. This is not to say that San Francisco’s Grandma Milly does not feel superior to the Japanese woman on the corner of 34th and Vicente who prefers to populate her flower garden with mud growing flora.
As for Diem, the US needed to prop up a government in the wake of the French retreat and, being supportive of the French against the communist rebellion made that rather difficult. It neither helped that they chose a soft headed diabolically incompetent man for the job, but that goes toward the folly of the enterprise in the first place. How it was conducted in the main, but also the calculation of when to accept defeat. In any case Diem’s assassination was a homegrown affair. Lastly, a question. Does this:
mean Vietnam was a colony of the USSR?
Katz,
This:
is not a cogent argument. Muhammad Ali did not want to fight in Vietnam because he did not feel blacks were equal citizens to whites in America, and that they should not feel compelled to fight for the establishment. I respect that point of view, I just didn’t realize we were talking about racism. Which gets me to the part about the argument’s incongruence, namely, what does white racism (hardly unique to the US) have to do with Cold War snafus or, I hesitate to ask, colonialism?
PS before you start to answer that last question with a diatribe about Conrad, my question above pertains specifically to how does the existence of racism in white America further your arguement that America’s involvment in Vietnam had colonialist motives?
Err, Majorajam,
1. “I should qualify that- they [Japan and Germany] were not colonies according to most known definitions.”
Yes they were, if only temporarily. Their sovereignty was in the hands of the Occupying Powers. This is vouchsafed by international law.
And additionally, when can it be said that India was part of the Biritsh Empire? By your argument India’s colonial status didn’t pertain until formal annexation in the 1850s.
This will come as something of a shock to a billion Indians:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_india
2. I don’t know what arrangement existed between the Soviet Union and the Government of Vietnam in regard to Cam Ranh Bay. Perhaps they were leased on the same basis as the US lease on Guantanamo Bay. The US claims sovereignty, if only temporary, over Guantanamo Bay.
3. “what does white racism (hardly unique to the US) have to do with Cold War snafus or, I hesitate to ask, colonialism?”
I raised racism because it is one of the element that helps explain US decision-making over Vietnam in the 1950s and early 1960s. Racism is often reflexive, even unconscious. Racism justifies colonialism, even “benevolent” colonialism of the type recommended to Americans by Rudyard Kipling when he urged them to “take up the white man’s burden” in the Philippines. Muhammed Ali, I would suggest identified and nailed that tacit white assumption when he made his famous and potent statement. It wasn’t only heard in the US. It was heard, possibly louder, around the world.
Our posts crossed.
A diatribe of any kind, least of all about Conrad, was the furtherest from my mind. That is is already in your mind may indicate something, if only to you.
To clarify further:
I’ve never said anything about American colonialist MOTIVES in Vietnam. What colonialism there was revolved around METHODS. The irony and tragedy of Vietnam revolved around the central fact that there was a major mismatch between motives and methods.
American colonialist methods triggered very unfavourable responses from broad groups of Vietnamese. (Remember that they had experienced different forms of colonialism for some time.) Absurdly, the Americans treated Vietnamese as if they had no history at all, but were rather a tabula rasa for their “benevolent” intentions.
Go back to Warren G. Harding’s inaugural address for a blatant example of Americans’ mental map of the world:
1. “Old World”: Europe, too much history, don’t get involved.
2. Western Hemisphere: Ours! Everyone else keep out!
3. The Rest: European colonies, primitive, awaiting the enlightened American contact.
Katz,
I wrote
you quoted me as writing
Now, that’s a pretty prodigious misinterpretation. We’ll chalk it up to speed reading. In the meantime, I’m still awaiting some semblance of an explanation regarding your contention that American involvement in Vietnam was an exercise in colonialism.
“I should qualify that- they [Japan and Germany] were not colonies according to most known definitions
“Now, that’s a pretty prodigious misinterpretation.”
What are you talking about? This is a direct cut and past from your post to which I have added a couple of clarificatory words.
You can disown these words, but you can’t unsay them.
Katz,
Your tangent
irked me so I went and looked it up. Having gone through the trouble I can’t help but wonder if all this is an elaborate effort to waste my time. If so, it’s working. Here are some outrageous excerpts from that blatant mental map:
and,
and finally,
Darn we is backward.