As part of my critique of pro-natalism, I’m looking at the philosophical foundations of the idea. Most of the explicit discussion takes place within the framework of consequentialism (the idea that the best actions or policies are those with the best consequences) and particularly of utilitarianism, broadly defined to say that the best consequences are those which maximise some aggregate function of individual happiness or wellbeing. Other philosophical traditions either avoid the issue explicitly (for example Rawls’ theory of justice) or offer little that can illuminate debate over population numbers (virtue ethics, contractarian theories).
Looking at the utilitarian analysis immediately creates a puzzle. All the early utilitarians, from Jeremy Bentham to John Stuart Mill supported population limitation. They accepted Malthus’ claim that, in the absence of limitation, population growth would inevitably reduce the great majority of people to subsistence. But unlike Malthus, who used this argument to say that attempts to make the poor better off were futile (he rejected birth control as “vice”) the early utilitarians accepted the desirability of limiting family size.
Most notable among this group was Francis Place. Taking significant legal risks in the repressive climate of the time, Place sought to spread information about contraceptive methods in pamphlets such as Illustrations and Proofs of the Principle of Population(1822).
Importantly, and in contrast to many 20th century Malthusians, Place rejected coercive measures, placing his trust in families to make prudent decisions given access to information and the methods of family planning. Except for his failure (unsurprising at the time) to consider possible conflict within households, Place’s position stands up very well 200 years later.
The classical utilitarians argued for public policies which promoted the welfare of the community to which they applied, on the basis of “each to count for one, and none for more than one”. This contrasted sharply with alternative guides like “national greatness” or “God’s laws”. And, while no philosophical debate is ever resolved, this way of thinking about policy choices (particularly economic policy choices) has remained dominant, or at least influential, down to the present day.
By contrast, contemporary utilitarian philosophy yields bizarre spectacles like “longtermism” which implies that our primary goal should be to produce as many descendants as possible provided that the result is an increase in aggregate utility.
This is far from the only problem with contemporary utilitarian philosophy. It’s commonly presented as a theory of individual ethics, saying that our actions ought to be those which promote the maximal happiness of everyone affected, giving ourselves the same weight as everyone else. Apart from being impossibly demanding, this prescription seems perfectly designed to produce absurd counterexamples (trolley problems, organ kidnapping etc)
The task of tracing where and when a tradition of thought has gone off the rails is usually complex and ambiguous. But in this case, the answer is amazingly clear. in 1874, one year after the death of JS Mill (the last of the classic utilitarians), Cambridge philosopher Henry Sidgwick published The Methods of Ethics, which became the standard interpretation of utilitarianism, at least in the philosophical literature
In the space of a few pages, Sidgwick introduced all three of the errors I have criticised above,
First, (Book IV 1.1) he states, “By Utilitarianism is here meant the ethical theory, that the conduct which, under any given circumstances, is objectively right, is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into account all whose happiness is affected by the conduct. ”
Second 1.2 “on Utilitarian principles, population ought to be encouraged to increase, is not that at which average happiness is the greatest possible,—as appears to be often assumed by political economists of the school of Malthus—but that at which the product formed by multiplying the number of persons living into the amount of average happiness reaches its maximum.”
Sidgwick asserts these points, but doesn’t really argue for them . Rather, his style of presentation is tight and rigorous, at least by the standards of 19th century philosophy and his tone is authoritative. The result is that even among philosophical critics, most notably GE Moore, his version of utilitarianism became established as the norm.
Superficially, it might seem that modern social welfare theory has taken Sidgwick’s approach and given it a mathematical formalism. The standard workhorse of this model, the social welfare function, is an aggregate of individual welfare measures, with properties that ensure that the higher the value of the function the better the outcome. But this function is invariably applied in ways that reject Sidgwick’s errors. First, it is used to evaluate public policy, typically in the context of models that do not assume individuals act as disinterest utilitarian ethicists. Second, it is applied to specific fixed populations. Where comparisons are made between populations, they are almost invariably presented in average rather than aggregate terms.
There are plenty of arguments to be made against the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill. But the starting point for such arguments ought to be a complete rejection of Sidgwick’s errors.
John Quiggin 
Well, Mr Quiggin, it has been many years perhaps a decade since I last commented here, but this article compelled me to do so.
This piece is a valuable clarification of why utilitarian reasoning works best when bounded by institutional and moral constraints. The discussion of Sidgwick helps explain why attempts to extend maximisation logic into population ethics and long-term aggregation so often generate conclusions that feel detached from the purposes moral reasoning is meant to serve.
I was genuinely surprised by the tragic realism you explore here, and I have to say that I largely agree which is something I have rarely found myself saying in the past (:
Andre S
This is me being lazy and quoting Google AI’s answer. The answer seems reasonable in a number of respects. Later, I will try not being lazy in this matter (and not being depressed and nihilistic in all matters to do with the future of the human race) and say something from my own views, if I can motivate myself and form views in this arena at short notice… quite a big “if”.
Quote:
“The best, or most significant, critique of Henry Sidgwick’s interpretation of Bentham’s and Mill’s utilitarianism argues that Sidgwick fundamentally transformed classical utilitarianism from a theory of public policy and legislative reform into a demanding, individualistic, and “esoteric” ethical theory.
While Sidgwick is often seen as the most rigorous systematizer of utilitarianism, modern critics, such as those associated with the ANU school of philosophy, argue that he misinterpreted the foundation of the theory by ignoring the practical, rules-based, and anti-elitist nature of Bentham and Mill, replacing it with a “Government House” approach.
Here are the key aspects of this critique:
Sidgwick claimed Bentham suffered from a contradiction (the “double aspect”) between believing that humans are naturally selfish (psychological hedonism) and yet should act to promote general happiness (ethical hedonism). The Critique: Critics argue that Sidgwick misrepresented Bentham. Bentham did not see this as a contradiction, but rather believed that the role of legislation and sanctions was to align private interests with the general good, a structural approach rather than a personal duty of absolute self-sacrifice.
Sidgwick explicitly stated that while utilitarianism might be true, it might be best if the general public did not believe it. He suggested an “esoteric morality” where the true principles are known only to a cultivated elite, who manage the lower classes with “subordinate” moral rules. The Critique: This elitist interpretation is strongly contrasted with Mill’s (and certainly Bentham’s) hope for a society where individuals understand and act on utility for themselves. Critics like Bernard Williams branded this “Government House Utilitarianism”.
Mill focused heavily on “secondary principles” (rules of justice, honesty) because they are the distilled wisdom of human experience regarding what maximizes happiness. The Critique: Critics suggest that Sidgwick, in trying to formalize utilitarianism as a purely mathematical calculation of total aggregate happiness, missed the practical, rule-of-thumb nature of Mill’s approach, which makes utilitarianism a more liveable theory.
Sidgwick pushed for maximizing total happiness, which, combined with his view that population growth is desirable if it increases the total happiness (even if average happiness drops), leads to what is now known as the “repugnant conclusion”. The Critique: Critics argue that this interpretation is a departure from the more modest goal of Bentham, which was primarily to minimize pain and secure basic welfare, and that it makes the theory impossibly demanding for individuals.
Summary of the Best Critiques
John Quiggin/Crooked Timber: Argues that utilitarianism "went wrong with Sidgwick" by converting it from a collective policy tool into an individualistic, demanding ethos. Bart Schultz: Highlights that Sidgwick turned utilitarianism into a more conservative, elitist theory compared to the radical, reforming bent of Bentham and Mill. Philip Schofield: Argues that Sidgwick misrepresented Bentham's views on the "double aspect" of motivation and the ability of a sovereign to align interests.In conclusion, the best critique is that Sidgwick’s interpretation refined the theory mathematically but destroyed it practically, making it cold, elitist, and unnecessarily demanding.” – Google AI answer.
I have no idea if the above is a good answer, nor if there are any outright errors in it.
An interesting answer, Ikon, but what question did you ask?
J.Q.,
Yes, apologies, as I said I got lazy and that includes me not posting my question, which I usually do. It was basically this:
“What is the best critique of Henry Sidgwick’s interpretation of Bentham’s and Mill’s utilitarianism?”
I hoped that question would elicit a decent answer that would precis the issues for me. I thought that if the answer was more or less accurate (and it sort of seemed reasonable to me) then others might find it interesting. But I have not bothered to check its veracity or quality as an answer.
There are certainly historical levels to the debate that I was not aware of. But then I know so little on this topic that that is no surprise.
I could drag out my old 2nd hand bookshop-sourced and treasured volume of “English philosophers from Bacon to Mill” – Burtt, Modern Library (mainly treasured for Bacon, Berkeley and Hume). I could read the over 200 pages of Bentham and Hume which I have not read yet. But these days I wonder, “What’s the point?”. I could enjoy the language and arguments and start forming my own opinions on these issues but still what’s the point?
As Marx wrote, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it”. I’ve almost lost all hope that good ideas change the world for the better. They will be ignored, distorted or corrupted. However, bad ideas no matter how crazy thrive like endless weeds. The spurge, cobbler’s pegs and fishbone fern I currently battle with (without poisons) are relatively easy to deal with compared to lunatic, malicious and malevolent ideas.
But perhaps I have become too despondent.
The old adage is “One year’s seeding makes seven years’ weeding.” I think Chauncey Gardiner of “Being There” would approve of thinking like this. To apply it to our current situation, we would have to say that 50 years of bad ideas seeding will probably necessitate 350 years of weeding to weed those bad ideas back out. I think that may turn out to be true, if homo sapiens lasts that long. However collapse without extinction could put the blowtorch to the bad ideas: not that I approve of torch weeding.
Noah Smith has a new screed on fertility decline, interested in any comment by you…
Ikon – thanks. Of course, I agree that my critique is best :-). I’ll look up Schulz and Schofield.
MitchellPorter I used to engage pretty closely with Noah, but mostly don’t these days. My subscription to his substack just expired
I find myself quite bemused by the absurd moral panic over falling fertility rates and the imminent “demographic cliff” we are supposed to falling over. I come from the generation that was told overpopulation was going to be a serious problem. When I see current scientific information on planetary boundaries, climate change dangers and population overshoot as per limits to growth analysis and ecological footprint analysis, I can only conclude that the warnings about over-population, resource depletion and waste sink capacities were correct and the situation is becoming ever more critical and even approaching the catastrophic.
So why the moral panic about the converse problem? Why is the “demographic cliff crisis being drummed up and trumpeted abroad?” I can only think that this moral panic is being used as misdirection and to maintain or even advance endless-growth-as-usual and neoliberal-business-as-usual agendas. Plus of course some online influencers will make up or get behind any crank theory for clicks and monetisation. I suspect there’s a fair bit of that too. Then there’s tech-bro hero-worship along with imitation and ingratiation.
Human fertility may indeed be approaching a possible zone of concern zone but from the physiological direction. There is significant evidence of an emerging, physiologically driven fertility crisis. There’s a whole bunch of stuff going on. Try this question on a few AIs (the better ones). “Is there is significant evidence of an emerging, physiologically driven fertility crisis?” Follow up with further research using your standard methods if you wish.
However, the usual proponents of democratic cliff theories tend not to mention these issues. Their main reason seems to be that they do not want to countenance the conclusion that neoliberal, billionaire invested, endless-growth-as-usual and neoliberal-business-as-usual practices (like the indiscriminate manufacture and sale of plastics and danerous chemicals (like endocrine disruptors and carcinogens) might need to be heavily regulated and curtailed. Oh no, (sarcasm alert) instead the problem is wholly social change influenced and we simply haven’t found the right way to nudge or pay people to have more kids.
Also, the usual proponents of democratic cliff theories do not mention, so far as I can see, inequality, poverty, housing (un)affordability pressures, general economic pressures, difficulty of household formation and so on as issues which dissuade women from having the required 2.1 to 2.3 kids (on average) for replacement. We can mention too the loss of hope and optimism as we all see the increasingly frightening effects of climate change, mass extinctions and other crossed planetary boundaries. Who wants to bring a kid into this world? A segment of the young, educated population with choices now does not want to do so.
I would say this. Take care of the people and reproduction will take care of itself. Take care of the people means spend properly on health, welfare, education and housing. Stuff like that. It means creating a society where equality for everyone and everyone having a stake in society are the guiding and actuating values. Basic stuff like that. It also means taking care of the environment.
I will say it again in bold:
Take care of the people and reproduction will take care of itself.
The arguments for pro-growth nativism are laughable when they are examined in the clear light of data and evidence. I am amazed that Brad de Long and Noah Smith who are not stupid people have fallen for it.
One of the arguments of the nativists is that improvements in life expectancy are bad because this creates a population with an older age profile which is obviously bad as old people are a burden. And then sometimes they say as a reductio ad absurdum argument that reducing mortality to zero so we live forever, would be unsustainable, as the population would spiral upwards to absurdly high levels.
But they neglect to mention that an ever increasing population if mortality rates drop to zero, only occurs if the fertility rate is above 1. If the fertility rate is 1, which is close to fertility rate levels currently in a number of Asian countries, then the population increases but then stabilises at a level of twice the starting population. The population grows according to an infinite series of 1 +1/2 +1/4 +1/8 ………..
So the final conclusion is that those countries with a fertility rate of 1 are adjusting their fertility to the levels necessary for the wonderful future when we shall all live forever!
I don’t know why my name doesn’t show when I make a comment, but the wondrouslybrave comment is from me. John Goss