A closer look at the text of the U.S. resolution on Iraq raises a number of points, some qualifying my previous arguments and some strengthening them. The first two substantive clauses say that the UNSC:

1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq’s failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991);

2. Decides, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the council;

While I’m no international lawyer, the plain meaning of these words is that Iraq has ‘a final opportunity to comply’. If this doesn’t wipe out the argument that the US maintains a right to intervene on the basis of previous resolutions even if Iraq disarms, it weakens it to the point where the US would be better advised to rely on some unrelated casus belli , such as the alleged Prague connection.

Clause 3 states:

the government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programs to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, etc. etc.

This seems to be crucial. As I understand the matter, the US will not be in a position to launch an invasion within 30 days. Hence, if Iraq fails to deliver a declaration within the timeframe, or delivers one that is obviously bogus, there seems little doubt that the UNSC will declare it in breach and something like a repeat of Gulf War I will ensue.

On the other hand, the declaration, once submitted, is a timebomb for Saddam. As soon as the inspectors find something that isn’t on the list, he’s in breach and, as far as I can see, can’t rectify it.

On past form, Saddam typically cheats in the short run, assuming he can back down later if the going gets tough. With the setup in the UN resolution, such a strategy would be fatal. So I think the odds of Saddam being found non-compliant are higher than I’ve previously argued.

Does this constitute a hair-trigger under which the US could invade without waiting to see what the UNSC says? I doubt it. The biggest single difficulty is that putative allies like Qatar and Kuwait are unlikely to want to set themselves up as invasion bases before a decision to invade has been made. Even if all other steps are in place, the process of putting an invasion army in place will take considerably longer than the time the UNSC will take to debate the issue. Hence, I remain of the view that this resolution lengthens the odds against a unilateral US invasion.