A lot of reports are suggesting that Britain and the US will propose the kind of UN resolution I’ve been advocating (and, on my optimistic days, predicting) for some time. The Economist says:

Along with Britain, America is working on its own version of a second resolution. Instead of asking for a clear mandate to topple Saddam by force, this could set a series of last-minute tests for the Iraqi regime—such as the immediate dismantling of missiles which, the inspectors say, have a range greater than that allowed under UN rules. If Iraq failed to pass these final tests, America would argue that Saddam had well and truly blown his last chance.

The game-theoretic analysis I’ve been proposing suggests that Saddam will in fact destroy the missiles. If he refuses, the missiles will be destroyed in the first five minutes of the war and he will probably be killed not too long after that. Working back, it follows that the supporters of inspection at the UNSC will agree to the resolution. Given that inspections backed by the threat of force will then be shown to be working, war will go on the backburner, probably until after the Northern summer.

This good news, but it raises a puzzle. If the analysis above is right, why would the US Administration put up such a resolution?

One reason would be that they sincerely want peace and disarmament. No comment.

Another is that they hope to include some demand which Saddam either won’t or can’t meet. In this context, the removal of conditions on U2 flights has been mooted. Given that U2 flights are already happening under the same conditions as in the pre-98 inspection regime, an attempt to change the terms now doesn’t seem like a goer.

A more plausible possibility is a demand for more unchaperoned interviews, but it seems unlikely on recent evidence that this is going to prove an ultimate sticking point. A requirement for documented evidence on the ‘missing’ weapons seems more critical, but is much more subjective. Some documents have already been produced, but aren’t adequate according to Blix. It seems unlikely that a demand of this kind will produce either an outright rejection or clear noncompliance in the short term (‘weeks rather than months’ in the words of the current cliche).

A third possibility is that we are seeing another misjudgement of Saddam’s responses. The US has clearly been surprised by Saddam’s willingness to back down, first on readmitting inspectors, then on inspections of Presidential palaces, then on interviews and U2 flights.

Having made disarmament the central basis of a casus belli, the US is finding that there is little alternative to seeing it through. In practice this means presenting Saddam with a series of clearly specified demands until either:
(a) he refuses the demands
(b) a substantial quantity of undeclared weapons is discovered
(c) the inspectors reach the conclusion that Iraq really has disarmed

Perhaps this process will be slow. But, it would surely be better for the US to wait a few months and have either a ‘smoking gun’ or clear Iraqi defiance of the UNSC than to rush to war on the basis of a subjective judgement about non-cooperation that is rejected by most UNSC members and the great majority of the world’s population. This point is argued forcefully by Jack Balkin and, surprisingly perhaps, endorsed by Ken Parish.