The meeting of the Iraqi National Conference has wound up in Baghdad, leaving, from the limited reports available, a very mixed record. Given the series of disasters we’ve seen in the last eighteen months or so, a mixed record is certainly better than the par outcome of total failure.

It was certainly good that the gathering was held at all, and appears to have encompassed a much broader and more representative sample of Iraqi opinion than anything of the kind held since the overthrow of Saddam (or, of course, while Saddam and his Baathist predecessors were in power). This report on the televised proceedings,at Healing Iraq gives an idea of what it was like.

On the other hand, the supposed purpose of the Conference, to elect an advisory council of 100 members to oversee the Allawi government, degenerated into farce. It appears that the Conference was presented with a slate of 81 members agreed by the big parties and a US-imposed decision that 19 members of the old IGC (originally 20, but Chalabhi was excluded after falling from grace). In the absence of any alternative, this slate was accepted by default.

But the biggest success (still not a sure thing, but promising) was the intervention of the Conference in the Najaf crisis, demanding that the assault by the US and the interim government cease and that Sadr withdraw from Najaf, disband his militia and enter the political process. Clearly, if it were not for the Conference, there would have been little chance of a peaceful outcome here, and the potential consequences were disastrous. Sadr has stated acceptance of the Conference’ demands, though it remains to be seen what that means.

I think there’s a reasonably good chance that Sadr will carry through a withdrawal from Najaf and that the government/US will accept this without trying (for example) to demand the surrender of weapons. That would resolve the immediate crisis and would certainly be a good thing for the people of Najaf and Iraq in general, as well as for the rest of us. The bloodletting of the last week, and of the April campaign, has achieved nothing, except to strengthen Sadr.

After that, everything is fairly ambiguous. Although it’s called an Army, Sadr’s militia is not the kind of force to which terms like ‘disband’ and ‘disarm’ are really applicable, certainly not in a country where weapons of all kinds are ubiquitous. Its members can take off their black clothes, and put their guns away, but they will still, in most cases, be unemployed and angry and ready to turn out in arms at short notice. Most likely, we will see a return to the situation before April, with Sadr in effective control of Sadr City in Baghdad and with his (now much more numerous) groups of supporters in other Shiite cities keeping a lower profile, but still ready for another round of armed conflict if it occurs.

There’s similar ambiguity surrounding Sadr’s proposed entry into the political process. The advisory council has been neatly stitched up, and unless this process is reopened, Sadr will be an outsider until (and if) elections are held. There’s no doubt that Sadr’s status has been greatly enhanced by what most Iraqis (Sunni as well as Shiite) see as his successful defiance of the US, so this may be better for him than a minor share in an interim administration with dubious standing.

It seems pretty clear that, if free elections are held, and Sadr runs, he will do very well. By contrast, a year ago, he was a relatively minor figure. If early elections had been held as Garner had proposed, it seems likely that a moderate Islamist government, heavily influenced by Sistani, would have emerged. That prospect seems much more attractive than any of the alternatives currently on offer.