With the death of Queen Elizabeth, the issue of an Australian republic has naturally arisen. The immediately following question is whether we should support a ‘minimal’ republic, as similar as possible to our current system, or replace the Governor-General with an elected President.
The starting point for both monarchists and supporters of a minimal republic. is the claim that ‘the existing system has worked well’. This is incorrect in two crucial respects
First, the current system gives the Prime Minister too much power, and this power has been increasingly abused in Australia and other Westminster systems. The discovery that Scott Morrison had been secretly sworn in to five separate ministries showed that, if the Governor-General had any role beyond that of a rubber stamp, this role had ceased to apply (except for the possibility, discussed later of a repeat of 1975). The increased use of ‘Henry VIII’ clauses, combined with the assumption that the Governor-General will automatically comply with their use by the PM has steadily undermined Parliamentary control.
In the UK and Canada, Prime Ministers who have lost their majorities in Parliament have prorogued Parliament, with the acquiescence of the Queen and Governor-General respectively. Johnson’s action was later ruled to be illegal, but the monarch did nothing to stop it. We need a President with sufficient independent legitimacy to resist improper demands from the PM.
Second, the issues raised by the 1975 constitutional crisis have never been resolved. Should the Senate choose, once again, to block Supply, the same problems would arise. The GG would have to either comply with emergency measures proposed by the PM, or repeat the deception practised by Kerr in 1975 to avoid being sacked. Alternatively, the PM might act pre-emptively, asking the King to appoint a puppet GG (perhaps even the PM themself) before the Senate had time to create a crisis.
The replacement of the GG with a President, secure from dismissal by the PM would
alleviate these problems. But this would depend on the President having sufficient legitimacy to rule against the PM where necessary. That legitimacy would be more secure if the President were directly elected than if they were appointed by a backroom deal between the major parties.
First, there is the default assumption in a democracy that the people should choose their rulers. Those who argue that the voters will inevitably get the choice wrong, for example by following the dictates of the Murdoch Press, ought to take the argument to its logical conclusion and support the (essentially) random procedure of choosing a monarch by primogeniture.
Second, there is the practical question of which procedure is more likely to select a political partisan.
The proposal that the President should be chosen by 2/3 majority of the House of Representatives is far from foolproof. Of the Federal elections since 1975, two (1975 and 1977) have produced governments with 2/3 majorities while 1996 came close. The same outcome has been seen in many state elections in that time. The 58 seats won by the LNP in 2022 are barely enough to give them a veto.
On the other hand, there is not much risk that either of the major parties could gain enough support to elect a partisan President, especially given a general presumption that the office should be non-partisan. Suppose that Labor, currently well ahead in the polls, nominated an obvious partisan. Provided the LNP did not follow suit, a respected independent would easily defeat the Labor candidate. Even if both major parties ran candidates, one of them would probably finish third, and an independent would win on preferences.
The final argument is that the idea of a nominated President has already been put to the people and resoundingly defeated. This failed model should not be given a second chance, just because it would suit the political class.
Would the President be too powerful? There is no reason to suppose so. The parliamentary republic with which we share the most history, the Republic of Ireland, has an elected President, and the system has worked very well. Even though candidates for President have been supported by political parties, they appear not to have acted as partisans in office, and have left the running of the country to the PM.
John Quiggin 
Taking a pessimistic view, all system are bound to fail when there is a candidate that is determined to exploit the system. Can a President be too powerful? Well, yes if the conditions arose. Is Ireland a close example? Maybe but I would also argue that the Irish Republic’s history has tended to produce a culture where it is working for now. Would a Rupert Hamer be a member of the Liberal Party in 2022? I doubt it very much altough he would have been a worthwhile President. The task is creating a republican constitution which will limit the power of the PM and the President without leading to paralysis like it does in the USA and be simple enough that someone with a Year 10 education can understand it.
As a side note, I would never vote for a republican model which discards the Westminster system. John Howard was defenestrated by the electorate without anyone needing to mop up blood afterwards which is quite civilised.
There is no significant difference in the rate of peaceful transfers of power between Westminster, non-Westminster parliamentary monarchies like Denmark, non-Westminster parliamentary republics like Germany, and presidential republics like Uruguay.
However throw in two elements—indirect election and an authoritarian party—and the rate of contested transfers of power spikes sharply upwards.
One practical issue is that the sovereign in Australia is non-resident and merely represented by a GG of much lower prestige. E II R met her Prime Ministers every week and read state papers in between: she therefore had a lot of information to go on. This did not apply to the Dominions. Another is age. Elizabeth was over 90 when she let Boris get away with his prorogation. Charles, like Pope Francis, has a chance to establish a tradition of retirement at some reasonable age like 80.
One practical issue is that the sovereign in Australia is non-resident and merely represented by a GG of much lower prestige. E II R met her Prime Ministers every week and read state papers in between: she therefore had a lot of information to go on. This did not apply to the Dominions.
Another is age. Elizabeth was over 90 when she let Boris get away with his prorogation. Charles, like Pope Francis, has a chance to establish a tradition of retirement at some reasonable age like 80.
The US system isn’t one to compare or emulate; the elected President gets to choose their own unelected executive. Look at the damage team Trump has been able to do in just 4 years.
An elected president is not necessarily an executive president. Far more parliamentary republics have elected presidents than appointed presidents. For that matter almost no other presidential republics give their presidents the kinds of powers and immunities that the US does.
Between them, Iceland, Ireland and and Finland have almost a quarter millennium of experience with an elected president who does not head the government or make policy. Anyone arguing that an elected president is an inherent danger to democracy needs to establish why no Icelandic, Irish or Finnish president has ever tried to overthrow the constitution.
> Especially given a general presumption that the office should be non-partisan.
Where will this presumption come from? I would suggest the opposite is far more likely. To Australians right now, “The President” is, of course, the US President – partisan since 1796.
Those that argue that a monarchy brings stability ignore the changes and reforms to the monarchy, often through violent struggles between the monarchy and its subjects.
The continuation of a monarchy is to deny democracy.
The next reform would be to elect the head of state.
You may be right that it is “natural” now to consider the issue of the republic given the death of Queen Elizabeth ii – she had a huge personal following and her progeny may prove less popular. A narrow majority of Australians seemed to want to move towards a Republic even before her passing. The catch for Republicans is how this is to be achieved. If politicians are involved then my guess is that the move will not get up so a direct vote would seem desirable if you support Republican aims.
Your criticisms of the role of the GG are, on the. one hand, the GG. acted too strongly and dismissed the Whitlam government and on the other hand that the GG acted too weakly and allowed Morrison to ‘take charge’ of several portfolios. So you want more power to the GG on one hand and less on the other. Any appointment – monarch appointed on the basis of the government’s advice or elected – will face these sorts of issues. Kerr was appointed on the basis of Whitlam’s advice and he appointed Fraser as acting PM until an election could be held. Not perfect but not catastrophe either – the people decided. Morrison’s silly moves were inconsequential and not much more than a distracting noise. Not a convincing basis for change.
A major argument that exists for the monarch to remain Australia’s Head of State lies in the links it gives us to our past. A sound functioning democracy and a decent legal system were the products of British rule. Becoming a liberal democracy has been the source of Australia’s attractiveness for millions of immigrants who came from a range of countries. Lefties with oedipal problems and with a barely suppressed hatred for tolerant, open societies and a near total disregard for the positive things our nation has achieved should not call the tune on the way we think about our past. Some traditions are worth keeping.
Harry, I think we wo t forget where we came from or our history if we became a republic. Arguing that we should hold on to the Quee.. (Damit! This will take some getting used to) ..to the Monarchy to remind us of our origins doesn’t take into account that our national identity is and should be allowed to change and develop. We can retain elements of the past that are useful while discarding others. It was the lack of transperancy inherent in an unaccountable hereditary leader that lead to the dissisal and Morrison’s portfolio collection. We could atempt to change our current system to require that such actions on the part of the GG be imeadiately made public. But a directly elected president would be subject to closer scrutiny and to the expectaction that they would act on behalf of their constituents rather than on behalf of the British crown.
It’s probably just as well that the first referendum fell over, the model wasn’t abundantly clear and with the debate the govt had the advantage.
Importantly, to break from tradition, the constitution should include the Voice. Until that happens we can’t move on.
Bottom up inclusive Republic shared governance model/s generation.
rog, and Harry agrees 😊 with me saying “If politicians are involved then my guess is that the move will not get up” – Similar for the Australian Republic Movement (ARM) Wikipedia,
“Notable supporters” tab, we find Australia’s bunyip royalty, bunyip aristocracy, “Liberals”, and a cinflict3d WWI war veteran:
– Peter FitzSimons[16]
– Joe Hockey[17]
– Alan Joyce[18]
– Ted Smout[19][20]
– Malcolm Turnbull[21]
rog I think agrees saying “the model wasn’t abundantly clear and with the debate the govt had the advantage. … “Importantly, to break from tradition, the constitution should include the Voice. Until that happens we can’t move on.”
If we want to move on we need a bottom up inclusive Republic shared governance model/s generation system.
ElPoppin reminds us that any proposal and system needs to … “be simple enough that someone with a Year 10 education can understand it.”.
● about 44% of adults read at literacy level 1 to 2 (a low level)
Australian government style manual.
JQ’s cousin Robynne Quiggin, in designing governance for aboriginal health sercices – Smith, Bauman and Quiggin (2014) – may agree with me that…
IF (huge if) the bottom 50% below yr 10 literacy, plus disenfranchised (aboriginals, health compromised, youth etc) WERE ALWAYS expressly involved from the outset in designing governance frameworks, we probably would not care less if we have a monarch, president or algorithm.
Time to hear from JQ’s cousin Robynne, – hello?
My (fn^RQ-JQ?) [inclusions] to try to indicate altering the process at t-0 towards others:-
“Rather than taking concepts of intellectual property [Republic model generation] as given, we ask what kinds of intellectual property [franchise] systems, if any, can best contribute to meeting [generating] the economic, social and cultural [models of republic] needs of Indigenous communities. [and disenfranchised for whatever reason ] (fn^RQ-JQ?)
JQ you saying “First, there is the default assumption in a democracy that the people should choose their rulers. Those who argue that the voters will inevitably get the choice wrong” is if course true, yet many will say many made a “wrong” choice either way. A 50+1 vote to me is unacceptable as we will have discensus.
Therefore I ask for everyone ro consider at t-0 – now – before we have an elite group proffer preferred Republic models, we entrain, as with Smith, Bauman and Quiggin (2014), a method and process which is more like sortition and lived experience by the disenfranchised prociding a shared voice. Scary for entitled yet in the long run, better for all.
So inclusion and communication is key. And JQ’s cousin Robynne, telling us that the user needs to be making the fabric of a decision for health: Smith, Bauman and Quiggin (2014).
Why not include for the fabric of a republic?
And I’d go further to suggest, if the bottom 50% below yr 10 literacy are not expressly involved from the outset in design of the republic model, we will continue to have disscensus + wiggle room, leading to, monarchy or republic, still having an asymmetric government potential decision framework and a disengaged and largely unincentivised cynical section of the populus without buy in.
(What word to replace buy in?)
A bottom up Republic generating process will allieviate future discensus. And be a fairer and more conceptionally and demographically acceptable process.
To repeat, if the bottom 50% below yr 10 literacy [insert any outgroup] WERE ALWAYS expressly involved from the outset in designing governance frameworks, I then could not care less if we have a monarch, president or algorithm.
I think!
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“Improving economic participation to overcome Indigenous disadvantage”
…
“It was a family event as my cousin Robynne, who has done lots of work in this field (currently chairs the Board of the NSW Aboriginal Housing Office, as well as being a professor at UTS among lots of other positions), also took part. Here’s a link to the UQ page with a video recording and here are my Powerpoint slides.”…
https://johnquiggin.com/2021/06/16/improving-economic-participation-to-overcome-indigenous-disadvantage/
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Robynne Quiggin et al referenced [22] in:
“Development and implementation of a shared governance model in a mainstream health unit: a case study of embedding Aboriginal voices in organisational decision making”
[22] Bauman T, Smith D, Quiggin R, Keller C, Drieberg L.
Building Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander governance: report of a survey and forum to map current and future research and practical resource needs. Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies; 2015.
https://www.publish.csiro.au/ah/AH20369
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^RQ-JQ?
Intellectual property and indigenous culture [electronic resource] / Robynne Quiggin, John Quiggin
…
“Rather than taking concepts of intellectual property as given, we ask what kinds of intellectual property systems, if any, can best contribute to meeting the economic, social and cultural needs of Indigenous communities.”
https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/6094142
My
fn^RQ-JQ?
My [inclusions] to try to indicate altering the process at t-0 towards others:-
“Rather than taking concepts of intellectual property [Republic model generation] as given, we ask what kinds of intellectual property [franchise] systems, if any, can best contribute to meeting [generating] the economic, social and cultural [models of republic] needs of Indigenous communities. [and disenfranchised for whatever reason ]
*
I question the need for anyone to replace the role of Governor General or State Governors for that matter. If the British Monarch no longer has a role in our constitution or government, surely those roles become redundant. I think our current parliamentary system of government, while not perfect, works reasonably well. I doubt an elected president, possibly alligned to a political party, would improve anything. I’m not surprised Albanese has kicked the can down re a republic. With a massive deficite, so many things requiring urgent attention, the last thing he or the country needs is the expense and distraction of a referendum that may well fail to get up. I think we may have to get used to Charles the 3rd as our head of state for a few years to come.
A major argument that exists for the monarch not to remain Australia’s Head of State lies in the links it gives us to our past.
Some traditions are worth abandoning.
If the British monarchy has no role in our government, what is the objection to removing reference to it from our constitution?
In reply to to J-D 7.48 pm. “If the British monarchy has no role in our government, what is the objection to removing reference to it from our constitution ?” From me J-D, no objection what so ever. Though I do question whether, or why, we need to replace the monarch’s representative, in this case the Governor General, with a President, elected or appointed ?
At this time a federal integrity commission ahs no role in our government. It must follow as a matter of logic that a federal integrity commission is a bad idea from the tenor of those comments facing on the British monarchy.
It is desirable to have an elected president because the prime minister of Australia has powers of which an American president or a British prime minister could only dream and those powers need to be reduced. One way ro reduce them them, that is followed by all parliamentary republics, is to have a president who must sign off on the constitutionality and legality of prime ministerial decisions.
RM, perhaps you have read section 2 of the Constitution and know what it says, but for anybody who doesn’t, this is what it says:
Now, how would anybody suggest removing the references to the monarchy from that? It’s not going to work to change section 2 to read ‘A Governor-General appointed by ___ shall be ___’s representative in the Commonwealth, and shall have and may exercise in the Commonwealth during ___’s pleasure, but subject to this Constitution, such powers and functions of ___ as ___ may be pleased to assign to him’, now is it? In order to remove reference to the monarchy, it is necessary to define some means of determining who is the Governor-General in the absence of appointment by the monarch. If you have a Governor-General, whether elected or appointed, who has the functions assigned to the Constitution by the Governor-General, but who is neither appointed by a monarch nor a monarch’s representative, then you have a republic, and it makes no difference whether the title is ‘President’ or ‘Governor-General’.
Geoffrey Robertson, KC, suggests Australia does not need a Head of State at all, royal or otherwise. In the alternative, the Head of State (president) should be directly elected by the public:
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/australia-has-no-need-for-a-head-of-state-royal-or-not-20220912-p5bhhf.html
I am neither a lawyer nor in any other way educated or well read in constitutional matters. Subject to this proviso, I venture to say it seems to me the Australian constitution relies entirely on the notion of representative government for individuals freedoms and rights and protections – other than property. To the extent that my reading is not entirely wrong, this reliance of ‘representative parliament’ seems to facilitate quicker changes in legislation to reflect changes in social norms than that provided by constitutions that include codes on moral values (a bill of rights being one example of such systems of codes). On the other hand, complete reliance on ‘representative parliament’ without some codes on moral values (human, animals, environment) to which all laws have to comply – testable in the High Court – there is no constraint preventing parliamentarians being unrepresentative – people have no common point of reference.
I shall follow the debate on the topic of this thread with great interest.
I’m confused – so, a GG is sort of like an appendix? It’s sort of there, doesn’t do much that anyone can tell, etc.?
I don’t get why anyone would want 2 executive figures? Maybe you don’t need a second one? It kind of sounds to me like your system isn’t really broken.
In reply to J-D 10.30 pm Sept 13. J-D our Constitution, even the section you quote, can be amended by referendum. I understand constitutional change is not something most Australians embrace. However, if we are to become a republic, it would be nice to hear some debate as to whether the roles performed by the Governor General and State Governors need to continue at all, or be re-invented as part of a republic.
The Governor-General does have functions, but they are limited. What they are is well understood by the small number of people who are interested enough to find out. The functions of the Governor-General are little understood not because it is difficult to find out about them but because most people aren’t interested. Most people aren’t interested in understanding much about how any aspect of the system works, and as a result don’t understand much.
The people who are arguing for a change to a republic are not doing it because they want to have two executive figures. (Well, maybe there are a few people who would like this, but only a very few.) It is possible to have a republic with two executive figures–they do exist, or have existed–but it isn’t a necessary feature, and it isn’t the usual arrangement.
It depends on what you mean by ‘broken’. The Australian system doesn’t work well. The UK system doesn’t work well. The Swedish system, the Norwegian system, the German system, the Italian system, the Portuguese system, the Finnish system, the Irish system, the French system: none of them work well. However, all of them mostly work well enough. Changing between one and another of those systems would make some difference, but it wouldn’t make a lot of difference. It wouldn’t be a catastrophe if Australia switched from a monarchy to a republic, it would be an improvement, but it would be a limited improvement, no more a eucatastrophe than a catastrophe.
So when I ask how it should be changed, you think that means I don’t understand that it can be changed, and need to have that explained to me?
Yes, so do I understand!
It would be nice if more Australians were more interested. Most Australians have little if any interest in the topic, and this will limit debate. The people who are arguing for a republic (with perhaps a very few exceptions) envisage the role performed by the Governor-General continuing without being reinvented; it’s not change to that role which is their objective.
J-D raises important points.
Like or loathe Mick Dodson, he makes my point:-
Bottom up inclusive Republic shared governance model/s generation.
In other words; Process before Republic model.
Ernestine, would you make a model before understanding the process? Something I think you are well qualified to answer.
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MD: “We have got to get the process right and we have got to have enough time to raise awareness and build confidence for people that they are making an informed decision.”
From:
“Papers on Parliament
No. 57 February 2012
Mick Dodson ‘Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians*’
…
” Mick Dodson — We have got to get the process right and we have got to have enough time to raise awareness and build confidence for people that they are making an informed decision. The question should just be ‘do you agree with inserting the words attached into the Constitution—yes or no?’ You shouldn’t split the question, shouldn’t say do you agree with the preamble, do you agree with changing subsection 26? They have got to be joined together and you can only give one answer to the question.”
…
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/pops/pop57/c02
The Constitution needs changes. Lots of changes.
Yet we may make beneficial changes with parliment.
This goes to Ernesrine’s point;
“…this reliance of ‘representative parliament’ seems to facilitate quicker changes in legislation to reflect changes in social norms than that provided by constitutions”.
We have a parliament which is able to enact changes via “a pragmatic and potentially achievable means” now.
George Williams says:
“An incremental approach to protecting rights by statutory means before constitutional means and of protecting certain rights before others is a pragmatic and potentially achievable means of bolstering rights protection in Australia. Importantly, it is also a process that would allow the oversight of the Federal Parliament at every step in continuing to build a culture of rights protection.
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“The Federal Parliament and the Protection of Human Rights
Research Paper 20 1998-99
George Williams, Consultant
Law & Bills Digest Group
11 May 1999
Contents
– Major Issues
– Introduction
– Rights in the Australian Constitution
– Federal Human Rights Legislation
…
“The merit of this argument is reflected in the recent enactment of a Bill of Rights by nations that had previously relied upon the common law tradition, such as Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
“There have been many attempts to bring about a Bill of Rights for Australia. These have been either in the form of a statutory Bill of Rights enacted by the Federal Parliament or as amendments to the Australian Constitution. Every attempt has failed. Most recently, the 1988 attempt to amend the Australian Constitution to extend freedoms such as religious freedom gained the lowest ‘Yes’ vote ever recorded in a national referendum.
“The record of failed reform in this area, as well as recent decisions of the High Court that have held that certain freedoms can be implied from the Australian Constitution, demonstrate the need for parliamentary leadership in any future attempt to bring about a scheme of rights protection. An attempt to introduce an Australian Bill of Rights should not be based upon judicial innovation.
…
Conclusion
“An incremental approach to protecting rights by statutory means before constitutional means and of protecting certain rights before others is a pragmatic and potentially achievable means of bolstering rights protection in Australia. Importantly, it is also a process that would allow the oversight of the Federal Parliament at every step in continuing to build a culture of rights protection. This would maximise the chances of achieving a workable balance between, enabling the judiciary to foster the rights of Australians and not vesting misplaced faith in the courts, to solve Australia’s pressing social, moral and political concerns.”
…
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp9899/99rp20
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N – GG like an appendix!
Excellent analogy. Some may say it contains the emergency biota.
I say chop it.
Kenneth Arrow – is for a republic and “the need for collective action”.
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“There are many other organizations beside the government and the firm. But all of them, whether political party or revolutionary movement, university or church, share the common characteristics of the need for collective action and the allocation of resources through nonmarket methods.”
Chapter 1, Rationality: Individual And Social, p. 26
“It is this thinking which I think gives rise to the greatest tragedies of history, this sense of commitment to a past purpose which reinforces the original agreement precisely at a time when experience has shown that it must be reversed.”
Chapter 1, Rationality: Individual And Social, p. 29
The Limits Of Organization (1974)
https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Kenneth_Arrow
I thought it was worth cross-posting the following, that I originally posted at Crooked Timber:-
“The starting point for both monarchists and supporters of a minimal republic is the claim that ‘the existing system has worked well’”.
No, that is not the starting point for monarchists. Among themselves, monarchists start with a stronger position, which they do not share with republicans, such as a commitment to monarchist principles. What you are describing is the starting point of monarchist engagement with supporters of a minimal republic, often as part of an argument that the latter already have what they want and so need not press their cause.
“We need a President with sufficient independent legitimacy to resist improper demands from the PM”.
Unfortunately, that risks facilitating the reverse: a PM with insufficient independent legitimacy to resist improper demands from the President. This was pretty much how the Prince-President of the Second Republic of France behaved.
“The replacement of the GG with a President, secure from dismissal by the PM would alleviate these problems”.
Only in the sense that sitting on a safety valve does. After all, you want a safety valve that works. This statement assumes that that function is no more than ornamental, that wiser and better heads will always head off any actual need for and use of it.
“The final argument is that the idea of a nominated President has already been put to the people and resoundingly defeated. This failed model should not be given a second chance, just because it would suit the political class.”
The same logic applies just as well to rule out any proposal for a republic. To my mind, though, it is only sufficient to rule out any proposal for a republic within the same generation or so, as not doing so would allow the political class to keep trying until the people got it right, as in the EU treaties with Eire.
“The parliamentary republic with which we share the most history, the Republic of Ireland, has an elected President, and the system has worked very well”.
That does not happen to be the case. I studied the matter last time around, and found to my mild surprise that an Irish researcher had come to a very different conclusion. Unfortunately, I do not have the references to hand, these many years later. Maybe google can help readers with this.
I refer readers to Gibbon’s opening remarks in chapter 7 of his “Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire”, many which remain applicable in many times and places.
I say the roles need to be reinvented. It’s perfectly true that government in Britain works quite differently because the king gets all the papers and the weekly audience with the prime minister is an accepted practice. It’s also different because the king is not a prime ministerial appointee and, more importantly, cannot be removed easily. It is not an accident that the prime ministers of Australia, Canada and New Zealand have unusual levels of power not found in other democracies—the explanation is very weak heads of state.
It’s not a terrible idea to have a counterpart to the prime minister who signs off on important decisions. Its is a nontrivial fact that almost all parliamentary republics have a separate head of state as a check on the prime minister. We should have an elected president and the prime minister should have a constitutional duty to keep the president informed on all government business.
The function of the head of state in a parliamentary republic is to remind prime ministers they are not kings.
In reponse to Anonymous. If we are to have a popularly elected head of state, that is to be a safeguard, or honest broker in the political process, how can that be assured, when it is certain politcal parties, politicians, current or aspiring, would become involved in the process of electing that head of state ? And what is to become of state governors ? It would be an odd look if we call ourselves a republic, while still having a governor representing the British Monarch in each of the states.
If we are to retain the Governor-General as an honest broker in the political process, how can that be assured, when politicians are involved in selecting the Governor-General?
I once read a Papua New Guinean’s account of what one of their Governors-General took with them from the official residence when leaving office. What do you suppose?
Several countries with parliamentary governments have popularly elected Presidents, and they manage, generally speaking, about as well as we do: not obviously hugely better, but also not obviously hugely worse. What they can manage to do, we can as well, if we want to.
It would be an odd look, but if we wanted to avoid that odd look, we could easily do so.
Is the Irish model one to consider?
“Opinion poll findings that show extremely high levels of satisfaction with the way in whichpresidents are doing their jobs suggest that the Irish electorate is relatively happy with the manner in which the functions of the office are discharged.”
The Dismal Dismissal in 1975 of Gough Whitlam’s Labor government of the day by John Kerr was illustrative of what can go wrong with the current system. A Double Dissolution election could have and should have been called, as the way to break the logjam of the opposition blocking bills of supply; no “caretaker government” necessary, no dismissal of the government necessary. The recently available letters of correspondence b/n the Queen’s representative and Sir John Kerr strongly suggest Kerr was being steered into seeing a limited option available. Why? Who can say?
The more recent case of the hidden shopping cart stuffed full of ministerial portfolios that the GG signed off to Slomo Morrison was a different specific failure of the GG.
Both cases have a few things in common though: in particular, the lack of transparency in terms of why the decision was made, and even that a decision had been made. The reporting rules were nothing more than guidelines, when it came to the crunch, in the most recent debacle. In the Whitlam case, Kerr could have had a constructive meeting with Whitlam as the legitimate government, and come to a decision that was announced by the legitimate government of the day; instead, we had secretive communications with the Queen’s representative that remained opaque to us Australians, yet arguably was the nudge that sent Kerr to emplace Fraser as some kind of caretaker government, rather than dealing directly with Whitlam and sorting out an acceptable path forwards.
Some legislative changes could fix up aspects of this lack of transparency. The issue of secret direction by the monarch’s representative is a much graver one, and it necessitates constitutional change by referendum.
Personally, I do not like the model of a popularly elected president. Unless the funding of campaigns is tightly controlled, we could easily get the situation of Clive Palmer beating out other eminently qualified candidates. Since we want the Prez to be non-partisan, yet acting in a position that, once in a blue moon, has vast responsibility for addressing a constitutional crisis—a manifestly political issue, it’s clear that no model for selection is able to completely eliminate issues of political bias. Perhaps there are models that can get reasonably close.
Perhaps a different model could be considered. What if a tribunal of Justices was selected to be called on in event of a constitutional crisis, and they together had the power of the GG/president to consider and to rule on how to resolve the crisis? By using a panel of credentialled people who clearly are expert in the Law, the selection could be done without the need for yet another election of potentially unsuitable applicants. And, since the likelihood of true constitutional crises seems fairly low, if the issues of transparency that recent portfolio sneaks have demonstrated are real are addressed adequately, it would seem a tribunal is as reasonable as any other model.
Oops. I meant “half-senate election,” not Double Dissolution—that took place in 1974; the half-senate election was what Whitlam proposed for breaking the logjam of a hostile senate blocking the appropriation bills. [Of course, if the half-senate had gone ahead and failed to change the make-up of the senate sufficiently, the same situation may have held as before, and then Kerr would have had to dealt with it then. Perhaps there was no good solution, and Fraser had simply and successfully forced Kerr into a corner.]
J-D I am questioning why we need a head of state of any kind, be it a Governor General, a President elected by popular vote or appointed. I thought I’d made that clear enough. I cannot see why a Prime Minister can’t fill that role.
There are two ends to the GG problem. At the British end, the lack of a written constitution makes the royal prerogative ill-defined, and weak in the face of an unscrupulous PM like Boris. This weakness is multiplied in the case of a GG, necessarily of lower status than the monarch they represent. If the cause of Scottish independence advances, this would require complex constitutional legislation, especially if the Nats decide to keep the monarchy. Why not go the whole hog and have a pair of written constitutions?
To those interested, I recommend looking at the Netherlands constitution last revised in 2018, so up-to-date and representative of one strand of good practice in constitution-writing. (https://www.government.nl/binaries/government/documenten/reports/2019/02/28/the-constitution-of-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands/WEB_119406_Grondwet_Koninkrijk_ENG.pdf).
The king gets a whole section (2.1) to himself. He enjoys a theoretical veto over acts of the States-General (article 130), but crucially Article 38 provides that “The royal prerogative shall be exercised by the Council of State until such time as alternative provision is made for the exercise of such power.”
The Council of State (est. 1531 by Charles V) is an efficient, not ceremonial, part of the constitution. It is in effect a constitutional court. The King is its chairman, though the work is really done by a deputy. I have the impression that this mechanism would give the King a much more solid basis for intervening in a constitutional crisis (say pitting a populist States-General against the lawyers on the Council of State) than would be enjoyed by his British counterpart.
For aficionados, take a look at the provisions in Article 133 protecting the status of provincial water boards, which are powerful bodies with taxing powers. The technocratic Dutch system proved its worth in the Ahr floods of July 2021. German dithering and lack of coordination led to many deaths there, which the Netherlands escaped by early and decisive evacuations.
This is the kind of comment that is often made by people who (a) don’t understand how the system works now and (b) have given no thought to the details of how an alternative might work.
Section 64 of the Constitution provides (in part):
‘The Governor-General may appoint officers to administer such departments of State of the Commonwealth as the Governor-General in Council may establish.
‘Such officers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-General. They shall be members of the Federal Executive Council, and shall be the Queen’s Ministers of State for the Commonwealth.’
If this were changed to read something like this–
‘The Prime Minister may appoint officers to administer such departments of State of the Commonwealth as the Federal Executive Council may establish.
‘Such officers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Prime Minister. They shall be members of the Federal Executive Council, and shall be the Ministers of State for the Commonwealth.’
–there would be nothing to explain how the Prime Minister was appointed.
In countries like India, Italy, Portugal, Israel, Finland, and Ireland (republics with parliamentary systems of government), the appointment of a Prime Minister is confirmed by the President. In countries like Japan, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway (monarchies with parliamentary systems of government), the appointment of a Prime Minister is confirmed by the monarch. In countries like Canada, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, Jamaica, and the Solomon Islands (the so-called ‘Commonwealth realms’, which share a monarch with the United Kingdom), the appointment of a Prime Minister is confirmed by a Governor-General acting on behalf of the monarch.
If RM has a different idea about how the appointment of a Prime Minister should be confirmed, it hasn’t been shared with us.
J-D, thanks, great information.
J-D, are you able to provide for us imaginatitive suggestion/s as to a future focused, not conventional or descriptive, suggestions for solving this – chimera / dilemma / governance control functions please?
For example, in a political crisis say blocking of supply, a constitutional crisis or hung parliament, why not get ‘us’ the people, directly involved at that time. Via sortition or other??? means.
I feel we are deciding this on already existing rubrics, not providing a proper inclusive process and avoiding discussing the many other potential confounders needed to be addressed such as The Constitution.
A future focused republic is… I am unable, at this time, to answer this question.
And considering “Chile’s Rejection”, I again repeat my now lament, it is the process first, not the model we need. Especially as we have such poor and fragmented communications and echo chambers. And the concensus destroying types ala Clive Palmer.
“Chile’s Rejection”
““Exit polls and vox pops revealed that many people were confused about what the plebiscite was actually about; some even thought that by voting to reject they were abolishing the Pinochet constitution.
“This is not surprising given that the only official information on the constitutional draft amounted to thirty minutes of television broadcasting a day, divided equally between Rechazo and Apruebo, over a 28-day period.”
…
https://newleftreview.org/sidecar/posts/chiles-rejection
Sweden’s rejection too. Couldn’t happen here – could it?
How is a republic model able to steer us from “the Swedish version of Sieg Heil, the Nazi salute. The party’s press secretary said Fallenkvist was drunk and “it came out wrong”.” Yeah, right.
Oh kt2! Don’t be ridiculous! “The party received a third of all blue-collar votes.”
Fix inequality first. And dump Stg 3 tax cuts or such a black swan may flap.
The process for inclusion is more important than the model.
*
…”And these are hardly your “ordinary” anti-immigrant populists. The Sweden Democrats has its roots in the neo-Nazi movement from only 30 years ago. In more recent times, they have proven unable to choose between Putin or Biden.
“Fallenkvist called her party’s election success a helgseger, a “weekend victory” – a hitherto unknown concept in the Swedish language. But the way she pronounced her words made them sound uncannily similar to a more well-established phrase: hell seger. That is the Swedish version of Sieg Heil, the Nazi salute. (The party’s press secretary said Fallenkvist was drunk and “it came out wrong”.)
“What is going on in Sweden? In this election, 12% of those who voted for the Sweden Democrats voted for the Social Democrats in the previous election, and 14% for the Conservatives. The party received a third of all blue-collar votes. And among Sweden’s young, first-time voters – Greta Thunberg’s peers – the party triumphed, all while proudly announcing that it would do less to fight climate change.
“The far right’s triumph in my country reveals a very Swedish brand of intolerance
Gina Gustavsson
“During the campaign, political parties on the right and left proved that our supposed liberalism is only skin deep
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/sep/15/far-right-sweden-intolerance-liberalism-election-results
I left that hanging there deliberately. The answer to the question ‘What did Papua New Guinea’s Governor-General** take from the official residence when leaving office?’ was ‘Everything that wasn’t nailed down.’
** This was something that one particular Governor-General did, not something that every Governor-General does: but how do you guarantee that another Governor-General won’t behave in a similar way? Answer: you can’t.
I’m more inclined to replacing the GG with some kind of constitutional oversight board or committee, that has it’s terms of reference clear and proceedings a matter of public record. How the checks on who gets appointed and for how long would be critical to maintaining integrity. Government appointed but requiring some kind of joint sitting of Parliament to confirm? Perhaps fixed terms that are staggered so no single term of government can stack it? But I admit to my ignorance on these matters.
@J-D Sept 16 9.09 am. J-D you seem to infer that a republic without a head of state would be unworkable. Well Geoffrey Robertson KC begs to differ. See comments Ernestine Gross (Sept 14 3.03 pm) Ernestine kindly provides a link to a SMH article Sept 13 by Robertson, “Australia has no need for a head of state royal or not.” Among other things Robertson asks why the elected Prime Minister could not be sworn in by the Chief Justice of The High Court.
RM: An obvious problem is that there is no such person as “the elected Prime Minister”. There’s a convention that makes the leader of the majority party, but it’s far from ironclad. What happens, for example, if a majority party splits and Parliament purports to choose a new PM, but the current PM prorogues Parliament and governs using executive power alone?
Robertson too clever by half here, IMO.
JQ you said “The parliamentary republic with which we share the most history, the Republic of Ireland, has an elected President, and the system has worked very well.”.
Ireland is now up to the 38th Amendment to it’s Constitution.
Relatively. I wouldn’t go as far as P.M.Lawrence in negating JQ’s “the system [Ireland] has worked very well.” to which PML replied “That does not happen to be the case.” I’m more inclined to J-D’s statement “However, all of them mostly work well enough.”
Ireland makes my point;
The process of selecting, communicating, gaining broad concensus to avoid future discensus is more important at this time.
What if Viatlik Butlin, Elon Musk,
Robertson and Clive Palmer decide to spend a billion or three?
Haste! No, process & imagination please.
“The Act, which was signed into law on 12 December 1936, was one of two passed hurriedly in the aftermath of [ insert dead monarch, GG, President, crisis here].
(Republic of Ireland Repeals
Executive Authority (External Relations) Act 1936 – Wikipedia below )
JQ’ s statement “On the other hand, there is not much risk” above, doesn’t inspire me with confidence. As…Ireland is now up to the 38th Amendment to it’s Constitution.
In 2001 the ability to investigate and remove Judges was NOT enacted by both houses! ? What the…
“There is no Twenty-second Amendment. The Twenty-second Amendment of the Constitution Bill, 2001 [relating to the removal of a judge from office and providing for a body to be established by law to investigate or cause to be investigated conduct constituting misbehaviour by a judge or affected by incapacity of a judge] was not passed by the Houses of the Oireachtas.
It was not until 2013 Ireland amended the Constitution to include a Court of Appeal, still with the attendant risks of a black letter rukings from the court.
“Thirty-third Amendment of the Constitution (Court of Appeal) Act 2013 [Provided for the establishment of a Court of Appeal]
If Ireland is the best example, I am underwhelmed.
If the process doesn’t provide unity from the start, my kid will still be arguing about this in, as with Ireland, 88 years.
On the other hand, there is not much risk. Didn’t NN Taleb write about that?
*
Republic of Ireland
“Repeals
Executive Authority (External Relations) Act 1936
“Executive Authority (External Relations) Act 1936
…”The Act, which was signed into law on 12 December 1936, was one of two passed hurriedly in the aftermath of the Edward VIII abdication crisis to sharply reduce the role of the Crown. It is also sometimes referred to as the External Relations Act.
Executive Powers (Consequential Provisions) Act 1937
“Unfortunately the speed with which the 1936 Act was passed also meant that some serious legal matters had been overlooked by the draughtsmen, touching on the top of the Irish legal hierarchy.
…
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Authority_(External_Relations)_Act_1936
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Republic_of_Ireland_Act_1948
*
Constitution, Bunreacht na hÉireann,
CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND
January 2020
“Enacted by the People 1st July, 1937
“In operation as from 29th December, 1937
“This text of the Constitution is a copy of the text enrolled on 13 November, 2019 pursuant to Article 25.5.2° except that the Transitory Provisions (Articles 34A and 51-64) are omitted as required by their terms and the Irish text has been altered so as to make it conform to modern standardised Irish.
“Amendments effected since the Constitution was enacted in 1937 up to the time of printing of this edition (January 2020) are listed below.
…
https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/cons/en/html
Why not start now and put in a submission to the:
“Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters
“Current Inquiries
Inquiry into the 2022 federal election
Submissions Close:
07 October 2022
See Also:
Completed inquiries by this committee
Related Sites
Australian Electoral Commission (AEC)
– Australian Parliamentary Library site particularly the section on elections and referendums
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Electoral_Matters
Assiatance?
“Make a submission to JSCEM
“The Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (JSCEM), has just announced their Inquiry into the 2022 federal election, and they are seeking submissions.
“This is an essential opportunity for us to speak up to level the playing when it comes to elections. Right now, no limits apply to spending on elections by political parties and campaigners. This means those with the deepest pockets can control what narrative voters hear.
“A cap on election spending would create a fairer national conversation where the best ideas are able to rise to the top, not the biggest bank balance.
“Making a submission is an effective way to ensure election spending caps are on the new government’s reform agenda.
https://www.ourdemocracy.com.au/jscem-2022/
‘Infer’? I do not think that word means what RM thinks it means.
I did not write that a republic without a head of state would be unworkable; I did not intend to suggest that a republic without a head of state would be unworkable; I know that it’s unhistorical to suggest that a republic without a head of state would be unworkable. The ancient Roman republic functioned without a head of state. There’s room for disagreement about how well that system worked, but it did work, at least some of the time. If somebody suggested that Australia should change to the ancient Roman republican system, the meaning would be clear (or clear enough), and it would be clear how the system was supposed to work without a head of state. (I don’t think it would be a good idea, and I’m sure it would not get the support it would need to be adopted, but the meaning would be clear.)
I observed previously that RM’s comments of the kind that are often made by people who (a) don’t understand how the system works now and (b) have given no thought to the details of how an alternative might work. The same is true of Geoffrey Robertson’s article. I am aware that he is an experienced lawyer and I am not a lawyer at all; but most lawyers, even very experienced ones, don’t have to deal with constitutional law, and even out of the small number who, there would be an even tinier number–if there are any at all–who have to deal, as lawyers, with the particular constitutional issues that are relevant to this discussion. Geoffrey Robertson wrote that ‘the democratic process can be left to resolve itself according to accepted Westminster conventions’; obviously he doesn’t understand that a key Westminster convention is that the designation of the Prime Minister is confirmed by the head of state, so that you can’t have accepted Westminster conventions without a head of state.
What usually happens in Westminster systems is that there is a clear parliamentary majority with a clear leader, and that person is then the obvious designee for the position of Prime Minister, making the head of state’s choice easy. That’s the situation I’m used to, and I expect it’s the situation everybody reading this is used to; Geoffrey Robertson, too. However, although I’m not professional historian, I’ve read enough political history to know that there’s no guarantee that this situation will always exist, and that when it doesn’t the head of state’s choices can be more difficult. John Quiggin has suggested one hypothetical scenario; I could describe several illustrative examples from the actual history of the UK, Australia, and Canada, but I won’t do that in this comment because this comment is long enough without it, and I don’t know whether anybody’s really that interested in the historical details. (I am myself, and ready to answer if I read any comments asking me to.)
It would be possible to make the Chief Justice responsible for confirming the designation of the Prime Minister. I don’t think it would be a good idea, and I think it would have considerable difficulty getting the support it would need to be adopted, not least because I would expect the Chief Justice to be opposed to it. However, if somebody said ‘I think we should make the Chief Justice head of state’, the meaning of the suggestion would at least be clear (or clear enough)–if only the person making that suggestion understands what functions the head of state performes under our existing system, which Geoffrey Robertson seems not to.
It seems to me that any model or proposal alternative to the current system is required to be >100% effective and resistant to any and every crisis imaginable.
Leaving aside the myriad of hypotheticals, the hereditary head of state fails to comply with the core defining values of a representative democracy.
I made a comment which has been hung up in moderation.
Now, maybe it’s being intentionally not published. I don’t know. If that’s what’s happening, I’ve got nothing to say about it.
However, it’s possible the non-publication is purely an oversight, so I’m drawing attention to it just in case.
Thanks for releasing my comment from moderation; I had a general idea of the kind of thing I wrote but probably couldn’t have reconstructed the details from memory.
J-D, you’ve asked 2x, here and Sandpit;
“and I don’t know whether anybody’s really that interested in the historical details. (I am myself, and ready to answer if I read any comments asking me to.)”.
J-D I am interested in your thoughts on;
1) the history details applicable to head of state /appointment / prime ministers
2) your view if republic models.
3 ) logical or other relevant confounders
And further to my fixation with THE PROCESS not the model, do you have any comments or pointers to a process leading to wider and deeper acceptance of such a fundamental and all encompassing change of ruling a country.
@J-D “I observed previously that RM’s comments of the kind that are often made by people who (a) don’t understand how the system works now and (b) have given no thought to how an alternative might work “. That’s a bit harsh J-D. If I was any of the things you claim, I would not be bothered reading, let alone commenting on this forum. My main concern is that the role of Governor General and State Governors with a couple of rare exceptions, have been largely ceremonial roles. I see a popularly elected head of state becoming a political role. I prefer any change to the status quo to be minimalist in nature. It is people like me J-D who will eventually decide what kind of republic we get, if in fact we get a republic at all. So give us the space to ask questions or put propositions without being expert on every detail.
Maybe you aren’t. I’ve had experience of people who are and who, as a result, make the kind of comments that you did.
The responsibility of Governors-General for confirming the designation of Prime Ministers and of Governors for confirming the designation of Premiers is a key feature of the present system, neither rare nor exceptional. The only way anybody has ever become Prime Minister is with the confirmation of the Governor-General. Anybody who doesn’t understand that doesn’t understand how the system works now.
If I have a choice between (Option 1) basing an opinion of what’s likely to happen if Australia changes to a system with a popularly elected head of state on the extensive experience of countries which already combine a popularly elected head of state with a parliamentary system of government and (Option 2) basing an opinion of what’s likely to happen on the opinion of an unknown Internet commenter, then I’m going to go with Option 1.
I’m not sure what kind of people you mean by that. You get one vote. I get one vote. John Quiggin gets one vote. We all get to decide, and nobody gets more than one vote.
I’m not sure what you mean by ‘give us the space’. John Quiggin has given you space on his blog. I’m not denying you that space: I wouldn’t if I could, but anyway I can’t. The fact that I have responded to your comments hasn’t prevented you from commenting.
I can’t give you space on my blog because I don’t have one.