While most attention has been (rightly) focused on the tsunami tragedy, mayhem has continued in Iraq, leading to suggestions that the elections due for Jan 30 should be postponed. It’s clear enough by now that, in this respect as in others, the Fallujah operation has been a complete strategic failure, as well as being a moral catastrophe for the US[1]. The population, forced by the threat of US terror to flee the city, has not returned, and the idea that elections can go ahead there is a nonsense. Things are little better in the rest of the Sunni triangle. As a result, the elections will be far from satisfactory.
That said, the only real hope is that the elections will be held on time, that they will produce a clear majority for the Shiite coalition endorsed by Sistani, and that the newly elected government will simultaneously reach out to the disaffected Sunnis and demand an immediate timetable for US withdrawal. It’s clear by now that the presence of US forces has done more harm than good in the long run. If Bremer had gone along with Sistani’s proposal for elections a year ago, things would be much better in every way. On the other hand, the situation is now so bad that only a gradual withdrawal can effectively be contemplated. It appears that Sistani and the groups he has backed recognise both of these facts.
Even in this best case outcome, things will be pretty grim. No serious commentator now pretends that a civil war can be avoided; the only question is whether a new government could restrict the resistance to a hard core of Baathists and Zarqawists, keeping the majority of all ethnic groups on side. Almost certainly this will require the abandonment of the secular elements of the existing setup, both those embodied in the US-imposed constitution and those inherited from Saddam. Women’s rights will be among the early casualties, as will the provisions of the constitution designed to protect Kurdish interests, although it is unlikely that the status quo of effective Kurdish autonomy will be much affected
It’s possible, though far from certain, that in the final washup, Iraqis will, on average be a bit better off than before the invasion. It’s much clearer that any eventual benefit will be far too small to justify the loss of tens of thousands of lives and the expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars.
fn1. The fact that the shooting of unarmed prisoners, recorded live on TV, barely raised a ripple is an indicator of how far the US occupiers have sunk in moral terms. But the earlier aerial bombardment of a city supposedly under the protection of the same occupying forces, was an even graver war crime. To forestall the obvious, I’ll point out yet again that the actions of the terrorists who exercised a fair degree of control in Fallujah before the US assault were even worse. But is “not as bad as Zarqawi” really the status to which Americans aspire? And whose fault is it that Zarqawi managed to operate from US-controlled areas in northern Iraq when Saddam was in power and then establish a base in central Iraq after the invasion?
John Quiggin 
“It’s possible, though far from certain, that in the final washup, Iraqis will, on average be a bit better off than before the invasion. It’s much clearer that any eventual benefit will be far too small to justify the loss of tens of thousands of lives and the expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars.”
Yes, but does not this still leave out the entire experience, with who knows how many consequences, whichever perspective you may be arguing? My problem with utilitarianism is that it supposes to clean the slate, whichever way it falls. In other words, it has a tendency to destroy history, according to the fall of the numbers etc. This aids the formulation of public policy, no doubt, but not necessarily an appreciation of the past – and its potential lessons.
Should the Sistani endorsed Shia coalition not win and become the government, it would mean that the election was rigged in one form or other. If so, Sistani’s ace-in-the-hole is to endorse a Shia uprising, something the US/puppeteers should be acutely aware of. I guess the $64K question is the reaction by Sunni insurgents to a Shia government by an election process which they appear set to boycott, the only way perhaps to dampen an ongoing insurrection against the new government would be the demand by the latter that the US depart.
It is noticeable that so far the Shias have resisted retaliation from what are obviously Sunni outrages, but with a new government, the kid gloves off and the moral force of a Sistani fatwa that attacks on the government attract the highest odium, it might just be manageable/containable.
between the US publics outraged response to US atrocities in Vietnam (napalmed child, My Lai) and the US publics non-outraged response to comparable US atrocities in Iraq (manslaughtered Iraqi insurgent, Abu Gharib) is indicative of the more hawkish and coarser post-911 US political sensibility. There is almost complete absence of mainstream anti-war movement.
My own prediction is that the Derbyshirian scenario where the US will push on with Iraqi elections which will then produce a Sistani-led Shiite majority. This party will ask the US to formally withdraw its main military forces. Bush can then declare Withdrawal with Honour.
The US power system will remain in Iraq to provide advisors and finance and probably a sizeable private security army to guard the Green Zone and oil installations.
The mother of all civil wars will probably follow, with Suuni Arabians and Shiite Iranians drawn in to support provincial factions. This will probably follow the Algerian/Lebanon example. No doubt the US will have to act as referee, as in the Palestinian issue.
So long as the US can secure the outflow of oil it will be satisfied with that outcome. However to secure the oil installations from terrorist attaks the terrorists will have to be bought off with some of the oil money, as per Columbia.
So the US will have ended up spending $300 bill of its own treasure and 3,000 lives of its own blood in producing the exact opposite outcome which it intended.
Jack S., I agree there is a possibility of civil war but the question has to be to determine how big is the element of the insurgency that actively goes after assassination of Iraqi’s ”cooperating” with the US ie Iraqi police and gov officials. My take is that there seems to be a split between this group and others who attack US troops only, although it has to be conceeded that the former also attack the US.
It follows that not all of the Sunnis belong to the Al Zhakawi group, (which for want of a better name, I would call Osama inspired jihadi-crazies with indeterminate numbers of non-Iraqis) who kill fellow Iraqis.
A feature of the Shia was controlling banditry at the beginning of the war in their neighborhoods, acting through their local mosques. This occurred when all law and order had broken down, filling the vacuum when Saddam and his regime vanished and included (and presumably still does) Mosque based charity to vulnerable constituents.
Assuming that the US is removed or in the process of going, negotiated by a Shia government which reaches out to include Sunnis, then the legitimacy of the jihadi-crazies is reduced to zero and the self defence capabilities of Shia neighbourhood will be a significant feature of the landscape.
I believe therefore that that the majority of Sunnis will generally accept the inevitable Shia control faced with the choice of cooperate and have a chance at political input , or fight and be crushed by Shia who outnumber them at least 3: 1
In short, I don’t believe that civil war is the inevitable outcome—the restraint of Shia in not reacting to attacks on them conceals perhaps the very powerful hand of Sistani who knows that the Jihadi-crazies are trying to provoke civil war between the Sunni and Shia thereby making it impossible for the US to control anything—Sistani knows that civil war precludes an election which he is determined to have, which will give the Shiites legitimate control, assuming the election is not rigged of course.
Oh, and support, material or otherwise from Iranians will vastly outweigh/outnumber any Arabian Sunni efforts. Sixty million Shiites next door will be the guarantors of Iraqi Shia ascendency.
The US Army is now running the Shias side of the civil war. When the US Army departs the Shia will start to fight their own fight. Think Lebanon and Algeria.
”When the US Army departs, the Shia will start their own fight”- Maybe, but it will more likely be against any Baathist/ jihadi crazies that resist a legitimate Shia government. I don’t see Shia fighting Shia, I think the moral force of Sistani will prevent that.
Note that Sistani does not want an Iranian style theocracy but he reserves the right to intervene as he has done successfully in the past 1) to scupper Bremer’s delusions generally 2) to stop US forces totally wiping out Sadr and 3) to insist on elections.
Lebanon and Algeria never had a version of Sistani, but I guess time will tell which of us is correct.
“between the US publics outraged response to US atrocities in Vietnam (napalmed child, My Lai) and the US publics non-outraged response to comparable US atrocities in Iraq (manslaughtered Iraqi insurgent, Abu Gharib) is indicative of the more hawkish and coarser post-911 US political sensibility. There is almost complete absence of mainstream anti-war movement.”
Yes.
US resistance to the War on Vietnam arose in the context of the rise of Black Civil Rights, the rise of feminism and the Draft, which mobilised middle-class whites. Today there are no movements of comparable size and strength in the States that might shift their focus and their energies to opposition to the War on Iraq.
Moreover, there is no Walter Cronkite in the US media who can talk with moral authority against the war. Earnest liberalism has been thoroughly gagged by the decline of the Networks and the rise of Fox.
Yet, despite all that, incumbency only just got Bush over the line. If he cares about succession, he has vvery few chances left to withdraw with credibility. My guess is that he doesn’t care much about incumbency. However, traditional Republicans do. This difference of opinion may serve to generate much heat on the Right in the next year or two.
Lebanon and Algeria aren’t exactly analogous to Iraq. Algeria certainly has had Sistani-type leaders – Bin Badis in the 30s and Madani in the 90s, but in neither period was the military disbanded whilst ethnicity and religious identity so closely tied. (Closest hypothetical analogy would be if the US had gone into Algeria as the FLN took over, and had tried to prop the OAS up – more a VietNam situation).
Lebanon is a lot closer – certainly in terms of ethnic majority set to takeover with accompanying internicine warfare. Iran could serve as the Syrian equivalent, but I cant see any other Iraqi neighbours coming in to bat for an ethnic minority (the way Israel did for the SLA). Turkey is more likely to undermine the Kurds, while Sunnis and Shiites in Kurdish areas launch attacks on the Kurds.
I suspect Iraq in the next 5-10 years will make Lebanon and even Algeria in the 50s look straight-forward and tame.
That is the hope. What if all that dead and distruction is pure due to the occupation? Would be a lot worse for America