The fact that people are so willing to support war is a puzzle that requires an explanation. After all, war is a negative-sum activity, so war between rational parties doesn’t make sense – there’s always a potential settlement that would leave both sides better off*. And empirically, it’s usually the case that both sides end up worse off relative to both the status quo ante or to a possible peace settlement they could have secured at a point well before the end of the war. Even the observation that rulers start wars and ordinary people bear the costs doesn’t help much – leaders who start losing wars usually lose their jobs and sometimes more, while winning a war is by no means a guarantee of continued political success (ask Bush I) All of this suggests that looking for rational explanations of war, as in the ‘realist’ tradition (scare quotes indicate that this self-ascribed title has little to with a reality-based focus on the real world) is not a good starting point.
So it makes sense to look at irrational sources of support for war. In this pice in Foreign Policy Daniel Kahneman (winner of the economics Nobel a couple of years back) and Jonathan Renshon start looking at some well-known cognitive biases and find that they tend systematically to favor hawkish rather than dovish behavior. The most important, in the context of today’s news is “double or nothing” bias, which is well-known in studies of choice under uncertainty as risk-seeking in the domain of losses (something first observed by Kahneman and Amos Tversky in their classic paper on prospect theory).
The basic point is that people tend to cast problems like whether to continue a war that is going badly in win-lose terms and to be prepared to accept a high probability of greater losses in return for a small probability of winning or breaking even. So we get the Big Push, the Surge, the last throw of the dice and so on.
There are other biases that are based more in the way we manage things as a society than in individual psychology. The most important is the failure to treat decisions about war in terms of opportunity cost, by contrast with the way in which the budgeting process of governments (admittedly imperfectly) brings home the cost of other government activities. More on this soon, I hope.
* This is not necessarily the case if your opponent is irrationally bent on your destruction, but one of the problems noted by Kahneman and Renshon is that people are overly willing to impute such motives to others, while perceiving themselves as peaceful and reasonable.
John Quiggin 
I can think of an example where war is good:
Country 1 is a dictatorship which maims/kills its citizens and
keeps them in poverty. Country 2 is a (reasonably pleasant) liberal
democracy. Country 2 spends some time and money deposing the
dictatorship of country 1. Country 1 loses some money. Country 2
gains social/economic freedom and its citizens are
spared death/torture/poverty at the hands of the dictatorship.
All hypothetical, of course.
On Dec 12th, good old Ambrose Evans-Pritchard of the Daily Telegraph commented on the expectation of the Pound Sterling to plummet. This becomes relevant where the role of the fall of the pound triggering a further catastrophic fall of the dollar is making the rounds this week.
Meanwhile, the oil price is falling. This may be a welcoming sight for motorists around the world, but this will go into the mix, or shall we say the descent into the maelstrom. Hedge funds could take a big beating. They have been betting on big macho man Cheney to hit Iran and start the rise of oil toward $200 a barrel. But, it has been delayed, though not entirely called off. Here’s a little bit of advice to my hedge fund friends. If the Democratic congress nixes the “surge” in Iraq, then oil will continue down. And alot of hedge fund people are going to be hung out to dry, like what happened to the Amaranth Hedge Fund people up in Greenwich Ct. Or the Amaranth people out in the Cayman Islands. You know, the usual arrangement, the onshore and the offshore branches of twin companies. Anyway a real crash is definitely in the mix for hedge fund people nation.
More at a href=’http://www.realcrash.com’>real crash
On Dec 12th, good old Ambrose Evans-Pritchard of the Daily Telegraph commented on the expectation of the Pound Sterling to plummet. This becomes relevant where the role of the fall of the pound triggering a further catastrophic fall of the dollar is making the rounds this week.
Meanwhile, the oil price is falling. This may be a welcoming sight for motorists around the world, but this will go into the mix, or shall we say the descent into the maelstrom. Hedge funds could take a big beating. They have been betting on big macho man Cheney to hit Iran and start the rise of oil toward $200 a barrel. But, it has been delayed, though not entirely called off. Here’s a little bit of advice to my hedge fund friends. If the Democratic congress nixes the “surge” in Iraq, then oil will continue down. And alot of hedge fund people are going to be hung out to dry, like what happened to the Amaranth Hedge Fund people up in Greenwich Ct. Or the Amaranth people out in the Cayman Islands. You know, the usual arrangement, the onshore and the offshore branches of twin companies. Anyway a real crash is definitely in the mix for hedge fund people nation.
More at real crash
Joseph –
A comforting myth. Got a single historical example that looks even remotely like that?
Paul and Joseph-
An example would be Equatorial Guinea under Macias Nguema. But no-one did anything about that terrible situation because the things Joseph lists are almost never the reasons one country invades another.
dez –
Exactly.
At the moment, Mugabe in Zimbabwe and the junta in power in Burma meet Joseph’s descriptive criteria.
The ONLY example I could come up with was MiloÅ¡ević’s Serbia.
JQ – A good book to read is this
http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/JOHOVE.html
The blurb from the advertisement:
” Overconfidence and War
The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions
Dominic D. P. Johnson
* 2005 Honor Book, New Jersey Council for the Humanities
Opponents rarely go to war without thinking they can win–and clearly, one side must be wrong. This conundrum lies at the heart of the so-called “war puzzle”: rational states should agree on their differences in power and thus not fight. But as Dominic Johnson argues in Overconfidence and War, states are no more rational than people, who are susceptible to exaggerated ideas of their own virtue, of their ability to control events, and of the future. By looking at this bias–called “positive illusions”–as it figures in evolutionary biology, psychology, and the politics of international conflict, this book offers compelling insights into why states wage war.
Johnson traces the effects of positive illusions on four turning points in twentieth-century history: two that erupted into war (World War I and Vietnam); and two that did not (the Munich crisis and the Cuban missile crisis). Examining the two wars, he shows how positive illusions have filtered into politics, causing leaders to overestimate themselves and underestimate their adversaries–and to resort to violence to settle a conflict against unreasonable odds. In the Munich and Cuban missile crises, he shows how lessening positive illusions may allow leaders to pursue peaceful solutions.”
I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again; in many cases (and wrt the US in almost all cases outside S.America) war is not about foreign policy or relationships with other States. It’s about domestic political manoevring. So, for them, it’s a fundamental waste of time to seek explanations of war in the foreign policy realm. Look for domestic political advantages, like the surge in popularity which Bush II achieved after the destruction of the World Trade Centre with his “war on terror” and invasions of foreign countries.
There is also (and I have the US in mind here too) the very considerable payoffs to armaments manufacturers from high levels of continuing military expenditure in peacetime and even more in wartime. Lots of people made a lot of money from Vietnam, and nobody thinks Halliburton took a bath in Iraq. Some of this money finds its way back into the politicians’ pockets, multiplying the political advantages further.
To say: “All of this suggests that looking for rational explanations of war…is not a good starting point” is mistaken. There are perfectly rational explanations, if you look in the right places.
Agreed, Gordon. The problem is, as with much seemingly irrational conduct, mis-alignment of incentives between the individual conducting the behaviour and those of the organisation to which they belong. Why is it that market traders are sometimes willing to take huge risks with seemingly little chance of paying off? This is not irrational behaviour, but a rational response to the incentives they are exposed to. Why is it that governments from an ostensibly free-market background keep increasing regulation? Again, their incentives are structured around their power base, not their philosophical background. Why do dictators make war and either leave their country in or take their country into penury? Their incentives are to hold on to power, not to improve the lot of the ruled.
Democratic governments tend to do things with a time horizon of the next election, or, if they are travelling really well, the election after that. Repressive governments have much shorter time horizons as the leader(s) has/have much shorter-term fears – coups or revolutions.
Trying to look at the problem as one of irrationality makes the common mistake of assuming the rulers and the ruled have the same objectives. The problem is not irrationality, but incentives.
I’m inclined to agree with Gordon on this one – otherwise it is difficult to explain the persistent habit of going to war to settle almost every dispute as well as the mind bogglingly stupid strategy of maximum aerial bombardment with minimum human engagement against guerrillas. Even where they do use humans, they have to carry huge packs and go around in humvees in case somebody shoots at them. Afghanistan and Iraq have got the US out of the recession it was in back in 2001. Probably it’ll put them back in one again when the current financial bubble bursts.
Grenada is the only case I can think of in which Joseph Clark’s idea has worked.
Also, Joseph mixes up his designators.
What of the “saving face” angle here (w/r/t “staying the course”)? Is it rational or irrational to give weight to the “perception of weakness” implicit in admitting defeat? Personally, I think admitting failure and seriously addressing its causes is a sign of wisdom, maturity and strength, but in actual fact I’m not very good at it in my personal life. Should I expect a nation to be any better?
As far as starting wars goes, this is usually a combination of impatience and bad advice. Impatience with the slow progress of peaceful solutions, and advice from people who just love wars that overstates the chances of success. They really believe in “their boys” (and increasingly their toys) and just can’t wait to see them in action, whuppin’ ass. Again, are either of these strictly irrational?
Stupid, yes.
Remember that nato’s action against serbia was decried as illegal etc in 1998 !
re: 7 – so Munich was a good “peaceful solution”?
We are having an “ABC moment” here, holding a view that war is the only answer is “puzzling” and “pro-war bias”. Hmmm…..
OK, how about the Falklands?
Should the UK not have defended and taken back their territory that Argentina invaded?
Exactly how would the UK and the Falkland Islanders have been better off by negotiating an outcome anything less than complete withdrawal of the Argnetinians from the Falklands?
It might have cost money and casualties, but there was and still isn’t any other acceptable outcome other than taking back total control of the Falklands. The UK decisions were the correct ones, they weren’t irrational.
Yes, but the Falklands was a response to an invasion, not a dictatorship with significant domestic backing.
More correctly, melanie, the Argentinian junta started the war by invading, calculating (incorrectly) that the UK would respond only with words, not weapons. They were trying to divert attention from a domestic economic crisis with a victory on the battlefield.
I agree Andrew, and it was their undoing (as I hoped and predicted at the time).
I think there is an underlying element to the attraction of “double-or-nothing” and aversion to “cutting losses”. And it’s the problem we have with endings. How many people have you seen (or perhaps have been) continuing in a realtionship that was pretty clearly no longer a ‘going concern’. It seems hard to end something because it, in part, acknowledges failure. So it’s better to have a ‘surge’/’another roll of the dice’, than admit it’s actually all over.
For the Falklands, the UK lost a bit (some ships, some men, many pounds), gained nothing, while the Argentinians lost a lot more. So war was a negative sum game, once more. Though far more so for the presecutors.
I think you have to get down to the level of genetic hard wiring to understand our enthusiasm for war. For genes as opposed to us war has traditionally not been a negative sum game. I am talking in terms of the tribal way we have lived for most of our existence.
Let me explain. Say you have two identical hunter gatherer tribes, tribe A and tribe B. Lets assume that by some chance an opportunity presents itself where tribe A can attack tribe B with a 60% chance of winning. Even though the probability of a win is greater than 50% this is still a bad decision from the people tribe A’s point of view. They have an almost 100% chance of being worse off even if they win as members of both tribes will be killed or maimed. With this sort of thinking war is irrational and should be rare.
From the point of view of the genes of tribe A it is a different story. If tribe A attacks tribe B several things will happen if it goes to the usual script. Some, perhaps many men in tribe A will be dead or maimed, but probably few or no women. All the men in tribe B will be killed or driven away but the women of tribe B not be killed because the victorious men in tribe A will want to enslave and/or rape them. So all men in tribe B dead or gone. Some or lots of men in tribe A dead or maimed. Few women of either tribe dead.
From the point of view of tribe A’s genes this is a very good outcome. The number of women available to the genes of tribe A is practically doubled. Which means they have doubled the number of potential offspring. So from the genes point of view this was a 60% chance of doubling their number of offspring. The fact that some men of tribe A died does not matter as one man can have many children.
But it gets better. Even if tribe A loses the war the women of tribe A will probably be spared. The men of tribe B will want to rape and enslave them. This is terrible from the point of the people in tribe A view but not disaster from the point of view of the genes in tribe A because
1) half their genes will survive through the mothers passing them on
2) the new offspring will have the genes of winning tribe which are presumably stronger giving them a greater chance of reproducing.
So from the gene’s point of view its a 60% chance of a win which doubles the number of offspring with your genes. And a 40% chance of a losing which halves the number of offspring with your genes. Under those odds attacking is rational, even necessary because if you don’t attack when the odds are in your favour you will certainly be attacked when they favour your enemy.
This theory rests on the assumption that women will not be risked in combat. The loss of men is insignificant in genetic terms because one man can have lots of children. But the loss of a women is significant because that is also the loss of a number of potential offspring. I think this is born out in practice as with some exceptions the offensive operations in war are carried out by men. The fact that women are killed in large numbers today is more a product of modern weapons being very powerful. Traditionally women do not risk their lives in attack and when on the losing side they are raped and enslaved by the victors rather than killed.
So if you carry this through to the logical conclusion you would think that our genes would try to make us more aggressive and supportive of war than our best interests would suggest. Our modern enthusiasm for war is a byproduct of genes shaped by the tribal societies we evolved in.
wilful,
The UK gained the Falklands, which, as was not known at the time, has good oil potential. As it was not known at the time, however, it could not have entered into consideration.
Look, though, at the UK leadership at the time. To have simply given up would not have fitted with the “Iron Lady” persona – so, even if the overall result was a loss to the nation in economic terms the political reality meant that the incentives for Thatcher to take military action were overwhelming. She effectively had no real diplomatic leverage (the US, under Reagan, were predisposed to help the Argentinian junta and only came on board after the taskforce sailed) and so either had to merely make token protests or take military action. It was a no-brainer for her even if, from an economic standpoint it represented a (short-term) loss to the country.
It is a no-brainer for anybody Andrew Reynolds. The residents of the Falklands were British subjects, obliged to adhere to British law, paid duties & taxes (where applicable) to the British Crown.
There were entitled to British protection, & they got it. Anything else would have been reprehensible.
SWIO, with reasoning like yours you guys had better start evolving soon or we’ll have to do away with you altogether! We have the technology… grrr!
Fortunately for you, Maggie Thatcher put a big ? over your theory. I suppose she didn’t imagine she might be raped and enslaved by General Galtieri though. She was too busy appealing to the spirit of Dunkirk, not to mention rescuing people from under the kitchen table at Government Cottage… and what about those brave souls who refused to drive on the wrong side of the road (for all of which, she won the next election)… ah yes, and testing the latest products of one of Britain’s major export industries.
So if we teach the world about game theory, we’ll put an end to war? Sounds good to me.
I don’t think our genes have hard control over our behaviour, only very strong influence. And more importantly the way genes shuffle themselves around so much means that there is a very big variation in outcomes. In general people have a strong desire for heterosexual sex driven by their genes. But this is not always the case. So most people will be genetically mentally wired up the way I hypothesize, but there will always be lots of exceptions.
But don’t blame it all on the men! Our genes face the same incentives whether they are inside a women or a man. If wars were entirely driven genetically hardwired men while women were completely rational then every war would end up with massive splits in support broken down by gender. This doesn’t happen. Its usually only a minor difference. Whatever it is inside us that encourages us to make irrational decisions about the outcome of war seems to be inside both genders, though more strongly in men
alpaca Says:
Not really.
SATP,
My recollection of the event was that at the time of the war, Falkland Islanders couldn’t vote in British elections, a bit of a sore point.
If my memory isn’t playing tricks, it somewhat undermines the idea of British principle and rational decision making in the affair.
SWIO, “Our genes face the same incentives whether they are inside a women or a man”? You mean women are genetically wired for rape and slavery? I don’t think so. It’s not a case of men being irrational and women being rational. War can be a rational decision (depending on the context as discussed above). The reason women are less fond of it than men is that, they need men around to help bring up the kids. This is also rational.
So because they didn’t or couldn’t vote they weren’t entitled to British protection Michael? Are you sure you want to run with that?
satp,
Put that comment in the context of Hong Kong and think about it. Same Prime Minister even. British nationality and territory can be bargained away, given the right framework.
There were, IIRC, even one or two in the British cabinet who opposed military action. It would not have been a no-brainer for everyone.
“The fact that people are so willing to support war is a puzzle that requires an explanation.”
It isn’t that much of a puzzle. In the case of the war against Iraq I support it for several reasons. One reason is because the Iraqis supported terrorist organizations like the FRC, PLF and MEK, all of which have attacked and killed Americans. The terrorists attack us, so we counterattack the terrorists and anyone who helps them.
What’s the puzzle?
“supported terrorist organizations like the FRC, PLF and MEK“
“we counterattack the terrorists and anyone who helps them.
You do you realise that the MEK gets support from members of the US congress?
http://www.hillnews.com/news/040203/terrorist.aspx
And quite likely has recieved training frem the CIA?
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article15564.htm
“You do you realise that the MEK gets support from members of the US congress?”
They better not provide MEK with any material support. That would be a felony.
Wilful says: “For the Falklands, the UK lost a bit (some ships, some men, many pounds), gained nothing…” As far as I remember, M.Thatcher was having some popularity problems of her own about that time, and if Andrew Reynolds is right and the Argentinian Govt. invaded to create a distraction (I don’t remember), then there is a lovely historical irony in their being defeated by a UK whose leader was delighted to turn the tables and seize the popularity for herself. The sailors roasted alive on the burning HMS Sheffield (I think it was) played a double role; reinforcing the Spirit of Dunkirk (from which Thatcher benefited) and proving that it’s a bad idea to build warships out of aluminium and to give sailors inflammable foam mattresses (thereby contributing to R&D for the UK arms industry). All quite rational.
“So because they didn’t or couldn’t vote they weren’t entitled to British protection Michael? Are you sure you want to run with that?”
sdfc, I’m very happy to run with that, as that wasn’t the angle I was considering. Rather , the failure to bother to extend one of the most basic rights (voting) to them, makes me wonder if the Andrew Reynlds suggestion of British motivation is a little more realistic than SATPs idealistic version. It appears that territory and pride were more important than noble sentiments of protecting British subjects, which probably puts it in the irrational category.
It was “irrational” for the UK to take back the Falkland Islands by force?
Please explain for us what would have been rational?
War is certainly a zero sum game, but US exceptionalism is not easily quantified.
“You mean women are genetically wired for rape and slavery? I don’t think so.”
Reconsider, Melanie. A woman shares genes with her brothers and woman sending two brothers out to rape and enslave is mathematically the same as being a man and raping and enslaving.
SWIO’s story is right. Broadly, the things that a creature likes are the things that promote its genes. Men have always delighted in war and women have supported them, wherever you look, in tribes around the world, since time began. No man is prouder than a young soldier. No man feels he is as part of something great and transcending as a man at war. “To strike for all that is true and strong, for all that is grand and brave, for all there ever shall be so long as man has a soul to save.” Doesn’t it make you think you’re missing something?
But be of good cheer. There is a counter to it: democracy. Democracies never war against each other. And Switzerland, where the people can veto over every law, has had no war for 150 years. In WW2 they were surrounded by fascism and the similar highland German culture next door welcomed fascism, yet the Swiss stayed free. As Aristotle said, and countless experiments in everything from betting markets to guessing the number of beans in a jar show, the people en masse have wisdom.
“It was “irrationalâ€? for the UK to take back the Falkland Islands by force?
Please explain for us what would have been rational? ”
SATP,
If it never bothered the British to value the Falkland Islanders highly enough to give them the vote, then it’s hard to argue that the purpose of the war, as you claim, had a rational basis in the protection British subjects.
I suspect if we were to be completely rational, the best course of action, given their location, would have been to allow Argentinia to assume sovereignty over the Islands, preferably long ago. But then Empires, even faded ones, aren’t too rational.
Just as well the leaders of the western world don’t have your mentality Micheal, or we’d be doing this in Japanese.
Mike Pepperday, I think you and SWIO are adopting a teleological approach. The best you can actually say is that war is not detrimental to the reproduction of the species. However, just because we like it doesn’t mean that it promotes the genes – otherwise there would be no homosexuality, for example. War, since it tends to promote brawn over brain, is probably holding back the evolution of the species!
Btw, a country that denies the vote to half its population is hardly a democracy. Got another example?
gordon,
you might want to check your facts on the HMS Sheffield – wikipedia covers it well. It was not a problem with the ship design it was a problem with battle tactics and the understanding of mission profiles.
.
Michael,
Rationality depends on your point of view. In the short term, it probably would have been better for the UK, as a country, to give up the Falklands. For the UK government, however, it would have been a devastating blow to the image of an “Iron Lady”. Action was, therefore, rational for the PM and the government, if not, possibly, for the country. As we cannot see what would have happened without the re-taking of the Falklands a judgement of the long-term position is much more difficult. Would it have been better or worse, in the long run, for Michael Foot to have become PM?
Any government is simply another interest group within a country, its impact varying by the powers it has. The more representative a government is the closer the interests of the government are aligned to those of the country – but they cannot be and will never be perfectly aligned. This is why, to me at least, we need a liberal framework, limiting the powers of governments.
Andrew,
I agree.
And what seemed rational for Argentina, may have been less so if it had factored into it’s calculations, the potential irrationality of a British response. Rational considerations must include the irrational.
SATP,
You asked for a comment on what was rational, not what was moral or legal.
Michael,
The British government’s response was perfectly rational – if I had been in her position (not likely, admittedly) I think I would have done the same thing. It’s what was rational for the government that counted, not what was rational (perhaps) for the British people. No irrationality was involved (IMHO).
The moral and legal response is occasionally not the rational one. As you noted, this is a crucial difference.
To invite a thousand flames down upon me, this is why I believe many do not understand the rationale of the current war in Iraq. The decision was, I believe, founded on a rational basis on what was known, or thought to be known, at the time. That the subsequent events have proved that many of the assumptions were wrong does not mean the original decision was irrational on the part of those who took the decision.
The British Govt’s response may have been perfectly rational from it’s prespective, but I’d imagine that the Argentinians might have thought otherwise. But then that could be their own irrationality (careless optimism). This is were knowing the irrational nature of decision making in war has its limits and can’t ensure a correct or good decision. Argentina looking at the Falklands probably saw a small isolated island far from GB, of minimal stratgic and economic signifigance. Thatcher obviously looked at the same islands and saw a threat to power, prestige and national pride. Different assumptions and weighted in importance very differently.
On the Iraq War, I think you’re right, you might get a bit of heat on this. I wonder to what degree can actions be based on self-delusion and remain rational?
Until (and if ever) the intelligence data is released the question of whether it was self delusion, simple error, wrong assements, deliberate misinformation or a combination of all of these or more will have to (IMHO) remain open. It will be an interesting question for historians to mull over in the decades to come. In the mean time the question is what to do now.
Andrew, I think you spiked your own argument. Rationality from the point of view of interests is not the same as rationality from the point of view of information/knowledge. I would contend that the Iraq war was rational from the interest angle – Big Oil, christian looney, support for Israel, etc, and then was dressed up with half-baked information about WMDs. The strategic interest actually prevented them from doing a proper assessment of the reality (particularly in their “planning” for the post-war situation).
Teleological, Melanie? You are the one talking of “detrimental to� and “holding back�. Meaningless. Utterly meaningless. “The best you can actually say is that war is not detrimental to the reproduction of the species.� Best? Good and bad play no role.
Please – go back and carefully read SWIO’s original post. What he says is orthodox Darwinism. Then put everything else aside and read The Selfish Gene – the 1989 edition with the addenda on game theory should be to your taste.
War didn’t promote brawn. Since we are the most warlike species and also the cleverest (but not the strongest) war presumably made our species. The cleverness requires a long slow childhood and the fact that men are the warriors may be why they take two years longer to mature than women.
Seeing someone get hurt when you think they deserve it gives a feeling of satisfaction, even pleasure. That we require no proof beyond reasonable doubt to feel that way appears seems to be irrelevant – the need for proof is not wired into our brains. The effect works quite well even with stuff we know to be fictional, like a good movie. The actual consequences also appear to be irrelevant – do the people of a nation that’s been thoroughly defeated end up feeling it was a fair cop or do they go on to feel satisfaction from seeing some of those “victors” get hurt? The consequences hoped for are largely imaginary, the costs are mostly hidden or glossed over and the suffering of those labelled as Enemy is a point of satisfaction, not remorse. I think I have to agree that there is an element of irrationality involved in going to war.