Home > Philosophy, World Events > War and its consequences (cross-posted at CT)

War and its consequences (cross-posted at CT)

July 18th, 2005

Chris Bertram’s recent post on responsibility got me started on what I plan to be the final instalment of my attempts to analyse the ethical justification for war. Comments much appreciated.

In thinking about justifications for war, I haven’t found just war theory to be of much use. The checklist it requires seems to leave too much room for interpretation to really settle anything.

Instead, I’m going to start, but not finish, with consequentialism. On a strictly consequentialist view, actions (including decisions to go to, or persist with, war) are morally neutral; it’s consequences that matter.

As I’ve argued previously, a serious consequentialist analysis suggests that war usually has more bad consequences than good. In particular, anyone who takes consequentialism seriously must reckon with the fact that war is a negative sum game. This means either that at least one side in a war has miscalculated or that the costs of war are being borne by people who don’t have a say in the matter. In addition, it’s necessary to take account of rule-based concerns about the effect of decisions to go to war in particular cases weakening generally desirable rules to the contrary.

My main concern though, is to look at positions that diverge from consequentialism, either by justifying war even when its net consequences are (reasonably expected to be) bad or by opposing war even when its net consequences are (reasonably expected to be) good. I think the first position can reasonably be called “pro-war” and the second “anti-war”.

The pro-war arguments typically amount to claiming that some of the bad consequences of war “don’t count”. An extreme version is the position of Norm Geras that those who initiate a just war aren’t responsible for the consequences of the (by hypothesis) unjust resistance of the other side. Chris has responded to this, and I said much the same here.

Not many supporters of war push things this far, but a large proportion seek some sort of let-out clause, allowing them to ignore at least some bad consequences of war, while claiming most or all if the good ones . The most common let-out is to ignore the casualties suffered by the opposing side, even though most of those killed or wounded would not, as individuals, deserve this fate. This is a common feature of pro-war analyses but it is morally indefensible.

In the case of the Iraq war, the Coalition and its militia allies have fought at least four different (overlapping) groups of opponents: the Iraqi army during the invasion; Sunni nationalist and ex-Baathist insurgents in the subsequent continuing resistance; jihadists led or symbolised by Zarqawi; and Sadrist militia in the two outbreaks of fighting last years. Of these, the Sadrists and what’s left of the army are now part of the Iraqi government, and presumably some sort of settlement will be reached with the Sunni nationalists in due course. Those who survived the war are (or will be) regarded as being citizens with human rights. But those who were killed will still be dead. Using war as a means of pursuing policy goals entails moral responsibility for all the deaths that result, not merely those of civilians or innocent bystanders.

A second common feature of pro-war analysis is a failure to take account of the opportunity cost of the resources used in war. The $300 billion used in the Iraq war would have been enough to finance several years of the Millennium Development project aimed at ending extreme poverty in the world, and could have saved millions of lives. But even assuming this is politically unrealistic, the money could surely have been spent on improved health care, road safety and so on in the US itself. At a typical marginal cost of $5 million per live saved, 60 000 American lives could have been saved. This is morally relevant, but is commonly ignored.

In summary, a lot of pro-war argument may be characterised as consequentialism+special pleading.

Turning to the anti-war side of the argument, the standard criticisms of consequentialism are nowhere stronger than in relation to war. Any decision to go to war, or to persist with war when peace is available, involves a collective decisions to kill and injure innocent people, to destroy their homes and livelihoods and to require our soldiers to obey orders to do such things or face military punishment. On any account of morality that takes individual rights and moral responsibility seriously, such a decision should require more than a mere expectation, based on balance of probabilities, that the net consequences of the decision will be good.

These rights-based considerations are less of a problem in the case of a purely defensive war, since we are morally entitled to defend our own rights. In addition, since willingness to fight defensive wars discourages aggression, it gains support from a rule-consequentialist viewpoint. But this only strengthens the case against wars of choice, where the other side can plausibly present their fight (at least to the soldiers and civilians who are expected to bear the costs) as one of self-defence against an outside aggressor.

Based on all this, I conclude that a war of choice aimed at overthrowing a dictatorial government or taking control of another country. should face a very high burden of justification. Examples include imminent threat of attack, intervention to stop current large-scale killings or or (and this is the case that ought to be treated most stringently) interventions where it is beyond reasonable doubt that the dictatorship can be overthrown, and a democratic alternative put in place, with minimal loss of life.

Once the decision is undertaken, it is morally obligatory to commit sufficient military and financial resources to make success as certain as anything can be in an inherently uncertain world, and to ensure an approach in which civilian deaths and injuries are minimised in the same way as they would be if the people involved were citizens of the country doing the attacking.

There are some wars that would meet these criteria and instances where decisions not to intervene were morally wrong (for example, Rwanda) but they are far outweighed, in the historical record, by morally unjustified wars.

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  1. abb1
    July 20th, 2005 at 22:40 | #1

    Hmm… Bush’s neocons definitely are messianic maniacs who definitely won’t stop till democracy and capitalism flourish everywhere on earth, so, if we are to assume that the opposite side are maniacs too, I don’t see how scalar or even vector functions can be of any help at all.

    My only hope is that neocons’ opponents have a perfectly rational desire to kick Western neo-colonialists out of their countries and be done with it. That’s, actually, what they’ve been saying all this time.

  2. July 20th, 2005 at 22:52 | #2

    John, my impression is that you arrive at a set of criteria, similair to a just war theory. Consequentialism seems to imply such common principles as universality and proportionality. Your advocacy for justifiability of defensive wars might be seen as similar to the Koran.

  3. Katz
    July 21st, 2005 at 08:35 | #3

    “Bush’s neocons definitely are messianic maniacs who definitely won’t stop till democracy and capitalism flourish everywhere on earth…”

    That’s what Bush’s maniacs would like to do.

    However, they will stop in just over two years when neither the Democrats nor the Republicans will want to be associated in any way with the messianism that characterises the politics, both foreign and domestic, of the Bush clique.

    The American electorate will punish severely any would-be national leader rash enough to utter the words “shock and awe”.

    This failure to produce a sustainable national consensus was highly predictable, about as close as I am willing to assert as inevitable.

    Howard probably heard this advice from his own Office of National Assessments, but has chosen to ignore it, thereby shackling Australia to Bush’s foreign policy adventurism, with unpredictable but probably seriously negative consequences.

    Howard’s own political life-cycle possibly had something to do with this choice to associate closely with the foreign policy of the Bush clique. He wins a couple of khaki elections and then retires with accolades before the pigeons come home to roost. (Menzies achieved something of the same apparent success with regard to Vietnam. However, Menzies lived long enough to rue his decision to involve Australia, calling the Vietnam fiasco “a very sad example of a war.”

  4. July 21st, 2005 at 10:30 | #4

    Katz

    This moment in history has resonances that have been twisted and decontextualised, largely by US neocons and their quislings elsewhere in the world.

    A quisling is someone who is treasonous to the national interest of his country, whether or not the beneficiary of her collaboration is a “traditional� enemy. Thus, Howard’s collaboration with the Bush clique is a result of a complex and mendacious calculation, with the ability to play wedge domestic politics looming large. The consequences of these calculations are against the Australian national interest.

    Katz is an idiot. I mean this in the literal etymological sense of one whose is consumed with the private ie idiosyncratic. He is forcing his own meanings on words, ala Alice in Wonderland, in order to pursue an ideological agenda. I also mean this is in the more colloquial sense, in that Katz is a stupid person.

    The dictionary definition of quisling is a native of a country who “helps the enemy army that has taken control of his or her country”. ie collaborates with an occupying enemy power. This self-evidently refutes Katz suggestion that a quisling need not be assisting an (occupying) “traditional enemy”.

    From this point of view it is possible to understand how Suunis (whether Baathists or Wahhabists) would see any Suuni or Shiite co-operating with the US military as a quislings. To most supporters of the Open Society it would seem that the January election results give basic legitimacy to the Iraqi government, although this fact seems to have escaped Katz’s notice.

    But Katz is arguing that Howard is a “quisling” because, allegedly, Howard’s support to US imperialists in their military ventures is based on “wedge political” considerations that is “treasonous” against some purported construction of the “national interest”. There, in a nuts hell, is a perfect distillation of the paranoid fantasies of the Idiot Left.

    Still, its worth recording the empirical evidence on Katz’s thesis. Howard”s support for the US’s Iraq attack probably cost him support amongst his Coalition base (“doctors wives”) and did not carve off much support from swingers or the Opposition’s base. The Morgan poll taken just before the Iraq war reported

    While just over half of Australians (56%) are in favour of military action if sanctioned by the United Nations, only 12% support unilateral action by the United States and its allies, and over a quarter (27%) are not in favour of military action under any circumstances.
    Across the Australian electorate there is a marked difference between electors. L-NP Coalition supporters are more supportive of Australia’s involvement in any military action against Iraq (63% with UN involvement, 20% unilaterally) than ALP supporters (60% with UN involvement, 9% unilaterally),

    This proves that Iraq-attack, to the extent that it was political, was consolidating the Coalition’s Base rather than trying to hive off support from the Opposition. So much for the illusive wedge.

    Most of the nation is strongly supportive of the ANZUS alliance, which would seem to make it in the national interest to support our US allies in time of war. The SMH reports the Australian Strategic Policy Institute survey

    finds support for the ANZUS treaty holding up well, with 84 per cent of voters believing it important.

    Howard has won four elections on the trot, with voters mostly giving him top marks for his performance on national security issues. A Newspoll survey showed that:

    on the subject of national security Labor again could hardly muster support, with just 21 per cent of the population behind it compared to the Coalition’s 57 per cent.

    There is no evidence that the ADF’s Iraq-attack has harmed our national interest. But there is evidence that it has helped. It was an insurance premium to the ANZUS alliance in a time of heightened security threat:

    Australia’s alliance with the US would have weakened “very substantially” if the Government refused to go to war against Iraq, the Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, said yesterday.

    “It wasn’t a time in our history to have a great and historic breach with the United States,” Mr Downer said yesterday. “If we were to walk away from the American alliance it would leave us as a country very vulnerable and very open, particularly given the environment we have with terrorism in South-East Asia, the North Korean issue.”.

    Of course Katz would probably be unaware of the fact that Howard won some crucial national security kudos and assets for AUS by commttting the ADF to this venture, most notably a the installation of a US base up North. This which will assist the ADF in controlling borders and deterring threats.

    Australia has not, as yet, suffered any adverse blow-back from Iraq-attack. But we have suffered some violent blowback from elements within the INDON state, as evinced by the Bali bombers and the SIEV-X sinkers. Does Katz think that Howard is “treasonous” because he consolidated the US alliance in the INTERFET expedition? Howard’s support for the US’s Iraq-attack was also payback for the US’s support of AUS in our regime change of ETIMOR. We could not have done it without the USMC:

    The Australian military couldn’t have pulled off the 1999 peacekeeping mission in East Timor without the United States, according to a recent report by an Australian military think tank.

    Howard is not a quisling. But Katz is an idiot.

  5. Katz
    July 21st, 2005 at 11:07 | #5

    Jack,

    “The fall of the USSR was a complex multi-factored event.”

    Yes, this has to be the start point for any intelligent discussion.

    The problem lies in:

    1. the ranking of the many factors

    2. identification of these factors as necessary or sufficient causes.

    “I do not think that the West’s “softâ€? cultural power was decisive”

    I take this to mean that you don’t believe “soft power” to have been the sufficient cause for the collapse of Communist control of the Soviet Union.
    (I acknowledge that “soft power” is a concept so broad that it almost defies precise definition).

    .

    On the other hand, you mention Economic Systems as “the critical” cause. You describe the disadvantage under which Soviet economic policy laboured: “relative industrial efficiency and innovativeness of capitalism versus socialism.” Again, I agree with your description of the definitive distinction between the two systems.

    However, I would dispute your ascription of this as “the critical” cause for the collapse of Communist government in the Soviet Union.

    Consider this: it cannot be argued that the economic systems of all countries around the world can be ranked according to their efficiency. Moreover, it is observable that many national economies have languished for a long time towards the bottom of this table without producing a serious political crisis, let alone the collapse of the regime.

    So the question is what causes the relative stability of some nations which score consistently quite low on the rank of economic efficiency? The answer is: something other than economics.

    I agree with your observation that an advanced economy is a necessary precondition for an effective military, including an effective counter to civil disruption. And I agree that the Soviet Army didn’t have the full range of weaponry available to it to “do the job”.

    But this state of affairs in itself doesn’t explain why the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union never made any determined effort to attempt to save the Communist Government.

    The pages of history are full of stories of armies that followed orders to put down uprisings. Many of those suppressions were successful: Russia 1905, China 1989, Peterloo, Burma, the list goes on. Some of these suppressions were unsuccessful: Russia 1917 (March), the Bastille 1789, the British in Boston in the 1770s. But in all these cases the armed forces turned out to do the job. In the Soviet Union in 1991 the armed forces never turned up, except as a token presence.

    There are two broad possible explanations for this unusual behaviour of the Soviet Armed forces. And I acknowledge that they are not mutually contradictory.

    1. Soviet Generals, having been ordered to defend the regime, did a careful analysis of their capabilities and decided that they were incapable logistically of doing the job.

    2. There was a crisis in the legitimacy of the project of saving the regime. This may have taken several forms:

    a. the Politburo decided that their regime was worth protecting and therefore issued no orders to protect it.

    b. the Generals, having received orders from the Politburo, decided that the regime wasn’t worth protecting and therefore decided to disobey orders.

    c. subordinate ranks, having received orders from loyal Generals to protect the regime, decided to disobey orders.

    In short, for whatever complexity of reasons, the Soviet Armed Forces decided not to turn up.

    This, it seems to me has less to do with capabilities and more to do with will and with loyalties, all of which are dependent on attitudes to the legitimacy of the Soviet regime.

    And further, it is likely that this gnawing sense of illegitimacy infected people at every level of authority in the Soviet Union.

    And one component of this perception of illegitimacy is the sense that thing could be much better than they were, a consciousness stimulated by increasing exposure to the allure of the West, especially its very seductive “soft power”.

  6. Katz
    July 21st, 2005 at 11:31 | #6

    Memo to Jack:

    My first refence to quislings in this thread didn’t mention Howard at all.

    Razor jumped to the conclusion that I was refering to Howard and jumped on to his high moral horse.

    If folks are determined to get angry,and froth at the mouth, why not improve the show with a bit of provocation?

    I’ve enjoyed the results so far immensely.

  7. e sciaroni
    July 21st, 2005 at 12:23 | #7

    The Soviet government lost the trust of many of their citizens after the Chernobyl Incident. I really think that this caused a paradigm shift in the USSR.

  8. July 21st, 2005 at 13:56 | #8

    Justification of war? There is no such thing like this. I rather call it “having a good excuse”. People like Mr. Bush using it all the time.

    Do not waste your time thinking about it or you will get in enourmous trouble with yourself.

  9. Andrew Reynolds
    July 21st, 2005 at 15:36 | #9

    Katz,
    I think what happened with the Soviet armed forces was that they were not ordered to do anything – for this reason alone Gorbachev deserves the thanks of his former people. If Stalin or Lenin had been in charge you would have seen the tanks on the streets, weapons discharging into the people, as you did in Tiananmen.
    The Soviet armed forces would not act without orders and a plan – they had neither.

  10. Katz
    July 21st, 2005 at 15:47 | #10

    AR,

    Gorby certainly did spike the cannon of the Soviet military. I think my point 2a above addressed your comment.

    The interesting thing as that no Kornilov-style regime loyalist took it upon himself to attempt to do what Gorby refused to do.

  11. July 21st, 2005 at 17:51 | #11

    anon — fine, go dispose dictators. Just don’t do it with my tax money, you socialist.

  12. July 21st, 2005 at 22:04 | #12

    Katz Says: July 21st, 2005 at 11:31 am

    My first refence to quislings in this thread didn’t mention Howard at all.

    Razor jumped to the conclusion that I was refering to Howard and jumped on to his high moral horse.

    No. Katz is being misleading and deceptive. Razor was reasonable to jump to conclusions, given the implications that Katz was making.

    Katz July 20th, 2005 at 10:23 am first mentioned quislings in the context of criticizing the Bush neo-cons and their foreign collaborators (“quislings”):

    This moment in history has resonances that have been twisted and decontextualised, largely by US neocons and their quislings elsewhere in the world.

    It is true that Katz did not specifically mention Howard as a quisling in this comment. But it is disingenuous of Katz to wiggle away from his implications. This statement can only be interpreted as a castigation of the leaders of states that Katz has execrated for signing onto the Coalition of the Willing. These states currently collaborate with the Bush regime by hosting US military installations used to prosecute the war in Iraq (including democraticly elected governments in Afghanistan and Iraq). They are certainly locked into neo-con strategic plans for Mesopotamia, whatever they are:
    Katz July 20th, 2005 at 6:36 pm then offers a more general definition of quisling which certainly fits into his immediate characterisation of Howard. His uses the term “collaborator” in both lexicographical-general and Howard-specific instances.

    A quisling is someone who is treasonous to the national interest of his country, whether or not the beneficiary of her collaboration is a “traditional� enemy. Thus, Howard’s collaboration with the Bush clique is a result of a complex and mendacious calculation, with the ability to play wedge domestic politics looming large. The consequences of these calculations are against the Australian national interest.

    Katz’s argument can be reduced to a syllogism and conclusively refuted.
    The major (theoretical) premise is that quislings are those natives who collaborate with alien powers against the national interest.
    The minor (empirical) premise is that Howard is a (native) collaborator with the (alien) Bush regime in a war which is against AUS’s national interest.
    The inescapable conclusion is that Howard is a quisling.
    But my argument showed that the Howard-hating quisling implication that Katz’s is propagating is root-and-branch false and scurrilous.

    I must say that I “immensely enjoy” making mincemeat of Katz’s puerile arguments.

  13. July 21st, 2005 at 23:10 | #13

    KatzSays: July 21st, 2005 at 11:07 am

    it cannot be argued that the economic systems of all countries around the world can be ranked according to their efficiency. Moreover, it is observable that many national economies have languished for a long time towards the bottom of this table without producing a serious political crisis, let alone the collapse of the regime. So the question is what causes the relative stability of some nations which score consistently quite low on the rank of economic efficiency? The answer is: something other than economics.

    This is correct, which is why I stated that the causes of the Soviet collapse were essentially multi-factorial. The collapse of the USSR cannot be attributed to purely domestic economic causes, there was an inescapable political factor: the legitimacy of Bolshevik rule was called into question by the very constitution of the communist state and its position relative to other capitalist states.

    The legitimacy of the Bolshevik party rule, and the integrity of the Soviet state, was based on their claim to represent and further a nominal popular interest. But this claim was not regularly validated by effective popular consent. When the gap between the nominal aims of the Soviet state and its effective outcomes became to great the state suffered a “legitimation crisis” and the one-party state collapsed.

    The interesting problem is identifying the nominal popular interest that the one-party state purported to serve. Most analysts take the Soviet ideology (classless socialist society) at face value and point to the disparity between principled ideology and practical reality as being a cause of the political breakdown.

    But it has been decades since anyone in Soviet society took the socialist ideology seriously. And it was clear that, absent popular consent, the Soviets had to find some other basis for their rule.

    The Bolshevik’s claim to political power over the Soviet Union, and the USSR’s claim to political power over Slavic Eurasia, was based on the Party’s purported ability to increase national economic productivity and translate that into an improved global military security. This claim was enhanced by Stalin’s performance in industrialzing the Societ economy and militarizing the Soviet polity.

    But the Stalinist industrial-martial success, overlooking its appalling human cost, was ephemeral. It is not in dispute that the Soviet Union started to experience secular economic stagnation from the time of Brehznev onwards. Its state-socialized (heavy-industrial goods) planned economy failed to make the transition to a human-capitalized (post-industrial service) market economy.

    This was bad national politico-economics since both Party, State and People were keen on more and better consumer goods and service for their own satisfaction. Most Soviet bloc people were aware that the First World was streaming ahead of the Second World in standard of living.

    It was also bad global politico-economics since the Party’s central claim to legitimacy since the collapse of Lenin’s regime had been its ability to protect and defend the Socialist Motherland (“Rodina”). This claim had been validated by its defeat of the Nazi Wermacht and its parity with the US Pentagon.

    The Soviet Union’s strategic military advantage started to slip in the sixties, as evinced by its drop out from the Space Race and its eagerness to enter into Arms Control agreements. At that time the Red Army was still competitive in conventional weaponry.

    But by the late seventies even that advantage was slipping. And here Reagan deserves some credit for putting the blow-torch on the Soviets military-industrial complex by upping the Arms Race ante.

    RR did this by upgrading the US’s strategic and conventional military power to the extent that the USSR could not catch up. He established IRBM’s in Europe which blocked Brezhev’s attempt at Soviet regional strategic hegemony over NATO. And he escalated the Pentagon’s conventional weaponry, which was proven superior to the Red Army’s arsenal in ME field tests. The Red Army’s inglorious campaign against the US-backed mujhadeen in Afghanistan only rubbed in how far it had fallen from its heights as victor over the Wermacht.

    Once the USSR’s martial route to global power was blocked the new leaders of the Soviet state (Gorby) focused on improving the state’s performance on national politico-economic issues: efficient productivity (perestroika) and populist legitimacy (glasnost). But perestroika failed whilst glasnost succeeded.

    The Red Army generals were discredited by their strategic and conventional military failure. This explains why”no Kornilov-style regime loyalist took it upon himself to attempt to do what Gorby refused to do”. Thus the USSR collapsed because it could not translate “firm” industrial power into “hard” martial power – which was the proximate basis for the political legitimacy of the Communist party. Whatever “soft” cultural power advantages the USSR had over the US – the moral appeal of proleterian abstinence had over capitalist indulgence – had disappeared decades before.

    The apparat and nomenklatura no reason to throw good money after bad. They therefore concentrated on getting their hands on the state’s assets rather than improving the performance of those assets. Since a mafiosi had grown up under Stalin as the organizers of a black economy this proved to be a natural evolution. The Soviet elite were happy enough to lose the Cold War so long as they could join the winning side of the Class War. If you cant beat ‘em, join ‘em.

  14. the commenter formerly known as anon
    July 21st, 2005 at 23:34 | #14

    John Humphries, I’ll raise my own militia to overthrow dictators if you raise your own to defend yourself when they invade.

  15. Katz
    July 22nd, 2005 at 09:10 | #15

    Further memo to Jack,

    This is how you characterized my attitude to the provisional government of Iraq.

    “To most supporters of the Open Society it would seem that the January election results give basic legitimacy to the Iraqi government, although this fact seems to have escaped Katz’s notice.”

    This is what I said on this very blog site on 7 December 2004. As you can see, my characterisation of the Shia majority is anything but that of a quisling regime. And I have no resaon to change this assessment. (In fact, I’m rather proud of my perspicacity):

    [Katz 7 Dec 2004]

    “But I doubt that Juan Cole’s reserved seat solution would work. The US administration would likely stack the deck with Sunni secularists who have minimal credibility in the Sunni community. Worse, the Shia majority, now powerfully united behind Sistani on a single ticket, would likely reject any efforts by this group to prevent Islamicisation of the administration of Iraq. It would be a signal for Sistani to do what he has refused to do so far: unleash the enormous power of Shia militancy.

    “The kicker is that once the Shia have taken control of the administration after the January 2005 elections they will be in a position to utterly dismantle US arrangements to derail popular sovereignty.”

    Jack, given your much boasted diligence in finding evidence to support your positions, it is surprising you missed this one.

    After all, Jack you did find a very juicy quote from Alexander Downer that endorses Howard’s foreign policy. I guess Downer’s pronouncements have to be the definitive word on that issue.

    Disingenuous? Moi??

  16. Katz
    July 22nd, 2005 at 10:06 | #16

    “Whatever “softâ€? cultural power advantages the USSR had over the US – the moral appeal of proleterian abstinence had over capitalist indulgence – had disappeared decades before.”

    Almost, Jack. But you underestimate the potency of perception. And you are slightly anachronistic.

    The idea of the “New Soviet Man” did have some potency during the Stalin era as a legitimation of Soviet social and economic arrangements, especially in justifying a spartan lifestyle.

    However, Khrushchev offered Soviet citizens a new bargain — comparable material lifestyles vis a vis the West. For a while, Soviet citizens could convince themselves that they were catching up. (Mostly smoke and mirrors, but there were some genuine advances.)

    By the 1970s, it was impossible to shield Soviet citizens from the gathering evidence of the likelihood that they would never catch up. Moreover, rock music, the sexual revolution, the women’s rights movement, and a multitude of other evidence of the cultural dynamism and fascinating allure of the West persuaded Russians that they were living blighted, boring lives, and offered Soviet citizens the hope and possibility that overthrowing the Communist regime might enable Russia to become like the West.

    This attitude affected all levels of Soviet society. Indeed, even the KGB troops who were ordered to assist in the August 1991 coup outright refused to obey the orders of their superior officers.

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