Andrew Leigh has moved to a new, more mnemonic location. He has a post which concludes that, although the Iraq war has turned out badly, it seemed like a good idea at the time. So, on the information available at the time, he suggests, he was right to support it. Much the same point has been made in discussion here. Tim Dunlop criticises this, pointing out that lots of people (in fact, the majority of people in most countries) looked at the same evidence and came to the (ex post) correct conclusion that war was a bad idea.
I want to pick up a different point. It’s still possible to argue (not convincingly in my view, but not absurdly) that who supported the war made a reasonable judgement on the available evidence, including the evidence supporting the existence of WMDs, provided by Bush and Blair. Only if you discounted this evidence, as bogus or at least slanted and exaggerated, could you draw the right conclusion. As we now know, the evidence was bogus and the whole UN process was a sham since Bush and Blair had decided to go to war anyway. But, someone who assumed that they were presenting the best available evidence, and accepted their repeated claims that war was a last resort, might reasonably have support the war.
However, Andrew wants to go further, saying “given the information then available, I still think Blair, Bush and Howard made the right call.” I can’t see how this claim can be defended. Clearly, Bush and Blair had the information that only later became available to the rest of us showing the spurious nature of the ostensible case for war.
As regards the argument for a “war for democracy”, it’s worth noting that this was explicitly repudiated by Bush, Blair and Howard, all of whom said that if Saddam co-operated on weapons there would be no war. More importantly, no hindsight is needed to make the judgement that the likely outcomes of a war were going to be bad – we have thousands of years of experience of war to tell us this. That’s why the bar should be set high for a war of choice, as opposed to the war of self-defence we were sold. So many things invariably go wrong that we should require convincing beyond reasonable doubt that the objectives will be achieved, and that the costs will be modest. In the case of the Iraq war, the experts predicted correctly that success (in the sense of achieving a transition to prosperous, secure democracy) would require many more troops and much more money than was committed.
Update These points don’t really apply to Howard. The decision he made was, in effect, to follow the US lead unquestioningly, as Australian governments have usually done in cases of this kind. I think this was pretty clear in the Australian debate, which is one reason Howard hasn’t suffered as much from the failure of the war as have Bush and Blair.
John Quiggin 
“a finding such as this would have to have been made by the security council [by way of another resolution] for it to have any meaning in international law.”
No, UNSC 1441 did not require another resolution. In fact, it specifically said it was Saddam’s final opportunty to comply, not his second to last opportunity to comply.
On the issue of public support for the action in Iraq, I never believed that it was based on anything other than a belated recognition that we’d ignored the dysfunction in the ME long enough that it began to spill out of the ME and onto the rest of us. My personal support wasn’t based on whether Saddam had or didn’t have WMD. It was based on the fact that he was required to PROVE to the UN that he had done what he claimed to have done with what WMD he himself admitted having in the list he provided to the inspectors (12,000 pages long, and still not complete according to inspectors). He had not complied with UN demands and it was quite clear that he never intended to, ever. My support was also based on the fact that he was going to continue to kill anyone in Iraq who disagreed with him politically. And his sons were going to continue that trend, if not step it up a notch or two.
Saddam was given a last opportunity to comply. He was told that he’d be removed if he didn’t comply. He made the choice. I’m glad he’s gone.
Right,no matter how this argument for war is still a debate,it has no moral justification,no grounds for legality,it is just plain and simply put,a war of aggression and plunder,the continuation of exactly what Adolf Hitler did,but failed,and now so many years later in a world that knows better,we have Three men George Bush,Tony Blair and John Howard,taking over the roll of Adolf Hitler,but theirs is more serious,their crime is against humanity in a much more serious way,and the other nations cannot do anything,to stop them,as they have the worlds biggest war machine of destruction,and even the UN is powerless to intervene,there seems to be no peace solution,as the worlds number one aggressor,does not want peace,it needs war to remain the dominant POWER.
No, UNSC 1441 did not require another resolution. In fact, it specifically said it was Saddam’s final opportunty to comply, not his second to last opportunity to comply.
two things:
1. according to ordinary principles of international law, the method of enforcement in case of a breach of a UNSC resolution is a matter for the UNSC, and not individual member states, and
2. UN 1441 itself relevantly states that the UNSC:
4. Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below;
and:
12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security;
even lord goldsmith’s ass-covering march 7, 2003 advice to blair admits that:
I remain of the opinion that the safest legal course would be to secure the adoption of a further resolution to authorise the use of force.
UNSC 1441:
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement
lord goldsmith’s advice:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1472459,00.html
“1. according to ordinary principles of international law, the method of enforcement in case of a breach of a UNSC resolution is a matter for the UNSC, and not individual member states”
the UN had already said there would be serious consequences for continued noncompliance. In the context of this situation, there was little doubt what that meant. Of course, at the time, we did not know that France and Rusia were guaranteeing Saddam that they could protect him, much less that they were passing (Russia at least) along information on coalition military preparations.
“2. UN 1441 itself relevantly states that the UNSC:
4. Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below”
Iraq’s breach was all reported to the Council in March 2003.
“12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security”
it did. Some UNSC members said under no circumstances would they carry through with what they’d already voted for. At that point, the UNSC members who MEANT what they voted for in 1441 enforced the resolutions.
UNSC 1441 did not require a subsequent resolution. Saddam’s out, permanently. He’s not coming back into power.
PrQ,
With respect, I do not think I have dodged the issue. I have seen no evidence, as yet, that constitutes a smoking gun. Yes, there were failings and yes, these may have come from the White House and / or Number 10. It may have even been on the direct orders of the President and Prime Minister that the intelligence was deliberately mucked up / obsfucated / turned into lies. As yet, however, I have seen nothing more than politicians ‘sexing up’ (in the words of a Number 10 aide) existing intelligence that may have come from wishful thinking and group think.
If you have a ‘smoking gun’, please give me a link and I will retract.
“UNSC 1441 did not require a subsequent resolution. ”
As your co-religionist the March Hare was given to remark – ‘a word means what I mean it to say, neither more nor less.’
I suppose if the well-evidenced fact that even Bush and Blair, and their in-house lawyers, thought otherwise, then nothing will convince you.
Back in the reality-based community, we’ll keep on plugging away with admittedly tedious evidence-based argument.
Quoth AR “As yet, however, I have seen nothing more than politicians ’sexing up’ (in the words of a Number 10 aide) existing intelligence that may have come from wishful thinking and group think.” This is exactly the point. This constitures inteference by politicians in getting clean intelligence. On September 13, 2002, the US made public its expectation that Australia would join a preemptive strike, subsequently ONA changed its tune about WMD. Now I expect at this stage the government asked the ONA for evaluation of WMD in the light of this change in US expectations.
It’s notable that Andrew and avaroo would rather be thought naive or obtuse, than dishonourable and complicit in lying (insight gained from somebody I read somewhere in the past week and have now forgotten; apologies).
“I suppose if the well-evidenced fact that even Bush and Blair, and their in-house lawyers, thought otherwise, then nothing will convince you. ”
Seeing a requirement for a further resolution actually IN UNSC 1441 would convince me. Resolutions are pretty thorough, they generally don’t leave out big, important stuff, like “another resolution will be required” if that’s what they mean.
“UNSC 1441 did not require another resolution.”
That’s not what John Negroponte, the then UN ambassador to the UN, said in his speech at the Security Council in support of the resolution. In fact in order to get some countries to vote for it he had to explicitly undertake that “This resolution contains no ‘hidden triggers’ and no ‘automaticity’ with respect to the use of force. If there is a further Iraqi breach … the matter will return to the council for discussion”. Which, of course, it never did.
Yet another lie from B&B.
“That’s not what John Negroponte, the then UN ambassador to the UN, said in his speech at the Security Council in support of the resolution. ”
Fine. Then point out where in UNSC 1441 it says that there will be another resolution.
“In fact in order to get some countries to vote for it he had to explicitly undertake that “This resolution contains no ‘hidden triggers’ and no ‘automaticity’ with respect to the use of force.”
I agree, there were no hidden triggers, the resolution was quite clear in what it expected. Complete and immediate compliance.
“If there is a further Iraqi breach … the matter will return to the council for discussionâ€?. Which, of course, it never did.”
ah, so there was no discussion after Blix gave his report?
AR, here are the Downing St memos. Read in particular the first para in red, from July 2002 “Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. ” More recent reports, show that the determination to go to war continued right through the period when the UN process was supposedly being given a chance to work. See here.
Avaroo, I don’ t think you’re adding anything to this thread – as in previous instances, you’re just trolling. Please end your contributions to this thread, or I’ll have to put you on automoderation.
PrQ,
I had not seen those before. If authentic (and I presume they are) they present a strong case that WMD was a pretext. I note, however, that they are based on the presumtion that WMD are present. In particular the (unhighlighted) section
is based on this presumption – before the intelligence and facts were being fixed. Then there is this section (also, unhighlighted)
To me at least, this means that the PM and the defence secretary believed that WMD were available to Saddam and could be deployed by him quickly.
Your last point is quite reasonable AR.
I think the context of your exerpted para may serve as a partial answer:
“On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
“For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.”
This is the Francis Richards, CDS (Chief of Diplomatic Service) speaking. There is no reason for him to be in the know about Saddam’s WMDs. Thus, it says nothing about what Blair or his Defence Secretary might know about WMDs, especially if it is in their interests to promote the deception that they believe that Saddam was in possession ofWMDs.
This is a classic example of the anthropomorphisation of governments (mentioned above): the assumption that all persons involved in a decision know as much as the most knowledgeable person involved in a decision.
This isn’t how the real world works.
Katz,
Re-read the last sentence of the blockquote.
AR, nearly everyone thought in 2002 that Saddam had WMDs, including Bush and Blair (and me). They therefore thought they were on safe ground in cooking up evidence, much in the manner of a police officer giving false evidence to secure a search warrant which he is confident will turn up the goods.
By early 2003, after the inspectors had searched all the obvious places. I think it was clear that there weren’t WMDs in the sense described above, but they still expected to find enough old stocks to be able to brazen the issue out.
I can understand your opinion, PrQ. I just do not entirely agree with it. It is, for the moment, an academic question. It will remain so until it gets in to court somewhere – which I am sure it will. I await the outcome with great interest.
Seeing a requirement for a further resolution actually IN UNSC 1441 would convince me.
i gave you two cites from UN 1441 that say this. stop being silly.
Resolutions are pretty thorough, they generally don’t leave out big, important stuff, like “another resolution will be required� if that’s what they mean.
but i suppose it’s just a typo that UN 1441 nowhere says “this resolution authorises the use of force without the need for further UNSC consideration or authorisation”.
Iraq’s breach was all reported to the Council in March 2003.
i spose you will provide a cite which shows UNMOVIC or the IEAE stating, in March 2003, that iraq was in ongoing material breach of UN 1441.
“Katz,
“Re-read the last sentence of the blockquote.”
No, AR, you have misinterpreted this.
“Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.” I read this as meaning the Defence Secretary added this comment to the previous comments of Francis Richards, i.e., Richards made the first observation in the paragraph and then the Defence Secretary added his comment.
To reinforce my earlier point, here is the Defence Secretary, who was in the know about the sexed up WMD intelligence, was selling the notion to others in the room, including Richards, who was not in the know.
Katz,
I agree that this is one possible interpretation of what was said. The other is that he believed the WMD were there. Unless we know what was in his mind at the time it is not possible to say if he was lying to others in the government or genuinely believed there were WMDs.
As you would remember, the attack on Israel scenario was one they were (if we accept that they believed that WMDs were there) particularly worried about due to the likelihood that this would have been very popular in the middle east. That is why it was added in.
This doesn’t seem to have progressed anywhere since JQ, rightly, said “this is silly. The whole process was a conscious fraud….”.
I guess I can understand the reluctance of some to accept this. That decisions of such gravity can be undertaken with such cynicism is something I would rather not believe either, but the available evidence points very strongly in this direction.
Hmm,
I’ve just read the Downing Street memo for the first time from the British point of view.
It’s most explosive contents, of course, are JIC Scarlett’s report of “Washington’s” desire for an intelligence-based pretext for military action against Saddam.
But the British discussions appear to be more modulated. The picture that Blair and the Defence Secretary wanted to project to the US is that they still believed that WMDs may be found.
They wanted this hunt for WMDs (whether they exist or not) to serve as a lever to convince “Washington” that they ought to go back to the UN to issue an ultimatum on Saddam.
“The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.”
This should be read in conjuction with Scarlett’s prefatory remarks:
“There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.”
The question is whether the British believed that the possibility that the US hadn’t worked out what to do after military victory might offer the British the opportunity to influence post-occupation policy.
As it turned out, the whole thing became so chaotic that the British stayed very much in their relatively safe enclave in Basra and genuine co-operation on reconstruction evaporated like a waking dream.
But surely waking dreams dissipate?
“The question is whether the British believed that the possibility that the US hadn’t worked out what to do after military victory might offer the British the opportunity to influence post-occupation policy.”
This is kind of a cynical view of the British, no? Is it likely that the British, if they recognized that no one had an after military victory plan, wouldn’t have spoken up?
It’s not necessarily a cynical view of realism.
It may be a realistic view of cynicism.
There simply isn’t enough information in those Downing Street Memos to make any definitive statement about British thinking about whether and how they should influence US post-occupation thinking.
But I think that it is worth observing that there are some hints about a British willingness to avoid talking about post-occupation strategy.
Once that willingness is acknowledged, then the question must arise as to why the British would choose not to talk about a topic that John Scarlett at least regards as a very important topic indeed.
Cynicism is just one possible explanation.
“Is it likely that the British, if they recognized that no one had an after military victory plan, wouldn’t have spoken up?”
This may well be the case, but to my knowledge a document detailing this hypothesised determination to talk about this important topic hasn’t been leaked yet.
I’d be happy to be corrected on this last point.
A British willingness to avoid talking about post-occupation strategy with whom? Each other or the US? And what would be the benefit of avoiding such a discussion? Increased loss of British lives? Makes no sense.
We must remember what the Downing Street memos are. They contain NO US comment, they are internal British memos only. They are not a definitive statement of US views on anything, yet they are often taken as such.
The DSW memos do not prove that there were no discussions between the US and the British concerning the after victory strategy. They also don’t prove that no oe wanted such discussions.
“Once we agree that the war on Iraq was wrong and that as it happened French/German/Russian/Chinese leaders turned out to be right, and then clearly we should give someone else a go at leading us.”
Yes but let’s note that the French et al weren’t right from any great moral or intellectual superiority.
Broadly speaking (and as a former farmboy) all it took to see that invading Iraq was a bad idea was not being as bumb as pig-shit.
“the UN had already said there would be serious consequences for continued noncompliance. In the context of this situation, there was little doubt what that meant.”
It means that the UNSC will re-convene to discuss further procedure, as indicated by the very next (and last) item in that resolution:
“14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”
and is not itself diplomat-speak for war.
The words for war, that are not contained in 1441 – but very much so, for example in the Afghanistan resolution and elsewhere – are “all necessary means”
Without those words, you don’t have a resolution for war.