I spend a lot of time these days thinking about what I, and Australia as a nation, should do if the US ceases to be a democracy. But, it doesn’t seem as if lots of other people are thinking this way. One possibility is that people just don’t want to think about it. Another, though, is that I’ve overestimated the probability of this outcome.

To check on this, I set up a flowchart using a free online program called drawio. Here;s what I came up with

I hope it’s self-explanatory. The bold numbers next to the boxes are the probability of reaching that box. The numbers next to arrows coming out of decision nodes (diamonds) are the probability of that decision.

I also apologize in advance if there are any arithmetic errors – my degree in pure mathematics doesn’t insulate me against them.

If the US were remotely normal, every entry on the left-hand edge ought to be equal to 1. Harris should be a sure winner, Trump shouldn’t find any supporters for a coup, the MAGA Republicans in Congress should be unelectable and the moderate program proposed by Harris should be successful enough that Trumpism would be defeated forever.

But that’s not the case. There are two end points in which US democracy survives, with a total probability (excessively precise) of 0.46, and one where it ends, with a probability of 0.54. By replacing my probabilities at the decision nodes with your own, you can come up with your own numbers. Or you may feel that I’ve missed crucial pathways. I’d be interested in comments on either line.

Note: Any Thälmann-style comments (such as “After Trump, us” or “Dems are social fascists anyway”) will be blocked and deleted.

Via Peter Hartcher in the Nine papers, I learned the other day that Albanese snubbed President Prabowo of Indonesia to meet King Charles.

The immediate decision before the Albanese government was how to deal with two important heads of state asking for attention at almost exactly the same time. The prime minister had a long-standing invitation to the inauguration of the new president of Indonesia in Jakarta on Sunday, and a request for a visit by the British monarch to begin on the same weekend.

This ought to be have been a no-brainer. As PM of Australia, Albanese should have been able to set the dates for a visit from Charles in his capacity as King of Australia. And, as Hartcher points out, he could have fitted in both engagements with a flying visit to Jakarta. Instead, he sent Richard Marles.

Here’s where Hartcher’s piece gets interesting. He makes the point that, thanks to AUKUS, our relationship with the UK has gone from being a sentimental relic to a central strategic commitment. As Hartcher mentions, this brings to mind the longstanding struggle over whether Australia is really an Asian nation, a claim firmly denied by Malaysian PM Mahathir Mohammed. He doesn’t mention, though it would have amplified his point, the view expressed by George W. Bush and John Howard, that Australia should act as a US “deputy sheriff” in the region.

Hartcher ends optimistically, saying that since Prabowo (in his previous capacity as Defence Minister) signed a defence agreement with Marles, the attendance of the latter at a major ceremonial event would not be a problem.

So Australia finds itself in the fortunate position of being able to draw on both its history and its geography, forming intensified strategic arrangements with both Britain and Indonesia, simultaneously. Not torn in two directions, but strengthened by each.

This strikes me as massively over-optimistic. The governments of ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, have generally been negative about AUKUS, and popular feeling is almost certainly more hostile still. Ostentatious preference for our former Imperial overlords over our neighbours in the region is unlikely to be helpful.

Perhaps none of this would matter if AUKUS had a clear strategic rationale, with demonstrable benefits for the region as a whole. But for Morrison, it was much more a matter of loyalty to the Anglosphere than of any coherent analysis. Now that Albanese has followed suit, as part of what Hartcher describes as a “remedial post-Voice effort to persuade the electorate that he does, in fact, identify with the Australian mainstream”, the racial overtones of this exercise are undeniable.

AUKUS was bound to be an economic disaster. It looks likely to become a diplomatic and strategic disaster as well.

We’re in another round of concern about the “death of the book”, and, in particular, the claimed inability or unwillingness of young people to read full-length books. I’m not going to push too far on the argument that this complaint is ancient, but I can’t resist mentioning the response of my younger brother, who, when asked if he wanted a book for Christmas, answered “thanks, but I already have one”). That was around 50 years ago, and he went on to a very successful legal career.

Fifty years ago, the main competitors for books were TV and radio. Critics at the time decried the passive mode of consuming these broadcast media, compared to the active engagement required by reading. Now, in many respects, the complaint is the opposite. The various services available on the Internet are interactive, and engrossing, finely tuned to keep our attention.

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Over the eight decades following the end of World War II, the US has taken part in dozens of land wars, large and small. The outcomes have ranged from comprehensive victory to humiliating defeat, but all have received extensive coverage. By contrast, the US Navy’s admission of defeat in its longest and most significant campaign in many decades, has received almost no attention. Yet the failure of attempts to reopen the Suez Canal to shipping has fundamental implications for the entire rationale of maintaining a navy.

Operation Prosperity Guardian was launched in December 2023, following a series of attacks on shipping undertaken by Houthi rebels. The US dispatched a carrier strike group, led by USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, and supported by ships from the Royal Navy and other European forces. Despite intensive bombardment of Houthi positions, attacks on shipping continued and traffic through the Suez canal fell by 70 per cent.

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In July, the Dwight D. Eisenhower quietly returned to returned to Norfolk, after what the Navy correctly described as “a historic nine-month combat deployment” but not historic in a good way. The strike force without achieving any of its goals. And then, in late August, came the official admission of  defeat As reported by Voice of America:

Vice Admiral George Wikoff, who heads the U.S. naval efforts in the Middle East said that not only have U.S. strikes and defensive efforts done little to change the Houthis’ behavior, it now appears unlikely the group will be swayed by military force.

“The solution is not going to come at the end of a weapon system,” Wikoff told an audience in Washington, speaking via video from U.S. 5th Fleet headquarters in Bahrain.

“We have certainly degraded their capability. There’s no doubt about that. We’ve degraded their ability,” he said. “However, have we stopped them? No.”

Why has this failure attracted so little attention? Why, for example, has it not even been mentioned by either side in the course of the Presidential election campaign? The answer, quite simply, is that the strategic rationale for the mission turned out to be spurious. “Vital shipping lanes” are not actually vital at all.

The closure of the Suez canal has, indeed imposed higher insurance costs on shippers using the canal, and has led much of the traffic to be diverted to the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope. But the overall impact on freight rates has been modest, and any effect on global economic activity has been too small to be observable. 

There shouldn’t have been any surprise here. Despite some hyperbolic claims at the time, the six-day blockage of the Canal in 2019 (due to the grounding of the Ever Given) caused only modest disruptions, with massive insurance claims being quietly settled for much smaller amounts

More notably, the Canal was closed for lengthy periods in the 20th century allowing studies of the economic impacts. These turned out to be very small except for India and Pakistan, both of which were then heavily dependent on trade with the UK and Europe.

And what is true of the Suez Canal is just as true of other “vital shipping routes”, such as the Straits of Malacca. It’s almost always better to take the long way around (for example through the Sunda straits or even through Australian waters in the Southern Ocean) than to fight a war to keep a short cut open.

On the other side of the coin, the failure of Russian attempts to block Ukraine’s exports of wheat and grain provides further lessons on the limits of naval power. Ukraine’s tiny navy was wiped out on the first day of the 2022 invasion. But Russia’s much-touted Black Sea Fleet has fared little better, being driven from its Sevastopol base to ports in Russia, out of reach of Ukrainian missiles. By sailing close to the western coast of the Black Sea, ships carrying Ukrainian grain can be protected by land-based defences, while sailing in waters too shallow to permit attack by submarines.

In summary, as a recent commentary put it, the failure of Prosperity Guardian poses an “existential threat” However, the threat is not to the world economy but to the US navy and, indeed, all the navies of the world. If keeping “vital trade routes” open is neither militarily feasible nor economically important,  a large part of the rationale for surface navies disappears.  

It’s unlikely that defeat by the Houthis will have much effect on perceptions of the US Navy in the short run. But with so many other demands on the defense budget, the rationale for maintaining a massive, but largely ineffectual, surface fleet, must eventually be questioned.

• I haven’t discussed the broader horror of the various Middle East wars, which gave rise to the Houthi attacks. My long-standing view is that the US can do nothing useful and, beyond humanitarian aid, should do nothing to help any party. Please don’t derail discussion by talking about this.

I’ve been consistently critical of the Labor party since Anthony Albanese became leader after Labor’s narrow but unexpected loss in 2019. It’s always easy to fall prey to confirmation bias in this kind of thing, making much of the bad and ignoring the good. To check my beliefs, I’m taking a widely circulated list of Labor’s claimed achievements, and giving my own responses. This is by no means a complete list of the governments achievements, and of course it doesn’t mention failures, but I’m confining myself to the list for now. Readers can judge whether I’m being fair.

Claims are in bold, my responses in italic

*Establishing National anti-corruption Commission

No significant prosecutions yet, decision not to pursue robodebt

*Cheaper child care

Genuine, but partially eroded by fee increases 

*Pay rise for aged care workers

A special case, amid real wage reductions for most workers

*Tripling the bulk billing incentive

Not sufficient to prevent a decline in bulk billing

*Single parent payment extended to age 14 (57,000 single carers will receive an extra $176.90 p/n)

Good. Reversal of change made by Howard and accelerated under Gillard

*$500 electricity rebate for all concession card holders

A once-off handout

*Savings on PBS subsidised meds

$12.50 per script Small but worthwhile

*60 Day dispensing halving the cost of medications

Overstated, but still worthwhile 

*Paid domestic violence carers leave

 Up to 10 days, small but worthwhile 

*Increase to Jobseeker and Rent Assistance (biggest increase to rent assistance in three decades)

Jobseeker increase of $20 above indexation (Morrison gave $50 increase). Still way below poverty line.  Rent assistance just kept pace with rising rents

*Cybersecurity developments

No idea what this is

*The Housing Australia Future Fund

A half-baked idea, still to produce any actual houses. Greens pressure drove much stronger action.

*Robodebt Royal Commission

No consequences for those responsible, no systemic reforms 

*180,000 fee free TAFE places

Good. Probably the most significant expenditure initiative of this government

*NDIS sustainability

These are cuts. Arguably necessary but misleadingly described 

*Largest increase ever for cancer nurses

Small but worthwhile

*Review into Australia’s visa system

If there is one thing this government does, it’s review

*Reopening trade to China

Overstated – China’s sanctions were largely symbolic and never affected our major export, iron ore

* Triple incentives for GPs

Repeated from above – not enough to stop decline in bulk billing

*58 Urgent Care Clinics

Worthwhile but small, and far too little to fix problems in emergency wards

* Fairer conditions for workers

Working conditions one of the positives for this government, but real wages have fallen

* Fixing a one-sided tax change

More hide than Jessie the Elephant. The one-sided tax change was their own election commitment, matching the LNP. Even after the fix, most middle income earners paid higher taxes than when the government was elected because of the scrapping of LMITO

* Two Surpluses (Two more than the LNP)

Who cares

* Aged care reforms

Marginal tweaks

* Halving of the inflation rate since coming into office.

If Labor wants credit for this, should be blamed for increase in unemployment rate and reduction in real wages