Paul Kelly in the Weekend Oz, is a must-read, both for the points on which he’s right and for those on which he’s wrong. Kelly presents a strong case that we should focus on our own region, rather than alienating potential allies in the war on terror by joining a US attack on Iraq (although he doesn’t clarify this, the point is much stronger in the case of a unilateral attack by the US and a handful of allies than in the case of an operation with broad international backing.
But when he comes to Indonesia, Kelly illustrates everything that’s wrong with the Australian debate on this topic. He says:

Unless Australia changes its cultural outlook towards Indonesia, it will fail this security challenge. As a nation we can no longer afford the insidious delusions that have been incorporated into our national mind-set ? that it was morally wrong to deal with a military autocracy; that East Timor’s liberation was a triumph of our values; that a weak Indonesia was less important to Australia; and that those Australians who sought to bridge the divide were either appeasers or betrayers of Australia’s own honour.

Does Kelly really think that our dealings with Suharto were both moral and sensible or that it’s a ‘delusion’ to say that East Timor’s liberation was a triumph of our values?
The problem is that Kelly’s uncritical support for friendly relations with ‘Indonesia’ (that is, whoever happens to be in power in Indonesia) is mirrored by the unalloyed hostility to all things Indonesian of those whose views were formed by the struggle over Timor. The most influential example is Scott Burchill, who refer to Indonesia as the Javanese empire.
While Suharto was in power, the appeasement policy advocated by Kelly and pursued with sickening fulsomeness by Keating was unchallenged within the establishment. The East Timor episode and the complete failure of the ties we had so carefully cultivated with the likes of General Wiranto and the Kopassus security forces discredited the Keating-Kelly policy and swung influence to the anti-Indonesians.
This shift in the debate combined with very poor policy on the part of the Howard government on a number of fronts (general disdain for Asia, the ‘deputy sheriff’ fiasco and the bullying chauvinism of ‘border protection’ and the ‘Pacific solution’) have produced the paradoxical outcome that, having followed a policy of sycophantic support for the dictator Suharto, we have had steadily worse relations with his successors, even as they have become steadily more representative of the Indonesian people.
The Howard government has done an excellent short-term job in the wake of the Bali bombings. But we will be paying the price for the mistakes (and worse) of the past for a long time to come. I don’t know how we are going to fix these problems, but generous aid to the Balinese could scarcely hurt.

Update Another lengthy and erudite comments thread clarifies the central role of Java and the Javanese (not the same thing) in Indonesia’s state and society. Nearly all posters are agreed on the failure of the Keating-Kelly policy, but there is a lot of disagreement over what should replace it. And there’s plenty of criticism for past and present governments of all political colours.
And if the prospect of comments many times as long as the original (lengthy by blog standards) post deters you, there’s a string of other great posts just waiting for comments. So jump in!

Further updateRoss Gittins, who is sensible here as usually, argues that “Good relations with Indonesia are vital”. This does not mean ‘kowtowing”. As Gittins points out, our problem is the opposite – Howard and others playing to the Australian gallery by ostentatiously not kowtowing.