One of the biggest concerns opponents of war with Iraq have raised is that the arguments used by the US constitute a precedent for any country that feels like attacking any other country that might represent a hypothetical threat. Ken Parish points to a piece by Eugene Volokh attempting to refute this argument. The main burden of his argument is the standard lawyer’s trick of distinguishing precedents. That is, Volokh takes a series of possible wars (China invading Taiwan, India invading Pakistan) and argues that an attack on Iraq isn’t really a relevant precedent. I think he’s missed a number of possible examples, most obviously the adoption of an even more aggressive stance by Russia in relation to Chechnya, Georgia etc. And retrospectively, the Bush doctrine could have been used by Saddam himself to justify his war with Iran as a pre-emptive strike.
But what really struck me in Volokh’s piece was the following
We might be slightly more troubled if democracies become slower to condemn non-democracies that act based on trumped-up claims of threat. Still, … the essence of sound foreign policy is distinguishing real threats from fake ones; most of the time, democracies will know when another country’s supposed justification for pre-emptive attack is well-founded.
The majority of the population in nearly all democratic countries has formed the judgement that the supposed justification of the US is not well-founded, but the attack is going ahead anyway.
This brings me to one final point. There’s been a lot of discussion of the inadequacies of the UNSC, its unrepresentativeness etc, and in a sense all of this is true. The fact remains that the UNSC has responded to the considered opinion of the majority of the world’s population, while the ‘coalition of the willing’ has not.