More losers than winners

The British people have spoken (or at least voted) and I don’t imagine too many members of the political class are happy with the results. The Labour government got back in, but with less than 40 per cent of the popular vote and a lot more vigour among opponents than supporters, it’s not a great result. In particular, given the weakness of the Opposition, the result is a pretty clear rejection of Tony Blair and his approach to politics.

For the Tories, the outcome is even worse. They only got 33 per cent of the vote, against a combined 60 per cent for Labour and the Lib Dems, parties which have broadly similar centre-left views. Barring a cataclysmic change in the electoral landscape, there’s no serious prospect that they can win in five years time.

The Lib Dems did better than most expected, but still failed to break out of third party status, even with the Iraq issue going for them. Their best hope is that Labour’s position will weaken to the point where they are forced into democratic reform of the electoral system, either PR or preferential voting.
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Some good news

The arrest by Pakistan of Abu Faraj al-Libbi is the first significant piece of good news we’ve had for a while in the struggle against Al Qaeda. Suspicious soul that I am, I checked on the possibility that his importance was being overstated, but there are plenty of sources (presumably predating his capture, since they go back to 2004), describing him as the Al Qaeda 3rd in command.

As the European struggle with terrorist groups in the 1970s and 1980s showed, terrorists can be beaten. Despite the fact that most of the policies our own leaders have pursued in the last few years have been either bothced (the failure to pursue bin Laden properly in Afghanistan) or actively counterproductive (Iraq), Al Qaeda is still losing ground on most fronts.

The only serious danger is that AQ will get its hands on nuclear weapons, and the most likely sources of such weapons are Pakistan and North Korea . The kid-glove treatment that’s been given to the Musharraf government is understandable in the light of this threat, and the network of jihadist sympathisers inside the Pakistani military and intelligence systems. On the other hand, dealings with North Korea have been botched horribly. Still, I think the odds are in our favour on this.

Short-changing Iraq

While I was thinking about Iraq, I ran across this Washington Post story headlined Power Grid In Iraq Far From Fixed and with the front-page lead-in “After two years and $1.2 billion, U.S. effort to resuscitate electrical system is wide of its mark”.

Given the $1.2 billion figure, there’s no need to read the rest of the article. The electricity grid here in South-East Queensland (pop 2.5 million as against Iraq’s 20 million) experienced some blackouts last year, and the distributor, Energex is planning to spend over $A3 billion (about US$2.4 billion) over the next five years to fix the problems[1]. That’s to upgrade a network which has suffered from some underinvestment, but nothing remotely comparable to the two wars and decade of sanctions Iraq has had to deal with. Put simply, $1.2 billion is chickenfeed, and could not be expected to do more than prevent further deterioration.

And electricity grids need generation as well as distribution. $US 1.2 billion spent here in Australia would buy one decent sized power station, say 1500 Megawatts generating capacity. That’s not even enough to replace the capacity that was wrecked, neglected to the point of collapse or comprehensively looted for parts during the war and its aftermath. And of course, construction in a war zone is many times dearer than in Australia.

In this piece, written shortly after the war, I concluded

If there is to be a reasonable chance of establishing a stable democratic government, it will be necessary to spend at least $US25 billion and probably $US50 billion. Australia’s share would probably be at least $A1 billion. This is a large sum of money, but Bush, Blair and Howard had no trouble finding the same amount to fight the war. Regardless of whether individual Australians supported or opposed the war, we are stuck with the obligations we have collectively assumed.

In fact, as far as I can tell, the amount of money that has actually been spent on reconstruction so far is around $5 billion, and the amount left over from the US appropriation of $18 billion, after overheads and diversions to security is between $5 billion and $10 billion. The World Bak Trust Fund, set up in 2003 with pledges of around $10 billion, mostly from Japan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, currently contains about $300 million.

fn1. Disclosure and disclaimer: I’m on the board of the Queensland Competition Authority which regulates Energex. I’m not expressing any opinions about Energex, apart from the generally accepted point that there was underinvestment in the past. I’m just using it as an example with which I’m familiar.
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MayDay again

Another year, another May Day, reminding me that I still haven’t got round to my long-planned posts on the erosion of workers’ rights under the present (and for that matter the preceding) government.

In the short term, though, the most important historical fact about May 1 is that it’s the anniversary of Bush’s “Mission Accomplished” speech on Iraq in 2003. When I wrote about this anniversary last year, I observed

the anniversary of Bush declaration of victory looks as good a time as any to date what seems increasingly certain to be a defeat [at least for the policies that have been pursued for the last year] … The Administration seems to be inching towards the position I’ve been advocating for some time – dumping the policies of Bremer and Chalabi (though not, unfortunately Bremer and Chalabi themselves), and handing over real military power to Iraqis. If the interim (still inchoate) government has substantial real power, manages to hold early elections and can get enough support to permit a rapid US withdrawal, the outcome might not be too bad. But there’s very little time left, and this scenario assumes exceptionally skilful management of the situation from now on.

How do things look a year later? Bremer is gone, thankfully, and I doubt that there’s anyone left who would suggest that the Coalition Provisional Administration he ran was anything better than a set of incompetent bunglers who achieved less than nothing[1]. Chalabi, by contrast, seems to be the eternal survivor, . The Americans dumped him after all, but he promptly switched sides and has popped up as some sort of Deputy Prime Minister in the new Iraqi government and looks set to get the lucrative oil ministry he’s been after for so long..
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Beazley on Gallipoli

I was just getting vaguely reconciled to the idea of Beazley as Labor leader when he came out with the following claim in a speech at the Lowy Institute (PDF):

We cannot understand the decisions of 1914, and we cannot understand Gallipoli, if we do not understand that Australia had compelling direct and distinctly Australian reasons for being there, he argued. Australia recognised that Britain would become increasingly less able and willing to guarantee Australia’s future security. So it was in Australian interests to become an active participant in imperial security, to ensure British power was not eclipsed.

This is wrong in just about every way a historical claim can be wrong
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Darfur again

Via Jeff Weintraub, I got this link from Harry’s Place on possible actions that can be taken to pressure the Sudanese government into calling off the continuing campaign of terror in Darfur. Things have improved somewhat under international pressure, but a lot more needs to be done. A good source of up-to-date information is Passion of the Present

Having opposed the war in Iraq, I should perhaps explain why I support intervention in Sudan. There are two aspects to the issue. The first is simple costs and benefits. A few tens of millions of dollars and some modest military force could save thousands of lives in Darfur. By contrast, the war in Iraq has cost tens of thousands of lives (quite possible more than 100 000) and hundreds of billions of dollars, for prospective benefits that have not yet been delivered.

Second, I think it’s necessary to strike a balance between the extreme claims for national sovereignty, defended, for obvious reasons by the Chinese Communists, and the US doctrine, backed by Howard and endorsed in blood by Putin, that any sufficiently powerful government should be able to do what it likes in response to perceived threats. Where a government engages in war against its own citizens, the international community should be willing to step in, starting with sanctions and going on to safe areas protected by no-fly signs and peacekeepers with rules of engagement that allow them to defend themselves and refugees against any attack. If this leads to the downfall of the government, as it did with Milosevic in Serbia, so much the better. The step of overthrowing a government, even a brutal and dictatorial one, and imposing rule by an occupying army is one fraught with danger, which should be an absolute last resort.

The opportunity cost of war

Among the responses to this post on the costs and benefits of the Iraq war, quite a few commenters doubted that it was reasonable to express the opportunity cost of war in terms of the alternative of an allocation to foreign aid.

This NY Times editorial refers to the fact that the main EU nations have finally made a serious commitment to increase overseas development aid to 0.7 per cent of GDP, a target that’s been around for a long time, but never reached. The US currently gives about 0.2 per cent, and an increase to 0.7 per cent would cost around $50 billion per year, which is pretty close to the annual cost of the Iraq war effort. It’s the one major country that’s holding out against making any sort of commitment.

Of course, it might be said that Americans, unlike the citizens of other developed countries, are prepared to pay to kill people, but not to help them, so the opportunity cost calculation is still irrelevant. Apart from being closely akin to the slur that Arabs are incapable of handling democracy, this runs up against the problem that many Americans support the view that the US government should give large amounts of foreign aid, well in excess of 0.7 per cent of GDP. The problem is that they imagine that the government is actually doing this on a still more lavish scale. On average, Americans think that 24 per cent of US government expenditure is allocated to foreign aid – the true figure is 1 per cent.

A more plausible objection is that it’s possible to do both. The UK was part of the Iraq war (though its contribution, in relative terms was much smaller than that of the US) and it has committed itself to meet the 0.7 per cent goal. To this my response is, let the US make a substantial commitment on aid first, and then it will be time to recalculate the opportunity costs of war.

UpdateHere’s a US criticism of aid in general

Preferential voting for Britain ?

I was thinking about Chris Bertram’s post on tactical voting at CT and I was struck by the thought: Why hasn’t Labour introduced preferential (single transferable) voting in Britain? Readers will probably be struck by the alternative question, Why should Labour introduce preferential (single transferable) voting in Britain?

My first is that this would be an improvement in democracy, both for individual constituencies and for the country as a whole. Although no voting system is perfect, preferential voting is much more likely to produce an outcome that reflects the views of the majority of voters than is first-past-the-post.

I don’t suppose that an argument like this will cut much ice with the Blair government (or most incumbent governments), so let me move to the second point. Labour would almost certainly benefit from this shift, at the expense of the Tories. It seems pretty clear that Labour would get the bulk of LDP preferences, as well as those of the Greens and minor left parties. The Tories would pick up preferences from UKIP (but this group looks like a flash in the pan) and the far-right (but this is a small group, and there are disadvantages attached to such preferences, especially if, say, the BNP demands preferences in return).

It’s true of course that the biggest benefits would go to the Liberal Democrats, since their supporters would not have to worry about ‘wasted votes’. But even here, there’s a hidden benefit for Labour. Sooner or later, there will be a hung Parliament, and the price of LDP support will be full-scale proportional representation. If Labour introduced preferential voting without being forced to, it would not only cement LDP support but would greatly weaken the case for PR.

The remaining objection is that of additional complexity. This can be overcome, in large measure by adopting the optional preferential system, where voters can indicate as many or as few preferences as they choose.