Reaping the whirlwind

I’ve been trying to make sense of the Brexit (or rather E-exit) vote in terms of the analysis I put forward a while back. The result, over the fold, is a piece in Inside Story, an Australian magazine.

The key point is, that, in the absence of a coherent left alternative, neoliberalism (hard and soft) is being overwhelmed by a tribalist backlash. Writing this, I realise it might be construed as criticism of Corbyn for failing to develop and propose such an alternative in the referendum campaign. That would be a bad misreading. The context of the referendum meant that it was always going to be a choice of evils: between the racism and bigotry that animated so much of the Leave campaign, and the neoliberalism of both the Cameron government and the EU. The option of a social democratic, or even soft neoliberal, EU was not on the ballot.

Reaping the whirlwind

The surprising decision by English and Welsh (though not Scottish and Northern Irish) voters to leave the European Union can only be understood in the broader context of the breakdown of the ideological consensus that dominated politics throughout the world until the Global Financial Crisis. Precisely because of its dominance this ideology was seen as common sense by its adherents. Its opponents gave it various names including economic rationalism (in Australia), Thatcherism (in the UK) and the Washington Consensus (in the Third World) but the most common was “neoliberalism”.

As neoliberalism has declined, it has been challenged on the right by the politics of tribalism, embodied in the Brexit vote and by the rise of Donald Trump in the United States. There has also been challenge from the left, reflected in the election of Jeremy Corbyn as the leader of the British Labour Party, and the strong showing of Bernie Sanders in the US Democratic primaries. To understand what is going here, it is necessary to go beyond the use of neoliberalism as a pejorative term of abuse, and understand it as a powerful, but ultimately wrong and dangerous, way of thinking about the world.

Before we can begin to think about it, we need to clarify some confusion about the term itself. Neoliberalism is mostly used to mean one thing in the US and something related, but different, everywhere else, including in most of the political discussion of the US. This difference may be traced back to the fact the term “liberal” in the US has historically been associated with the centre-left, combining support for social and civil liberties with a moderate form of welfare statism. By contrast, in Europe, the term “liberal” is more closely associated with the 19-th century free-market view commonly called “classical liberalism”.

Correspondingly, the term “neoliberal” is used, outside the US, to refer to the revival of 19th century free market ideas. Closely associated with this is the return of the 19th century globalised economy, made possible both by the free market and by the creation of the first global telecommunications networks, based on the telegraph. Thanks to telegraphy, money could move instantly and freely about the world, while people and goods travelled at the much slower, but still historically impressive, speeds of steamships and railways.

Neoliberals, in this sense merged from the economic crisis of the 1970s, which destroyed an earlier consensus, centred on Keynesian macroeconomic management and a social-democratic welfare state. Its core idea was that unfettered financial markets could do better than governments in every respect, from stabilising employment and inflation to allocating investment to allowing people and families to manage the risks of unemployment, sickness and old age. The full program of neoliberalism in this ‘hard’ sense involved the dismantling of the 20th century welfare state and the associated mixed economy.

The US version of neoliberalism corresponds to what was called elsewhere the Third Way. It involved an attempt by former liberals (in the US sense) and social democrats to accommodate to the demands of financial markets while still softening the edges of capitalism and maintaining a more active role for the state in filling the gaps left by market provision of services. This ‘soft’ neoliberalism was exemplified by the (Bill) Clinton administration in the United States and the Blair government in the UK and was prefigured, in important respects, by the Hawke-Keating government in Australia.

As an ideological retained its dominance until the Global Financial Crisis, which fatally undermined the central claim that a massive and powerful financial system would guarantee prosperity for all. Despite its death as a credible theory of economics and politics, neoliberalism has stumbled on in zombie form for nearly a decade, maintaining its hold over major political parties and over organizations like the OECD, IMF and European Commission. As I observed in my 2010 book, Zombie Economics, the economics profession as a whole has learned almost nothing from the Global Financial Crisis. Ideas like austerity that should have been decently buried long ago continue to wreak havoc throughout the world, and most notably in Europe.

The political situation is similar. During the decades of neoliberalism that began in the 1970s, the, the political system, nearly everywhere, was based on electoral competition between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ versions of neoliberalism, focusing on marginal differences in economic policy, and on more heated divisions in social policy (the so-called ‘culture wars’). Within the political class, and among business leaders and policymakers, there was a near-universal consensus in support of neoliberal ideas. To take any position outside the narrow range from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ neoliberalism guaranteed marginalisation and exclusion from serious political debate.

Yet, despite its dominance, neoliberalism hardly ever achieved broad support among the public at large. Rather, the seeming success of neoliberalism concealed the continued strength of currents that remained submerged for decades, becoming politically significant only in occasional eruptions.

The most important of these submerged currents was tribalism, that is, is politics based on affirmation of some group identity against others. While there are as many tribalisms as there are tribes, the most politically potent form, and the relevant one here, is that of a formerly unchallenged dominant group facing the real or perceived prospect of becoming a politically weak and economically declining minority. The most important such group consists of white Christians, where ‘Christian’ is interpreted in a sense of cultural identification rather than any specific religious belief.

Opposed to the tribalists in critical ways, but similar in others, is a disparate group that may be called, for want of a better term ‘the left’. As well as a small group who adhere to marxist or other radical critiques of capitalism, the ‘left’ in this sense includes environmentalists, feminists, unionists, old-style liberals and social democrats, and a wide variety of groups whose personal or cultural identity is threatened by white Christian tribalism.

Most people aren’t systematic thinkers and many combine a mixture of these views. For example, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation combined a dominant tribalist theme of opposition to immigration with a reaction against ‘economic rationalism’, and drew a significant amount of support from union oriented Labor voters.

Because neither ‘hard’ nor ‘soft’ neoliberalism commanded much in the way of support, the dominant neoliberal parties relied on the votes of the excluded groups. The ‘hard’ neoliberal parties relied on the votes of tribalists and made symbolic gestures in their direction, but largely ignored them, particularly if their interests came into conflict with those of big business. The big point of conflict within this coalition was immigration policy, favored by business but feared by the voters whose support they needed. The resolution, which was sustained for quite a long while, was to expand skilled and business migration, the kind most favored by business, while focusing tribal fears on particular groups (in the Australian context, those who arrived by boat).

Soft neoliberals similarly gained the electoral support of the various left groups through a combination of modest concessions and willingness to support “the lesser evil” in the absence of any alternative. The archetypal example, and the one that does most to explain the Brexit eruption was Tony Blair’s New Labour, which explicitly abandoned the traditional positions of the Labour Party and embraced globalisation and the financial sector.

The project of European unification, embodied in the European Union and its associated institutions was, in its origins, a classic example of soft neoliberalism. Its central aim was the removal of barriers to the flow of goods, people and money across national borders within Europe. This was, however, constrained by a wide variety of protocols, commonly referred to as the Social Chapter, which were designed to protect European welfare states within a framework of market liberal reform.

Over time, however, hard neoliberalism came to the fore, most obviously in the creation of the euro and its managing institution, the European Central Bank (ECB). The charter of the ECB was focused entirely on targeting inflation, and precluded the use of monetary expansion to finance budget deficits.

The Global Financial Crisis, and the responses of the policy elite proved fatal to neoliberal dominance. Everywhere, bankers and the financial system were bailed out, while ordinary people were made to pay the price. The situation was worst in the Eurozone, where the design of the ECB made it virtually impossible to adopt any policy except ‘austerity’, a counterproductive focus on cutting budget deficits and controlling the non-existent threat of inflation. (Even if an alternative had been possible, the arrogance and incompetence of ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet ensured that no alternatives would be considered). The result has been a decade of depression in most of the developed world. Even in the US and UK, which have, on some measures recovered, living standards have never returned to the previous growth path, and the inequality of income has been ever more evident.

But just as the economic ideology of neoliberalism lumbers on in zombie form, so, until recently has the political system it supported. Insurgents of various kinds have gained support nearly everywhere, but the alternation between different versions of neoliberalism has continued.

In 2016, all of this has broken down. Hardly anyone now believes in the assurances of the policy elite that they know what is best. It is clear that things have gone substantially wrong in the global economy. What is less clear is why things have gone wrong and what can be done to fix it.

On the left, the answer to the first question is relatively straightforward: the excesses of financialised capitalism have finally come home to roost. This perception was crystalised most dramatically by the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011, and by the stream of research showing that the benefits of globalisation had gone overwhelmingly to the top 1 per cent, or even the top 0.1 per cent, of the population. On the other hand, the process of developing a coherent alternative has barely begun.

By contrast, the tribalists have a clear answer to both questions. The problem is not (or at least not primarily) to be located at the top of the class structure, among bankers and CEOs, but at the bottom, among immigrants and racial minorities who benefit from state protection at the expense of ordinary ‘people like us’. The natural response is to stop or restrict migration and, if possible, to force recent migrants, and particularly illegal migrants, to leave.

The Brexit referendum represents the first truly major victory for the tribalist opponents of neoliberalism. Although a wide variety of issues were canvassed, the central focus of the Leave campaign desire to reassert national control over migration policy, particularly against migrants from poorer EU countries in Eastern Europe. Against this, the neoliberal supporters of Remain painted terrifying pictures of the damage that would be done to business and particularly the financial sector by a break with the EU.

The vote for Britain as a whole was quite close. But a closer look reveals an even bigger win for tribalism than the aggregate results suggest. The version of tribalism offered in the Leave campaign was specifically English. Unsurprisingly, it did not appeal to Scottish or Irish voters who rejected it out of hand. Looking at England alone, however, Leave won comfortably with 53 per cent of the vote and was supported almost everywhere outside London, a city more dependent than any other in the world on the global financial system.

Given the framing of the campaign, the choice for the left was, even more than usually, to pick the lesser of very different evils. Voting for Remain involved acquiescence in austerity and an overgrown and bloated financial system, both in the UK and Europe. The Leave campaign relied more and more on coded, and then overt, appeals to racism and bigotry, symbolised by the murder of Labour MP Jo Cox, stabbed to death by a neo-Nazi with ties to extreme tribalist organizations in both the UK and US. The result was a tepid endorsement of Remain, which secured the support of over 60 per cent of Labour voters, but did little to shift the sentiment of the broader public.

The big problem for the tribalists is that, although their program has now been endorsed by the voters, it does not offer a solution to the economic decline against which most of their supporters were protesting. Indeed, while the catastrophic scenarios pushed by the Remain campaign are probably overblown, the process of renegotiating economic relationships with the rest of the world will almost certainly involve a substantial period of economic stagnation.

The terms offered by the EU for the maintenance of anything like existing market access will almost certainly include maintenance of the status quo on immigration. In the absence of a humiliating capitulation by the new pro-Brexit government, that will mean that Britain (or England) will face a long and painful process of adjustment.

And, even supposing a successful reassertion of control over migration policy, many pro-Brexit voters may find that the negative personal consequences of leaving Europe outweigh the abstract satisfaction of having excluded anonymous foreigners. At a relatively trivial level, there will be the need for a visa to visit Europe (which in this context will probably be as close as Edinburgh). More serious consequences will arise for people whose sons or daughters meet their partners while travelling in Europe, as so many young people do, or even in an independent Scotland. If they are to live together, the English partner will be forced to emigrate and seek citizenship under more liberal EU laws.

Nevertheless, in the absence of something better, tribalist sentiment is only likely to grow. The great tragedy of the period since the GFC has been the failure of the left, broadly defined, to articulate a coherent alternative to, or even a clear critique of, the zombie ideas of neoliberalism. There are, to be sure, some signs of such an alternative, from Syriza in Greece to the Sanders campaign in the US, but so far none of these have been more than modestly successful. Nevertheless, if we are to avoid the dead end of tribalism, there is no alternative.

64 thoughts on “Reaping the whirlwind

  1. @Luke Elford
    Not sure what you mean by “demographic transition” but if you mean modernizing their own economy by retaining young people and educated people then I would say yes. It is better for both Poland and Britain (or whatever is left of it) if hard working Poles stay in Poland in my opinion. That is not to say that foreign investment or aid might not be necessary, it’s just that I think these very large trade zones have caused the course of history to go awry and are hurting more people than they are helping. An internationally mobile work force is good for big business and good for the relatively small number of immigrants or guest workers (though not always) but bad for pretty much everybody else. Poland should be something more than a supply of labor. Exporting workers is probably not helping Poland in the way they intend. I have to admit I’m a little out on a limb, not being that familiar with the Polish economy. I know much more about Britain than Poland.

    I think we’ve wandered off topic. I must have been bored last night when I wrote that very long post, but everybody else seemed to be doing it too so I thought, “Why not?”

  2. The EU and Brexit issues are heavily characterised by centrist and moderate left thinkers as moral issues about immigration. This is true up to a point but it is also a shallow reading of the bigger picture.

    1. Western moral vanity assumes that the undeveloped world always needs our help and they always need to migrate if their own countries “don’t work”. There is more than a hint of elitist thinking in this.

    2. If we stopped invading, bombing and capitalistically exploiting undeveloped countries, they would need far less of our “help”.

    3. The people of undeveloped countries are just as smart and resourceful as us. To somehow imply or assume otherwise is clearly fallacious.

    4. Their “backwardness”, mostly economic but sometimes possibly cultural, is due to certain historical forces and contingencies. The first main factors are the industrial and technological revolutions started somewhere else (England, then Europe) mainly due to what we can call luck and historically contingent factors. The second main factor is the aftereffects of Western empire building as oppression and exploitation.

    5. The first thing we need to do is stop interferring in their regions by applying the principle “first do no harm”. We should simply make knowledge available including technical know-how and do so free of patent and IP charges and let them take which knowledge they wish. We should trade and aid on a non-interference basis and not tie assistance to what we call “economic reform.” We should probably tie aid to de-militarisation but make bilateral, transparent de-militarisation cuts of our own as a show of good faith. Of course, this would mean reigning in the arms trade under capitalism – a herculean task even for democracies.

    Conclusion – We can note that China, India and S.E. Asia have been strong enough to resist excess Western interference in their regions mostly since WW2 or since the Vietnam wars in Vietnam’s case and since the Malayan Emergency and Sukarno in Indonesia. They have mostly prospered (relatively speaking since starting from a low base). The Middle East and much of Africa have not been strong enough to resist excess Western interference in their regions since WW2. They have been a shambles because of our interference. (The US and EU are the main culprits.) Let those developing regions handle their own affairs.

  3. @Ivor
    except that work itself is disappearing and regardless of brexit and ‘workers’ position, robots will be the new black –like Japan. In the future only rich people will have access to work.

    which also makes worries over migration completely moot I’d guess

    (also in reference to earlier bit in our thread…. http://evonomics.com/not-selfish-economists-think-heres-proof-genuinely-good/ and why straight materialism is bent by our moralistic urges, as directed by our other preferences/biases/individuality, those things which populists stir up and use to throw mud, mud like racism

  4. Everyone here knows I am pro-Brexit and anti the EU Neoliberal Dystopia. At the same time, I am quite sceptical even now that the UK will leave the EU. The Greek people voted to leave the EU and their government ignored them. Greece is still in the EU. The UK is not Greece of course. However, I see no sign of the UK government moving anytime soon to Brexit. My guess, and it’s only a guess, is that the UK is at best a 50-50 chance of leaving the EU. There could be a long litany of delays and excuses culminating in the UK remaining in the EU. The only factor that gives me pause in this issue is the reaction of German politicians, particularly Merkel and Junckers (EU). They seem particularly keen for the UK to leave. I suspect Germany wants the UK out, though they have to pretend (poorly) that they don’t.

  5. @Ikonoclast

    Gradually I come to the view that you either distort information deliberately, or theorise in a factual vaccuum or regurgitate fact free propaganda such that you proclaim your opinion on your own dystopia which you then label “EU”. Your EU does not exist in reality.

    Examples:
    1. “The Greek people voted to leave the EU but the government ignored them” [Ikonoclast]
    Fact: There was no referendum on Greece exiting the EU. There was a referendum in 2015 on accepting the bailout conditions.

    2. What happens after a public vote on a specific question in an EU member country depends on the constitution of a country. In the UK, sovereignty rests in the Queen’s Parlament. This means the Queens Parlament can act according to the outcome of the vote or not. The EU’s constitution has to allow for institutional differences among member countries. This is the reason for the EU having Article 50 in its constitution. It is the UK government which needs to notify the EU of its intension of leaving with reference to Article 50. Cameron says he is a democrat (defined as a person who accepts the people’s wishes by means of simple majority vote) but he does not like the outcome and therefore resigns effective around October this year. Cameron’s decision is a logical decision, given he had called for a referendum and lost on his bet that the Remain vote will prevail. I am not a UK citizen and therefore shall refrain from commenting on UK internal political matters. However, it is clear to any outsider that the current situation has created uncertainty for all other EU member state governments: The current head of national government in the UK says ‘exit’ but he is not going to make it official because on a personal level he says ‘no exit’.

    3. “The only factor that gives me pause in this issue is the reaction of German politicians, particularly Merkel and Junckers (EU)”

    Juncker isn’t a German politician and never has been one. He used to be the PM of Luxembourg.

    4. “They (Merkel and Juncker) seem particularly keen for the UK to leave.”
    Fact: Merkel has been repeatedly quoted as saying words to the effect that the UK decision to leave the EU should be made effective (Article 50) as soon possible but without haste. It seems to me Cameron’s timeframe for his departure is quite consistent with Merkel’s set of words.

    5. “I suspect Germany wants the UK out, though they have to pretend (poorly) that they don’t”

    Do you ever look at EU internal trade statistics, EU internal direct foreign investment statistics, stock exchange data, internal migration data for elementary checks on your suspicians?

    I recall some of your posts didn’t distinguish between EURO member countries and EU member countries. The idea that the EU is dynamic set of nested sets of agreements between national governments might be worth while for you to study instead of categorising people into pro and anti EU on the basis of your methodology indicated in my first paragraph. At least leave me out of your mental model. m0ty can speak for himself.

  6. Ikonoclast :
    The Greek people voted to leave the EU and their government ignored them.

    No, that’s not true; the Greek people did not vote to leave the EU.

  7. @J-D

    I stand corrected:

    “A referendum to decide whether Greece was to accept the bailout conditions in the country’s government-debt crisis proposed jointly by the European Commission (EC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB) on 25 June 2015, took place on 5 July 2015. …

    As a result of the referendum, the bailout conditions were rejected by a majority of over 61% to 39% approving, with the “No” vote winning in all of Greece’s regions. …

    On Monday, 13 July, the Syriza-led government of Greece accepted a bailout package that contains larger pension cuts and tax increases than the one rejected by Greek voters in the referendum.[58]”

    Technically, not a vote for “leave” but a possible end result of the Syriza-led government obeying the people’s will, could have been an exit.

  8. Hello to all. Back after some writing hiatus but kept reading J.Q. posts.
    Now, i just had to respond to Ernestine Gross and point that what she wrote in commment #21 is exactly neoliberal ideology that J.Q. wrote about in above post that is the ideology of why we have GFC

    Why was Greece treated that way as it was treated by power brokers, while some other EU countries were in much worse conditions then Greece, like Netherlands, Denmark, luxembourgh.. are given much better or no conditions for refinancing public debt? By ECB?
    Why is Greece, that needs the most help, excluded from help programs that ECB and Commission offers? Yes, you can find excuses, but Greece has better conditions then some other members yet those are not mention at all?

    Ernestine, you give all those false and neoliberal excuses on why Greece should not be helped but punished unlike any other indebted EU member.

  9. Well worth a read;

    http://isj.org.uk/the-internationalist-case-against-the-european-union/

    There are some witty quoted gems in this article.

    “Larger now than the Roman Empire of two thousand years ago, more opaque than the Byzantine, the European Union continues to baffle observers and participants alike.” – Perry Anderson.

    “Delors’s description of the EU as an “unidentified political object”—neither a
    conventional state nor a mere cooperative arrangement between sovereign states.”

    “… the Union has been using chequebooks rather than swords as leverage. Nevertheless, the substance of its policies has been similar to many previous imperial exercises: export of laws, economic transactions, administrative systems, and social habits” – Zielonka

    There is also plenty of history and analysis to read through.

  10. Quick observation – the current debate seems to imply that xenophobia prevailed over common sense and that voters just didn’t understand the issues. This rather patronising and dismissive commentary misses the point that so many Brits are making. The net benefits of EU membership are skewed and are likely to follow a similar distribution to income or wealth. The costs, i.e. increased competition for jobs, the rental market, access to schools, even the opportunity to see a doctor are invariably borne by low skilled workers forced to compete with similarly low skilled economic migrants. Whereas, the benefits of increased trade and freedom of movement are enjoyed by business owners or high skilled workers who can access those opportunities. In hindsight, its not hard to see why the vote went the way it did. We shouldn’t be surprised either when other EU countries follow suit.

  11. @Jordan from Croatia

    Nothing will change for the better as a result of repeating words amounting to objections to the word ‘neoliberalism’, In my opinion, one has to study details that lead to undesirable outcomes and then work toward changing the institutional environment.

    Disambiguation: As is evidenced by JQ’s books (some of which I have specified on reading lists in the past), he is typically focusing on changes in the institutional environment (policy implementation over time). He has repeatedly made precise what he means by ‘neoliberalism’. Hence he is explicitly excluded in my paragraph 1.

    You write “Ernestine, you give all those false and neoliberal excuses on why Greece should not be helped but punished unlike any other indebted EU member.”

    I do no such thing. I do not write about neoliberal ideology or promote it. I describe some details of changes in the institutional environment since financial market liberalisation – a core element of neoliberalism.

  12. @Ernestine Gross

    “… one has to study details that lead to undesirable outcomes and then work toward changing the institutional environment.”

    I agree. The part of the institutional environment which needs to change is the institution, all institutions, surrounding ownership of the means of production. Along with this, we need the extension of the institution of democracy into the workplace. I guess the problem I have with moderate “social democrats” is that they simply won’t look at and identify this core root of the problem and then advocate cutting it out. They don’t seem to envisage any revolution in “pre-distribution” as they call it.

    I think the conclusions from Piketty’s work are crystal clear. Returns of capital going to a minority of owners IS the problem. If people don’t like the word “socialism” we can call it “distributed capitalism” if they like. It is of course the case that worker socialism will still have “capital”. There will be capital equipment and capital assets as “already-produced durable goods or any non-financial asset used in production of goods or services”. Financial capital or money capital will also still exist. Even fictitious capital might exist in some forms though its operations could likely be very changed. “In terms of mainstream financial economics, fictitious capital is the net present value of expected future cash flows.” [1]

    Note 1- Wikipedia.

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