Chris Bertram’s recent post on responsibility got me started on what I plan to be the final instalment of my attempts to analyse the ethical justification for war. Comments much appreciated.
In thinking about justifications for war, I haven’t found just war theory to be of much use. The checklist it requires seems to leave too much room for interpretation to really settle anything.
Instead, I’m going to start, but not finish, with consequentialism. On a strictly consequentialist view, actions (including decisions to go to, or persist with, war) are morally neutral; it’s consequences that matter.
As I’ve argued previously, a serious consequentialist analysis suggests that war usually has more bad consequences than good. In particular, anyone who takes consequentialism seriously must reckon with the fact that war is a negative sum game. This means either that at least one side in a war has miscalculated or that the costs of war are being borne by people who don’t have a say in the matter. In addition, it’s necessary to take account of rule-based concerns about the effect of decisions to go to war in particular cases weakening generally desirable rules to the contrary.
My main concern though, is to look at positions that diverge from consequentialism, either by justifying war even when its net consequences are (reasonably expected to be) bad or by opposing war even when its net consequences are (reasonably expected to be) good. I think the first position can reasonably be called “pro-war” and the second “anti-war”.
The pro-war arguments typically amount to claiming that some of the bad consequences of war “don’t count”. An extreme version is the position of Norm Geras that those who initiate a just war aren’t responsible for the consequences of the (by hypothesis) unjust resistance of the other side. Chris has responded to this, and I said much the same here.
Not many supporters of war push things this far, but a large proportion seek some sort of let-out clause, allowing them to ignore at least some bad consequences of war, while claiming most or all if the good ones . The most common let-out is to ignore the casualties suffered by the opposing side, even though most of those killed or wounded would not, as individuals, deserve this fate. This is a common feature of pro-war analyses but it is morally indefensible.
In the case of the Iraq war, the Coalition and its militia allies have fought at least four different (overlapping) groups of opponents: the Iraqi army during the invasion; Sunni nationalist and ex-Baathist insurgents in the subsequent continuing resistance; jihadists led or symbolised by Zarqawi; and Sadrist militia in the two outbreaks of fighting last years. Of these, the Sadrists and what’s left of the army are now part of the Iraqi government, and presumably some sort of settlement will be reached with the Sunni nationalists in due course. Those who survived the war are (or will be) regarded as being citizens with human rights. But those who were killed will still be dead. Using war as a means of pursuing policy goals entails moral responsibility for all the deaths that result, not merely those of civilians or innocent bystanders.
A second common feature of pro-war analysis is a failure to take account of the opportunity cost of the resources used in war. The $300 billion used in the Iraq war would have been enough to finance several years of the Millennium Development project aimed at ending extreme poverty in the world, and could have saved millions of lives. But even assuming this is politically unrealistic, the money could surely have been spent on improved health care, road safety and so on in the US itself. At a typical marginal cost of $5 million per live saved, 60 000 American lives could have been saved. This is morally relevant, but is commonly ignored.
In summary, a lot of pro-war argument may be characterised as consequentialism+special pleading.
Turning to the anti-war side of the argument, the standard criticisms of consequentialism are nowhere stronger than in relation to war. Any decision to go to war, or to persist with war when peace is available, involves a collective decisions to kill and injure innocent people, to destroy their homes and livelihoods and to require our soldiers to obey orders to do such things or face military punishment. On any account of morality that takes individual rights and moral responsibility seriously, such a decision should require more than a mere expectation, based on balance of probabilities, that the net consequences of the decision will be good.
These rights-based considerations are less of a problem in the case of a purely defensive war, since we are morally entitled to defend our own rights. In addition, since willingness to fight defensive wars discourages aggression, it gains support from a rule-consequentialist viewpoint. But this only strengthens the case against wars of choice, where the other side can plausibly present their fight (at least to the soldiers and civilians who are expected to bear the costs) as one of self-defence against an outside aggressor.
Based on all this, I conclude that a war of choice aimed at overthrowing a dictatorial government or taking control of another country. should face a very high burden of justification. Examples include imminent threat of attack, intervention to stop current large-scale killings or or (and this is the case that ought to be treated most stringently) interventions where it is beyond reasonable doubt that the dictatorship can be overthrown, and a democratic alternative put in place, with minimal loss of life.
Once the decision is undertaken, it is morally obligatory to commit sufficient military and financial resources to make success as certain as anything can be in an inherently uncertain world, and to ensure an approach in which civilian deaths and injuries are minimised in the same way as they would be if the people involved were citizens of the country doing the attacking.
There are some wars that would meet these criteria and instances where decisions not to intervene were morally wrong (for example, Rwanda) but they are far outweighed, in the historical record, by morally unjustified wars.
John Quiggin 
You could read this book “Overconfidence and War : The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions by Dominic D. P. Johnson.” It argues a very convincing case that overconfidence and false illusions can lead to one side starting a war. Often the justification is just a set of dreams in the minds of the leaders that are never achieved.
Anyway it is a really good read.
Presumably the same analysis would apply whether the decision to go to war was decided by the UN or a solo country, but somehow it doesn’t seem to in practice. In the end it is all unknowable and we revert to analogous history to try and judge a priori the costs and benefits. Spread those costs and benefits too widely and you probably wind up with the Rwandas and Darfurs, although miscalculations of narrow costs and benefits, coupled with overconfidence may see the fall of the Third Reich, as well as withdrawals from Vietnam or Afghanistan.
Presumably you meant to draw show some distinction between just and unjust wars wars here, or something like that.
But there’s really no distinction between your cases. Germany miscalculated, started a colonial war in Europe, lost. France and later the US miscalculated, started a colonial war in Vietnam, lost. Russia miscalculated, started a colonial war in Afghanistan, lost.
It was obvious to me from about April last year, when the US went bannanas over the killing of the mercenaries in Fallujah, that the US had done the same thing. Started a colonial war, and lost.
Pr Q gives a good round-up of the “useful consequentialist” (versus the “good intentionalist”) justification of war.
The main thing missing from his analysis, but no doubt implicit, is the importance of intellectual veracity on the part of agents, and institutional accountability within agencies, in testing various claims for war. This is especially critical when offensive “wars of choice” are being considered, as opposed to defensive “wars of necessity”.
The case for a defensive “war of necessity” is easy because the threat is already manifest and there is a prima facie causus belli for counter-attack.
The case for an offensive “war of contingency” (or choice) is much harder to justify as the threat is latent. The general ignorance of the unpredictable consequences of war, and the great potential for these consequences to be adverse and escalate in cost, should be a prima facie constraint on aggressive war. To quote one of the experts in this business:
A. Hitler
Apparently Napolean coined a similar usage, according to Margaret Atwood. Her article on the uncertain consequences of war, written in the run-up to the conflict, turned out to be very prescient:
This is most evident with Iraq War, an offensive war of choice alright, where policy makers relied on lies in order to exaggerate the threat posed by Iraq and lies to underestimate the costs of goint to war. The general unpredictability and iniquity of the ME and the Bush admin made the (consequential) ex post costs of war much higher than the Bush admins (“pre-sequential”) ex ante estimations.
The usual mode of justifying lying and violence inherent in an aggressive war is that “the ends justifies the means”. But this is only the case where the threat is real and the alternatives are diabolical. In the case of Iraq the situation was contained, the threat was moderate and more peaceful alternatives to war were being explored.
It is not without some pain that I rake over the embers of this episode, as I was well aware that the official rationale for the war was bogus. I glibly invoked invoked the Machiavellian justification as I trusted the deceitful Bush administration to be capable of executing the war effectively, equitably and efficiently. The path from rogue to fool is surprisingly short.
One important policy implication of this analysis is that the decision to wage aggressive war should never be within the power of the aggerssor state. This is because of the systemic tendency for the aggressor state to overestimate the threat of non-war and underestimate the costs of war. It follows that aggressive wars should always be regulated by super-national bodies such as the UN, or something equivalent in authority and legitimacy.
The Hawks must surrender the power to wage aggressive war to a super-national Leviathan agency. And the Doves must ensure that this super-national Leviathan is institutionally constituted to be accountable and responsible to its principals.
Unfortunately the current UN is inept at many of its tasks (as a multicultural socialist bureaucracy one could hardly expect otherwise). Thus persons who wish to employ a capable international military agency to constrain despotism and genocide are left with the unpalatable options of relying on either the iniquitous US administration or the ineffective UN administration.
So far the Doves have given us plenty of idealistic criticism of bad situations, but not much realistic constructivism of good institutions. I would be interested in Pr Q’s suggestions on practical reforms to the UN’s constitution, bearing in mind the difficulty of imposing these kinds of reforms, as evinced by the EU’s problems.
“Presumably you meant to draw show some distinction between just and unjust wars wars here, or something like that.”
Dunno SJ. Perhaps it’s case of just wars belonging to the victors, although victory may have some long tailed and unintended consequences. Much as I enjoy Andrew Bartlett’s insights into many areas of his expertise and experience, I thought his typical left wishy washy differentiation of a just war in Afghanistan cf ET and Iraq, was self evident. Too much 20/20 hindsight about quagmires and consequences in a very uncertain field for mine.
Take the issue of consequences and justification for Aus involvement in ET. We really risked total war with a populous neighbour for what? To tear up a very good negotiated deal on Timor oil, all for the sake of self-determination for a minority group in the Indonesian Archaepelago. Some might say a much riskier proposition than tagging along on the coat tails of large powers in Afghanistan and Iraq. Easy to pull out with them and not lose much face if things go pear shaped. Casualties, quagmires and long tailed consequences are important considerations to be weighed against immediate justice and vested interest here as always. Personally of the 3 conflicts, I would have a priori placed ET, Afghanistan(graveyard of empires a la Soviets,etc) and Iraq(big buddies) in order of descending risk for Aus involvement. With independence for Timorese and a peace treaty between Jakarta and Aceh in the offing, I’m not looking too good.
What if some of my ancestors had chosen a different course? The Poms stuck with Chamberlain- forget Poland, no Dunkirk and did a deal with the Third Reich via Hess. Similarly the Yanks said none of our business after Pearl and signed a non-aggression pact with Japan, with due compensation for a misunderstanding over the Yank Fleet’s threat to honurable Japanese intentions in unifying Asia. A benign Fourth Reich now rules from Moscow to Capetown and the cliffs of Dover to Bombay. After the Third Reich’s final solution in Palestine and elsewhere, Islam is living comfortably and happily within the Fourth Reich. With Hitler taking out Russia and the Emperor China, Stalin and Mao’s casualties and Cold War never happened. The Americas are the third countervailing Superpower after Canada repatriated French in Quebec to their preferred homeland. Here in Aus its God Save the Emperor, we like hunting whales rather than watching them, eating supersize sushis, and we got to enjoy the benefit of Toyotas a lot sooner, without the need to suffer the Leyland P76 AND the leftys aren’t whinging about US hegemony. Oh what a feeling!
Downer, for one, was all pre-apologetic before the Iraq war about the upcoming death and injury to Iraqi civilians (using that annoying serious voice that he must think sounds good.) He pre-cleared his own conscience before the killing started. Can’t make omeletes…,etc. He must sleep soundly now. Wonder if he also pre-cleared his conscience about the blowback we’re bound to cop here in the future.
Part of the pro-war mindset is the fury over blowback. eg London. There is the idea of ‘remote’ war. We’re in a war but only when it’s over there.
One aspect of international war which is often overlooked is that international wars are often domestic politics fought by other means.
Some wars are fought to discipline the nationals of a belligerent. The Falklands War was an example of this for both the British and the Argentinians.
Some wars are fought to claim domestic legitimacy and/or to take control of national myths. The Greek aggression against Turkey in the 1920s was an example of this.
Some wars are fought as a means of redistributing national assets from one group to another or to benefit a vested interest. The current Iraq War contains elements of this.
Once it is recognized that many foreign wars are at least in part civil wars by proxy, then the notions of national will or legitimacy of government or corporate responsibility, or cost/benefit become problematic.
And it is worth noting that the typical path to military failure taken by great powers is via domestic dissent and civil disobedience. This applies to such diverse nations as Britain and decolonisation, the US in Vietnam and probably in Iraq, and the Soviet Union in its global overreach, as exemplified in Afghanistan.
Once this path to failure becomes recognised as not atypical, it must cause regimes to rethink the consequences of bellicosity and it must give powerful national dissenting forces great hope in the ultimate success of their causes.
SJ,
To me it comes down to a question of the US intentions as to whether this was a colonial war – for it to be that the US must have intended to colonise Iraq – something I do not believe they intended. The same may well be true of Vietnam.
Unfortunately, in both cases I do not think that they thought that far ahead. In both cases I believe they thought that they could go in, shock and awe until the job was done, do a bit of nation building, leave a compliant leader in charge and get out, with a couple of bases there to annoy and worry their neighbours – Iran in the case of Iraq and China in the case of Vietnam.
To me, at least, the problem with a consequentialist view is that it tends to a post hoc justification. In the short term, PrQ is right – war is a negative sum game. In the longer term, however, it may turn positive if the costs are kept down (in both lives and money) and any improvements it may bring are both great and highly probable.
In the case of Vietnam, if the US had won a short war and it had done some good nation building afterwards then, to me at least, the war may have been justifiable – the property and goods destroyed would have been more than replaced by the increased trade generated (when compared to what happened under the dictatorship that was going to, and did, result from the US loss).
The lives are always more difficult to replace, but, just as I would be willing to go to war and risk losing my life if it would mean a better outcome for my daughters, if the result was a much better life for those remaining then the war might be justified.
The problem is, of course, to make those outcomes both lower in cost and more probable. IMHO, in the cases of both Vietnam and Iraq, the external belligerents both underestimated the costs and over-estimated the probability. Does that mean that the wars were both unjustified, or that the external belligerents were only guilty of optimism?
observa – your alternative post-1940 scenario is a much better approach than UN bashing. It does remind us that – a bit like Dr Who’s time machine – changing one thing can lead the world down very different and impossible to predict paths, which is a useful thing to keep in mind.
However, I’m not sure it goes a long way to addressing what Prof Q is trying to do. I think your East Tmor assessment is still incorrect. Clearly it was a risk getting involved – war is always a risk – but the ‘rightness’ in doing so goes to some of the wider issues that have to be taken into account in making these decisions and shows there are things beyond just a dispassionate cost/benefit analysis (important though I think that is). Also, it was not Australia charging in our own.
The rights and wrongs of each armed conflict are not just a matter of saying yes or no to getting involved – of even greater importance is what type of involvement, how the war is conducted and (perhaps most important of all) what is planned and commited to beyond the strictly military phase.
Another interesting alternative post-1945 history to consider is what would have happened if the winning side of WWII had decided to carve-up the ‘spoils of victory’ or occupy territories (such as the USSR did), rather than engage in rebuilding. I don’t profess to know international history well enough to suggest a scenario, but it would have been a very different (and probably less positive) world.
…can’t shake the impression that it was jquiggin’s ancestors advising Chamberlain in Munich…
“observa – your alternative post-1940 scenario is a much better approach than UN bashing.”
Andrew, I’m not against reliance on a UN, ‘many heads are better than one’, type notion for assessing just wars, their costs and benefits, which is relevant to John’s post here. However, I can’t seek moral clarification from any international body, that equates the vote of a Mugabe with a Helen Clarke, let alone that of Kim Jong Il with George Bush. Such a UN may get it right occasionally but all too often it would fail, in comparison to a body of democratic countries. Hence my preference for a United liberal democratic Nations, where I would be more comfortable with an equal vote between a Chirac and a Bush. A two thirds binding majority vote, with no power of veto on just and doable wars, by such a gathering, might produce better outcomes than the deliberations of the current gaggle of gangsters.
This sort of international democratic body might then be able to compile a hit-list of just and doable wars in order of priority. Interesting to speculate how such problematic arenas would be prioritised isn’t it? Think of Taliban Afghanistan, Saddam’s Iraq, Ayatollah’s Iran, Castro’s Cuba, KimJong Il’s NK, Sudan, Darfur, etc, etc Which one first and what will be the measure of ‘Mission Accomplished’ before we all vote again on the next cab off the rank and direct our combined power to that task. One good aspect of compiling such a public hit-list of just war projects by committed democracies, would be the enormous moral suasion for reform on the countries lower down the hit-list order. Lots of Gaddafi type sea-changes without firing a shot I reckon. Dump the gangsters and let the bastards quiver as we democracies deliberate over which of their necks is for the chopper next.
JQ — I like some of your thoughts in this post. Mostly because it is what I’ve been saying for years. A few things though…
In particular, anyone who takes consequentialism seriously must reckon with the fact that war is a negative sum game.
This is obviously untrue in the long run. Wars can result in changes of institutions, and these can lead to long run benefits. In case this still isn’t obvious consider an example: war in Nth Korea leads to liberal democratic (or, for your sake, social democratic) government which leads the people to prosperity, freedom and happiness.
Also, it’s not at all obvious that you must include the costs of other countries in your analysis. This is not how any other BCAs are done for any other government programs. While it may be nice to care about the world, the reality is that governments are charged with the responsibility to their own citizens only.
[I note that open immigration becomes easy to defend if we take the universal welfare criteria instead of the national welfare criteria]
Also, there is no need to talk about the opportunity cost of the war… it is enough to simply talk about the cost. The only reason not to do this is because some people have an irrational hatred of using money as a store of value. They can use bannanas or peanuts if they prefer, but money is the easiest & best thing to use for comparisons.
Finally, on a personal level I strongly agree with your point that the burden of proof lies with the entity that wants to violate basic freedoms and rights. The logical conclusion form this is that the burden of proofy always lies with the government before it acts — and the consequentialist argument for government programs (including war) need to show a benefit, as you say, “beyond reasonable doubt”.
Careful Q — if you believe what you wrote above, and you’re consistent, you might be turning libertarian. ;p
TCFKAA — Goodwin’s law.
This is really all a load of academic codswollop. If it was based on evidence of what factors were considered when a decision to go to war was made, then I would take notice. This is simply a waste of time, unless you can show me evidence that decision makers are actually using this sort of decision making framework.
Clausewitz has been shown to be correct in saying that war is an extension of politics by other means. It is therefore the politics of the decision that are important. And each war and it’s politics is completely different to every other war. Professor Blamey wrote an excellent book on the causes of war, and one of the key factors, among others is a belief in victory being attainable – nobody has ever fought a war they didn’t think they could win. When defeat becomes inevitable, you surrender. It’s not rocket science.
More comment here http://www.janegalt.net/
John Humphreys – I think you mean Godwin’s law:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Godwin's_law
You’re being unfair: Godwin’s law doesn’t hold if the discussion is directly related to WWII or to the holocaust. I think this thread reasonably satisfies, especially as my reference to WWII was not explicitly a reference to the Nazis, but rather to the motivations for going to war (or not) leading up to WWII, and any theory of the justification of war must address WWII as it was the most significant war of the last century.
To clarify my point:
On this reasoning, Chamberlain did the right thing in Munich, ipso facto the analysis is lacking something.
JQ —
This site on argument uses the Iraq war as a case study, and so may be of interest to you.
Enough with misrepresenting the Munch agreement already. It was a deliberate attempt to encourage another ‘Drang Nach Osten’, to entice Germany into attacking the Soviets. Every school child outside the anglosphere knows it.
Razor — I did my analysis of benefits and costs before the war. My analysis assumed Iraq had bio & chem weapons, that he would pass them to terrorists and that the war would end all terrorism, and the war still failed my BCA.
My line of thinking existed before the war.
The fact that the government doesn’t assess benefits and costs before it spends billions is surely a bad thing. So if decision makers aren’t currently using this sort of decision making framework — they should start.
I agree war is an extention of politics. All government programs should have to pass a strict burdon of proof.
No abb1, only every pissant conspiracy theorist knows it. Sure, Britain did not want an alliance with the Soviets, but they were also not willing to go to war against Germany, I suspect for much for the same reasons outlined here by jquiggin.
While the Munich outcome was popular with the British public, it was criticized by several other politicians including Churchill.
I am with Razor on this one: every war is different. For me to be convinced that this analysis carries any weight I’d want to see it applied to more than just the Iraq and Vietnam wars. At present it simply looks like post hoc justification for the anti-US-aggressor position.
tcfkaa,
Just so we’re all debating the same thing, are you arguing that the British should have drawn a line in the sand (or soil, in that case) over the Sudetenland, rather than acquiescing in its annexation? Or are you arguing that the major liberal democracies at the time should have taken the more radical action of launching a war on Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy to achieve regime change? I’m not trying to put words in your mouth (or on your keyboard), I’m just trying to clarify what alternative course you are (retrospectively) advocating to that taken by Chamberlain, and the relationship of this issue to the debate on this thread.
PN,
I’m gratified that you’ve taken up the issue of British options in 1938 and 1939.
This moment in history has resonances that have been twisted and decontextualised, largely by US neocons and their quislings elsewhere in the world. For example, the Munich trope was used as a substitute for thought in justifying two wars against Saddam. However, the circumstances in 1938, 1991 and 2003 were only vaguely related. And in twisting the circumstances surrounding Munich, the neocons have falsified history.
1. Chamberlain had a realistic understanding of the inability of Britain to counter German bellicosity vis a vis Czechoslovakia. He had been PM for less than a year. He began to rearm Britain after the rundown of British military capacity during the Great Depression. But he knew that Britain had no capability of standing against Hitler. Chamberlain was buying time.
2. Chamberlain knew that only the US and the USSR were powerful enough to counter German military might. But in 1938 the US was determinedly neutral. By emphasising by implication (see below) the probable mendacity of German promises over Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain hoped to mobilise US sentiment in favour of intervention in Europe (not even Churchill was able to achieve that ambition. It took Pearl Harbor to shake the US out of its isolationism). Thus Chamberlain was not the only British PM frustrated by US disengagement from the affairs of Europe.
3. Chamberlain knew that Stalin was itching to intervene in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Ambassador to Prague offered to send troops. (Indeed, a squadron of Soviet fighters flew into Prague unannounced and uninvited). Benes, President of Cz, was thus faced with dismemberment by Germany, or assistance by Stalin. He chose the former. Chamberlain breathed a sigh of relief because this seemed the lesser of two evils for the entire world. Many Right Wingers in the world today would be inclined to agree with him.
4. While waving the piece of paper to the waiting crowd at Croydon Aerodrome, Chamberlain misled the world about his own thoughts about the likelihood of “peace in our time”. (Chamberlain expected Hitler to break the agreement.) No one likes lying politicians. But some folks, like neocons, are inclined to wink at lies when they seem to be productive of welcome outcomes. Thus, the various lies told by Bush, Blair and Howard to embroil the COW in Iraq seemed to neocons to be fine examples of visionary statesmanship. Chamberlain was not the only politician in history to think that lying was a good idea in the circumstances.
I think the British should have drawn a line in the sand over the Sudetenland, and if that had meant going to war against the Germans alongside the Czechs, they should have done so. But even if they were not willing to draw a line there, they should have at least declared war on Germany with the aim of overthrowing Hitler when he annexed the rest of Czechoslovakia.
Of course, this view is possible with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. But nevertheless, on JQ’s criteria the British government did the right thing. Hence if we follow his advice and another Hitler comes along, we’ll be doomed to make the same mistake.
Is it possible to come up with criteria for war that would rule out Vietnam (and possibly Iraq), but allow earlier intervention in WWII?
“they should have at least declared war on Germany with the aim of overthrowing Hitler when he annexed the rest of Czechoslovakia.”
But in the light of one of the points raised by Katz, and in view of how the actual war panned out, it is inconceivable that this aim was achievable in the absence of (amongst other conditions) both the USA and the USSR seriously committing themselves to it alongside Britain and France. The issue here is not the desirability of regime change in Nazi Germany, but the feasibility and prudence of Britain and France attempting such a course of action in 1938-39 given (a) German power and preparedness and (b) the actual US and Soviet positions at the start of WWII.
This is where the preconditions set by John Q become relevant, to whit:
“. . .a war of choice aimed at overthrowing a dictatorial government or taking control of another country. should face a very high burden of justification. Examples include imminent threat of attack, intervention to stop current large-scale killings or (and this is the case that ought to be treated most stringently) interventions where it is beyond reasonable doubt that the dictatorship can be overthrown, and a democratic alternative put in place, with minimal loss of life.
“Once the decision is undertaken, it is morally obligatory to commit sufficient military and financial resources to make success as certain as anything can be in an inherently uncertain world, and to ensure an approach in which civilian deaths and injuries are minimised in the same way as they would be if the people involved were citizens of the country doing the attacking.”
In short, if another Hitler does come along, might it not be an even more serious mistake to launch an attempt at forcible regime change in circumstances where there is a high probability that such an attempt would end in defeat and demoralisation for those virtuous nations who would do the regime-changing, on top of all the human and material costs of the war?
In this case, I would so no, it would not be a serious mistake, particularly when we’re talking about combating genocide (please don’t invoke Godwin’s law on me). I’d rather die trying than live in appeasement for lack of numbers.
“All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing�
This line of argument is also relevant to Observa’s call for the formation of a crusading union of liberal-democratic nations which would claim a moral mandate for undoing the regimes of Iran, North Korea, Zimbabwe, Cuba, Syria, etc.
If we reflect on the history of both World War II and the Cold War, it is a mistake to regard either as ending in a straightforward victory of the liberal/social democratic world over the undemocratic world. In both cases, victory was achieved by an alliance between liberal democracies and undemocratic states and movements of a certain kind against a bloc of some, but not all, of the world’s extant dictatorships.
In the case of WWII, we have to ask what the outcome might have been had the democratic allies not also been allied with the USSR, Guomindang China and the Communist partisans of many states – and, for good hypothetical measure, what the outcome might have been had these powerful undemocratic states and movements formed a grand totalitarian alliance with the fascist states against the liberal/social democracies.
Likewise, the Cold War might well still be running, and perhaps not running in the West’s favour, had it not been for the falling out between the USSR and the largest Communist state (China), and the contributions of undemocratic states of various kinds (e.g. Indonesia under Suharto, Iran under both the Shah and Khomeiny) to anti-communist alliances of convenience with the liberal democracies. Also, and this is very relevant to Observa’s argument, ultimately the Cold War was lost by the USSR and its allies as much by soft power as by hard power, soft power in this case meaning the superior social and economic example set by Western societies (e.g. the European social democracies and social market economies), and the largely peaceful efforts of internal opposition movements (e.g. Solidarnosc) and of reforming currents within the Soviet-style regimes (e.g. Gorbachev, Poszgay, Dubcek, Kucan).
Now, if the liberal democracies were to form the kind of crusading alliance which Observa suggests, with strict exclusion of all states not satisfying robust liberal-democratic criteria, and with a long-term strategic agenda of overthrowing such regimes wherever they exist, is it really to be expected that the various non-democratic states would fail to hang together rather than let themselves be hung separately? And in the launching of a series of regime-change crusades which (if Iraq is any guide) would be costly in human and economic terms and messy in political and military terms, would not the liberal-democratic alliance advocated by Observa lose much of the “soft power” which comes from setting a superior example of how a decent society should behave and function, and which is absolutely essential if liberal (or social) democracy is to be spread by emulation?
“I’d rather die trying than live in appeasement for lack of numbers.”
An admirable sentiment. However, when deciding whether to try one must consider the likely practical consequences of one’s efforts. In the case in question, if the likely outcome of an heroic effort would be that Hitler Mk.II would be left in a stronger position vis-a-vis the good guys than if such an effort was not made (or was deferred until the circumstances had become more favourable for its success, which is what we’re really talking about) then such an heroic failure must be considered a serious mistake to be avoided.
PN’s point about “soft power” is most apt.
Vladimir Putin made an interesting comment recently when he opined that it was rock music that ended Soviet Communism. I am aware of the hyperbolistic nature of this comment. But it is worth considering that the allure of Western culture caused Soviet citizens to rise up and to overthrow communism simply by turning out into the streets. Indeed, even the Communist Party itself and the KGB recognised that the game was up. The second greatest military power in history fell with barely a shot fired in its defence.
The Right tell a different story about the effectiveness of military confrontation. And indeed it cannot be denied that the Soviet economy was broken by perhaps an unnecessary attempt to counter US military capability.
Nevertheless, I believe it is now time for historians to tease out the power of the various preconditions and causes for the peaceful collapse of the Soviet regime.
In line with my earlier comments about the relationship between military adventurism and civil dissent, my preliminary preference is for the effectiveness of PN’s “soft power”.
Of course PN, I don’t disagree with you. But a policy of not acting unless it is “beyond reasonable doubt that the dictatorship can be overthrown, and a democratic alternative put in place, with minimal loss of life” will in many circumstances simply encourage the dictators, not discourage them.
The world community should implement policies that ensure malevolent dictators have “reasonable doubt” that they will be allowed to remain in power, not vice versa.
“I’d rather die trying than live in appeasement for lack of numbers.”
X-Anon,
Fortunately, owing to the fact that, by popular demand, the GWOT has been granted an extended season, you can put your money where your mouth is.
The armed forces of the COW are crying out for committed fellows (and fellowesses!) with your positive, can-do attitude.
haha. As far as moral crusades go, the war in Iraq is not quite in the same league as the war against Hitler’s Germany.
” But nevertheless, on JQ’s criteria the British government did the right thing. ”
How so? Let’s stick to the simple consequentialist analysis to start with. Then the British government did the right thing if the consequences of Munich were that the war turned out better than it would have if the line in the sand had been drawn earlier. That’s arguable, as several people have pointed out, but most people would say, at least in retrospect, that Munich strengthened Hitler’s position.
I judge that, all things considered, drawing the line at Czechoslovakia would have been more likely to produce good consequences than did the Munich agreement (and non-consequentialist considerations point in the same direction) so I think the British government did the wrong thing.
Are you asserting (as some of your comments imply) that it would have been better to fight earlier, even though the result would probably have been defeat instead of victory?
The question I’m really asking is whether or not a ULDN body would be more functional and effective than relying on it now as a subset of the larger international UN body now, that includes a gaggle of undemocratic gangsters with democratic rights at the international decision-making table. Many of us have serious qualms about those who rely on the current UN legitimacy for their moral guidance as to whether Aus should ever have been in ET, Iraq or Afghanistan.
The second issue is whether a ULDN type body should ever ‘crusade’ with its power to intervene militarily in ‘failed’ states, albeit that the definition of failed states would be theirs and some power of priority ranking given to where they should intervene first. This would need circumstantial flexibility for the Rwanda and Darfur crises, as well as the longer term plans for the Saddams and Talibans. If you don’t subscribe to their right to actively intervene in such horrible circumstances, it seems to me you have to wear the consequences of taking the view, that- They’ll all sort themselves out and come around to our way of thinking and behaving in the long run. IMO, what this really means is you need to be quite comfortable with pushing the refugees fleeing such unfinished business, back over the borders, to get on with sorting themselves out. I don’t think the pacifist luvvies can have their moral cake and eat it here.
“Are you asserting (as some of your comments imply) that it would have been better to fight earlier, even though the result would probably have been defeat instead of victory?”
No. I am saying that using your criteria, and the information available at the time, the British did the right thing in not drawing the line at Czechoslovakia.
“I judge that, all things considered, drawing the line at Czechoslovakia would have been more likely to produce good consequences than did the Munich agreement (and non-consequentialist considerations point in the same direction) so I think the British government did the wrong thing.”
I don’t think you can make that judgement based on the information the British had available at the time. I think it is only possible with hindsight – knowing what followed.
I think it is very rare that the consequences of not overthrowing a dictator are known at the time the decision is made to go to war. Eg WMDs as a justification for Iraq – the US congress voted for the war at least ostensibly based on the consequences of Saddam having and using (or allowing terrorists to use) WMDs, yet in hindsight that turned out to be a false justification. The reverse applies to Hitler: no-one suspected the holocaust at the time the British made the decision to appease.
It is also very rare that we know “beyond reasonable doubt that the dictatorship can be overthrown, and a democratic alternative put in place, with minimal loss of life�. Again, the British in Munich or after the Czech annexation would have known there was no way of overthrowing Hitler without massive loss of life. The Americans (or at least the Bush Administration) in Iraq believed that they could satisfy your requirements, but it turned out they were wrong.
My point is that if your criteria are to be useful as a decision-making tool, they have to eliminate unjust wars and allow just wars, using only the information available at the time the decision to go to war is made, not information only available in hindsight. I don’t think they succeed in that.
If we want to get serious on when intervention should have occurred to prevent, or reduce the effects of, WWII we should look at the re-militarisation of the Rhineland in 1936. Hitler had given orders to withdraw if confronted and this would have been a serious humiliation for him, personally. This would have reduced his ability to intervene in Spain and probably toppled him during a bad period.
Let me clarify the moral dilemma for the pacifist luvvies here. Millions of Iraqi refugees(remember those camped in Iran?) went home and are still there now despite the quagmire created by the COW. Also they have to face up to the fact that sitting on their hands with the Saddams, means he can push any problematic individual over the border for others to worry about. Nice work if you can get it as a tyrant, which is exactly the gift he gave an incoming COW administration, by emptying all the jails, the moment he knew the game was up.
“I don’t think you can make that judgement based on the information the British had available at the time. I think it is only possible with hindsight – knowing what followed.”
Precisely right X-Anon!
All actors exist in a universe of incomplete information.
Historians understand this. Economists and some disciplines tend to imagine that they can turn incomplete information into a dependent variable.
In fact, incomplete information is the ultimate independent variable.
Katz Says: July 20th, 2005 at 1:05 pm
I do not think that the West’s “soft” cultural power was decisive in the victory of the First World over Second World since both “soft” cultural power (toys) and “hard” military power (guns) are derivative from “firm” industrial power (tools). The polity decides the priority between martial guns and cultural toys, but it is constrained by its industrial tools.
The fall of the USSR was a complex multi-factored event. The Cold War struggle between First World USA and Second World USSR forces was the vector of at least four monumental world-historical ideological conflicts:
1. State Constitution: Democratic Constitutionalist v Dictatorial Communist
2. Economic Systems: Catallactic Capitalism v Coercive Socialism
3. Cultural Nationalism: Eurasian Nationalism V Russian Imperialism
4. Arms Race: Pentagon NATO V Red Army WARSAW PACT
Of the four, I would say that “2. Economic Systems” was the critical one: the relative industrial efficiency and innovativeness of capitalism versus socialism. The fact that the Chinese Communist Party is still in the political saddle because it changed to from a socialist to a capitalist economic system is a controlled experimental proof of this thesis.
However, the Russian Communist Party might well have survived for many more years as ruler of the USSR (as per Castro in Cuba) had not Carter and Reagan re-ignited “4. Arms Race” which gave Pentagon NATO strategic and conventional power over the Red Army WP system. The proof of this is the strategic advantage Reagan won by installing Pershing Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles to counter Brezhnev’s installation of SS-18’s. This blocked the Soviet’s last chance at clinging to strategic power: regional hegemony over Europe.
The destruction of the Syrian (Bekka Valley 1983) and Iraqi (Desert Storm 1991) military forces by US made conventional weapons only rammed home the US’s full-spectrum dominance in military technology over the USSR. That was why the Red Army’s attempt at a coup failed in 1991.
It should be noted in passing that “3. Cultural Nationalism” demonstrated that the USSR’s politico-economic system lacked international legitimacy amongs nations which prized their own identity. This made Russia an unlikely candidate as the mediator of the “End of History”.
Finally, “2. State Constitutions” showed that democracy was the key to a state’s national legitimacy. Interestingly, constra Orwell and Hayek, the example of Gorbachev showed that it was possible to evolve from a dictatorial to a democratic system without bloody revolution and war.
This is a critical piece of knowledge since it removes part of the justification for aggressive regime change of dictatorships. Containment, sanctions and constructive engagement can work to bring liberal forces to the fore.
Eden knew perfectly well what would follow if the British walked away at Suez. And it did – a generation later, after the media had got bored with claiming how wrong history had proved him.
From the perspective of Eden’s aims, the only flaw was in not pursuing matters sufficiently vigorously and promptly – which Britain simply didn’t have the resources for. Sending a gunboat straight away would have been far more effective than a belated air assault.
None of this is endorsement, just pointing out that, yes, people very often did know the consequences of inaction. This reply is not about their value systems, only their clearness of eye.
Katz,
“From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Look up Quisling in Wiktionary, the free dictionaryQuisling is the surname of Vidkun Quisling the leader of the Norwegian fascist party Nasjonal Samling (NS) and a staunch ally of Nazi Germany during World War II. He was executed by firing squad for treason.
Quisling in modern English has taken on the meaning of any person who is a traitor to their country or collaborates with their country’s traditional enemies based on the actions and name of the original “Quisling”, Vidkun Quisling himself, because he is considered a traitor to Norway and a collaborator with the Nazis. ”
I strongly object to your use of the term quisling to label those who support military action against Saddam Hussien, the Taliban and terrorists in general.
The term is actually more appropriate for those who oppose these things.
“Economists and some disciplines tend to imagine that they can turn incomplete information into a dependent variable.”
Resolving the problem of how to treat incomplete information is a central focus of my research, on which I’ve been spending most of my time lately. I hope to have something interesting to say before long.
No abb1, only every pissant conspiracy theorist knows it.
Oh sure, you’re aware of it, but, apparently, it creates some kind of a cognitive dissonance in your heads, so that you have to immediately reject the most obvious and most logical explanation as a ‘conspiracy theory’. Oh, well. Just another one of those things.
“Resolving the problem of how to treat incomplete information is a central focus of my research, on which I’ve been spending most of my time lately. I hope to have something interesting to say before long.”
Usually one represents the incomplete information by a random variable X, and then the criterion to be optimized becomes a function f of X and your other variables y. All prior knowledge is used to constrain the distribution of X. One then chooses y maximizing the expected-value of f(X, y).
However, expected-value analysis is not much use when considering the consequences of war – minimax is more appropriate: choose strategy y such that min over x of f(x, y) is maximized. Ie, choose the strategy that leads to the best possible worst outcome.
Minimax would lead us to overthrow all dictators as soon as they popped their vile heads into view.
Razor,
“Quisling in modern English has taken on the meaning of any person who is a traitor to their country or collaborates with their country’s traditional enemies based on the actions and name of the original “Quislingâ€?, Vidkun Quisling himself, because he is considered a traitor to Norway and a collaborator with the Nazis. â€?
You’re free to object as much as you like.
The concept “quisling” has nothing at all to do with collaboration with “traditional” enemies.
A quisling is someone who is treasonous to the national interest of his country, whether or not the beneficiary of her collaboration is a “traditional” enemy. Thus, Howard’s collaboration with the Bush clique is a result of a complex and mendacious calculation, with the ability to play wedge domestic politics looming large. The consequences of these calculations are against the Australian national interest.
As Talleyrand said: “Treason is simply a matter of dates.”
Not bad, x-anon. Use bulls**t to justify a predetermined conclusion. Betcha Bush never thought of that one. 😉
actually SJ, it’s not bulls**t, although maybe not that relevant to the discussion – mathematical modeling is often not. And the conclusion wasn’t predetermined.
When I set out writing that comment I thought minimax would lead to (more or less) JQ’s position, and I was going to have to come up with something between minimax and expected-value to justify my position. But when I got to the end I realized otherwise, much to my surprise.
Anon, I think you mean “maximin”. In a zero sum game, this is the same as trying to select minimax for the other side.
But unless you’re dealing with a maniac whose sole object is to harm you, zero-sum games are the wrong model. Except in this case, any war outcome is dominated by the same outcome achieved as a result of negotiation, so war always reflects miscalculation or irrationality by at least one side.
It follows that, as you first suggested, the optimal solution is usually somewhere between maximin and EV.
On a more technical note, the f(x,y) “stochastic production function” model is inadequate in many respects. I have a bunch of papers on this, of which this is probably the most accessible.
I think some esteemed educators have stumbled upon the ideal way of judging war and its consequences here http://www.news.com.au/story/0,10117,15990099-23109,00.html
JQ, yes, I meant “minimax” in the generic sense of optimizing one way under the assumption that the other side is optimizing the other way. I didn’t want to use “maximin” as fewer people are familiar with the term.
I assumed the dictator was the maniac you described. Not a bad assumption for Hitler or Osama Bin Laden (who we may assume is a dictator over his small group of followers), but probably not reasonable for Saddam Hussein.
I’ll check out the paper.
ok, I checked out the paper. I don’t understand it – too far from my world and too many words for me.
Can you explain for me in simple terms what your model adds?
What is missing by modeling the cost f(x, y) as a scalar function of the unknowns (x – can live in an arbitrary space if necessary – R^N, the space of all differentiable curves, whatever), an arbitrary distribution over X, and the things I can control (y – again, anything you like)?