My latest in The East Asia Forum
The May 2025 federal election campaign was characterised by a studious avoidance of the main issues facing Australia, most notably the country’s future relationships with the United States and China. Canberra should confront the quandaries redefining the US relationship, initiated by President Donald Trump’s second term. Washington’s radical reorientation shows no sign of reversing even after 2028, when Trump is due to leave office.
The major parties’ avoidance of this issue is unsurprising given the complex attitudes of the Australian public, particularly towards the United States. On the one hand, Australians’ views of US President Donald Trump are overwhelmingly negative, a fact that contributed to the scale of the conservative Liberal–National Coalition’s defeat. On the other hand, there has been no genuine challenge to the general belief of policymakers, and the majority of the public, that Australia’s alliance with the United States is both necessary and beneficial.
During Trump’s first term in office, these seemingly contradictory perceptions could be reconciled. Trump’s election was seen as an aberration, driven by dislike of the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton and the vagaries of the Electoral College system. His bellicose rhetoric could be dismissed as theatrical bravado. The phrase ‘take him seriously, but not literally’ was coined by writer Salena Zito to describe the attitudes of Trump supporters in 2016. The adage became conventional wisdom. Trump’s conventional Republican choices for Cabinet appointments meant that his policy choices were supposedly constrained by ‘the adults in the room’.
Joe Biden endorsed the view of Trump as an aberration after his narrow victory in the 2020 election. After Biden proclaimed that ‘America is back’ and the strong backlash against the storming of the Capitol on 6 January 2025, it seemed that Trump and Trumpism would be driven from public life.
The situation in 2025 is radically different. Having been vindicated by a plurality of voters in the 2024 election, Trump has governed as a radical extremist, with appointees to key positions who are, if anything, even more extreme than he is. Both domestically and internationally, he has shown a clear preference for dictatorship over democracy. And there is no reason to suppose that things will return to pre-Trump normality even assuming he leaves office as scheduled
The May 2025 federal election campaign was characterised by a studious avoidance of the main issues facing Australia, most notably the country’s future relationships with the United States and China. Canberra should confront the quandaries redefining the US relationship, initiated by President Donald Trump’s second term. Washington’s radical reorientation shows no sign of reversing even after 2028, when Trump is due to leave office.
The major parties’ avoidance of this issue is unsurprising given the complex attitudes of the Australian public, particularly towards the United States. On the one hand, Australians’ views of US President Donald Trump are overwhelmingly negative, a fact that contributed to the scale of the conservative Liberal–National Coalition’s defeat. On the other hand, there has been no genuine challenge to the general belief of policymakers, and the majority of the public, that Australia’s alliance with the United States is both necessary and beneficial.
During Trump’s first term in office, these seemingly contradictory perceptions could be reconciled. Trump’s election was seen as an aberration, driven by dislike of the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton and the vagaries of the Electoral College system. His bellicose rhetoric could be dismissed as theatrical bravado. The phrase ‘take him seriously, but not literally’ was coined by writer Salena Zito to describe the attitudes of Trump supporters in 2016. The adage became conventional wisdom. Trump’s conventional Republican choices for Cabinet appointments meant that his policy choices were supposedly constrained by ‘the adults in the room’.
Joe Biden endorsed the view of Trump as an aberration after his narrow victory in the 2020 election. After Biden proclaimed that ‘America is back’ and the strong backlash against the storming of the Capitol on 6 January 2025, it seemed that Trump and Trumpism would be driven from public life.
The situation in 2025 is radically different. Having been vindicated by a plurality of voters in the 2024 election, Trump has governed as a radical extremist, with appointees to key positions who are, if anything, even more extreme than he is. Both domestically and internationally, he has shown a clear preference for dictatorship over democracy. And there is no reason to suppose that things will return to pre-Trump normality even assuming he leaves office as scheduled
As far as Australia is concerned, Trump has made it clear that the United States will not be bound by treaties — even those he negotiated in his first term. Further, he believes that all US allies, including Australia, have cheated the United States in the past and deserve punishment. His 10 per cent tariff on Australian exports, while lower than those announced and then suspended for countries with which the United States runs a trade deficit, represents a clear breach of the US–Australia Free Trade Agreement.
In these circumstances, it would be foolish to expect that the United States would come to Australia’s aid in the — fortunately remote — event of a conflict with a regional neighbour. This realisation has coincided with a historical reassessment that the United States has always viewed its Australian alliance as more transactional than Australians themselves imagined.
Then Australian prime minister John Curtin’s famous turn to Washington in the Second World War was negatively received in the United States, which viewed Australia more as a geographically convenient base for fighting Japan than as a natural ally. The United States declined to militarily assist Australia during the Indonesian Confrontation and the Malayan Emergency — Commonwealth operations against Southeast Asian insurgents in the 20th century. They gave only grudging and limited support for the liberation of East Timor.
But even this relatively limited support is far more than Australia could expect from the Trump administration or its possible ideological successors.
The US alliance is also seen as offering Australia domestic and regional security through the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence sharing arrangement and access to high-tech defence equipment. But Trump has already compromised the potential of both benefits, reportedly planning massive cuts to the Central Intelligence Agency and threatening to expel Canada from the Five Eyes agreement.
As the politicisation of all aspects of the US government continues, there can be no guarantee that intelligence sharing would not be manipulated to benefit the United States at Australia’s expense. Similar issues arise with military equipment. Trump’s threat to restrict alliance partners to functionally limited versions of the new F-47 fighter aircraft have led many potential buyers to consider alternatives such as the French Dassault Rafale fighter aircraft.
The re-elected Albanese government needs to accept the fact that the United States, as Australians have imagined it since Curtin’s famous speech, is gone for good. In the new world, the United States no longer has allies, only clients who can be discarded whenever it becomes convenient to do so. Meanwhile China, which was attempting to use trade coercion against Australia until recently, continues to assert its own claims.
In protecting itself against the hegemonic pretensions of the great powers of the United States and China, Australia must find a balance between the two that preserves its independence.
The re-elected Albanese should pursue closer relations with Asian neighbours who face the strategic predicament.
As far as Australia is concerned, Trump has made it clear that the United States will not be bound by treaties — even those he negotiated in his first term. Further, he believes that all US allies, including Australia, have cheated the United States in the past and deserve punishment. His 10 per cent tariff on Australian exports, while lower than those announced and then suspended for countries with which the United States runs a trade deficit, represents a clear breach of the US–Australia Free Trade Agreement.
In these circumstances, it would be foolish to expect that the United States would come to Australia’s aid in the — fortunately remote — event of a conflict with a regional neighbour. This realisation has coincided with a historical reassessment that the United States has always viewed its Australian alliance as more transactional than Australians themselves imagined.
Then Australian prime minister John Curtin’s famous turn to Washington in the Second World War was negatively received in the United States, which viewed Australia more as a geographically convenient base for fighting Japan than as a natural ally. The United States declined to militarily assist Australia during the Indonesian Confrontation and the Malayan Emergency — Commonwealth operations against Southeast Asian insurgents in the 20th century. They gave only grudging and limited support for the liberation of East Timor.
But even this relatively limited support is far more than Australia could expect from the Trump administration or its possible ideological successors.
The US alliance is also seen as offering Australia domestic and regional security through the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence sharing arrangement and access to high-tech defence equipment. But Trump has already compromised the potential of both benefits, reportedly planning massive cuts to the Central Intelligence Agency and threatening to expel Canada from the Five Eyes agreement.
As the politicisation of all aspects of the US government continues, there can be no guarantee that intelligence sharing would not be manipulated to benefit the United States at Australia’s expense. Similar issues arise with military equipment. Trump’s threat to restrict alliance partners to functionally limited versions of the new F-47 fighter aircraft have led many potential buyers to consider alternatives such as the French Dassault Rafale fighter aircraft.
The re-elected Albanese government needs to accept the fact that the United States, as Australians have imagined it since Curtin’s famous speech, is gone for good. In the new world, the United States no longer has allies, only clients who can be discarded whenever it becomes convenient to do so. Meanwhile China, which was attempting to use trade coercion against Australia until recently, continues to assert its own claims.
In protecting itself against the hegemonic pretensions of the great powers of the United States and China, Australia must find a balance between the two that preserves its independence.
The re-elected Albanese should pursue closer relations with Asian neighbours who face the same strategic predicament.
John Quiggin 
John, this (or parts of it) seems doubled up ie. experiencing deja vu reading it.
I think everyone from all persuasions are starting to realise now the US can’t be relied upon for much at all (me included). This has been a real eye opener.
Goes both ways though. Next war they start: we should be strong and raise the middle finger at them. No more of this blindly following them into conflict.
We should be re-evaluating all our defence spending with a clear preference to source elsewhere. Ditto aviation, ditto farm equipment and capital equipment.
They burned us in trade, in tax revenue, in resource extraction, in resource access, in market access, in their stupid wars and global hypocrisy and that’s before Trump. Maybe Trump is punishing us for being suckers (his rhetoric)… Just kidding… We all know all his (ad hoc) policies are centred around self interest/enrichment.
Anyway, the rest of the western world appears to have woken up.
like. like. Which reminds me that some time ago, the University of Canberra was considering producing a double strength beer, which would be branded as UC double!
“there has been no genuine challenge to the general belief of policymakers, and the majority of the public, that Australia’s alliance with the United States is both necessary and beneficial.”
The position of “policy makers” is no doubt due to having their snouts buried deep in the US MIC trough and their hopes of latching straight back onto the many US teats post political and “public service” careers.
Then there are the legal political donations, bribes, rewards, and muscle directed at Oz “policy makers” by US interests in plain sight and contrary to the Oz public interest. A small sample of that “soft” power:
(2019) Company % US investors / % Australian investors
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 60.89 / 22.45
CSL Ltd 56.95 / 13.25
BHP Group Ltd 72.91 / 9.2
Westpac Banking Corp 63.85 / 17.2
National Australia Bank Ltd 61.8 / 19.7
Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Lt 53.42 / 21.93
Woolworths Group Ltd 66.08 / 17.01
Wesfarmers Ltd 56.34 / 21.74
Telstra Corp Ltd 25.04 / 46.78
Macquarie Group Ltd 54.41 / 26.52
Transurban Group 34.59 / 48.06
Rio Tinto Ltd 65.34 / 12.35
Woodside Petroleum Ltd 57.3 / 18.83
Goodman Group 56.04 / 12.28
Scentre Group 57.73 / 23.66
Brambles Ltd 45.69 / 21.45
Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield 50.51 / 30.56
Fortescue Metals Group Ltd 15.22 / 6.06
ResMed Inc 4.09 / 44.37
Newcrest Mining Ltd 55.76 / 14.58
Are the minds of the majority of the Australian public ever at one with their “policy makers”? Highly doubtful in the Australian context short of matters put to a referendum or plebiscite.
Simply unbelievable.
I think Russia and China are planning a coordinated, multi-front war against the West. The likely date for launching this war, in my opinion, is the northern summer of 2028. Their military build-ups and preparations will likely be ready by this date, although some pundits see 2029 as more likely. The argument in favour of 2028 is that Trump will still be in power, barring natural mortality, illness or misadventure. Trump being in power, and even preparing or executing an auto coup to unconstitutionally retain power, will further hobble and degrade US power and responses. Trump is Russia’s and China’s ace in the hole in this regard.
Russia is prepositioning new troops and equipment ready to drive towards Kaliningrad along the Suwałki corridor.
“The Suwałki Gap, also known as the Suwałki corridor, is a sparsely populated area around the border between Lithuania and Poland, and centres on the shortest path between Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast on the Polish side of the border.” – Wikipedia.
The front against Ukraine will be maintained and a new front opened against the Baltic States and Poland with Belorussia acting as an ally on this front. Russia is maintaining and even slowly expanding the front against Ukraine while also raising new armies and pre-positioning new armour and equipment for the Suwałki corridor front. Poland, the Baltic States and Germany have belatedly commenced a military build-up and defensive works to shore up the corridor.
It might seem impossible to Westerners that Russia could sustain another front. However, I don’t think modern Westerners, especially strategists and economists, fully understand what a war economy is. They rate economies by the total value of useful production plus the production of all the ephemeral frippery and rubbish of excess consumption. However, under conditions of total war only war production and sustaining civilians for war production matter. The question will be whether the West can move to a war economy. There is a dangerous chance that Russia, as a war economy, will be able to sustain two fronts. It doesn’t have to win them. It occupies Western Europe while China moves.
China is likely preparing several fronts. I am not saying Russia and China will succeed. They may succeed in simply blowing up the world. However, it appears their planners now consider the West, on the both sides of the Atlantic, as weak enough and divided enough to be attacked. The concerning thing is that Putin and Xi, plus their state apparatuses, believe they can win and believe that the time to launch the war is about 2028/29. The West is projecting weakness and disunity and inviting attack.
Corrections for above.
I did not mean Russia could occupy any significant land area in Western Europe. I meant the Russians could keep Western Europe fully engaged (“occupied” in that sense) on a large front such that Western Europe could not provide significant forces for other theatres like the Middle East and the Pacific.
Re “strategists and economists” I meant;
“I don’t think modern Westerners, especially armchair strategists and armchair economists, fully understand what a war economy is. They rate economic power by the total monetary value of all final goods and services produced in a year (GDP). (Much of this production is for frivolous consumption: frivolous by comparison to the dangers of climate change, pandemics and threatened wars.) They then assume this type of “producing for consumerism” power is readily and rapidly convertible to military power under the imperatives of a war economy.”
Of course, I am open to charges of being an armchair strategist and armchair economist myself. However, I think myself less naïve on these matters than most of the population.
It’s looking a lot like the beginning of the end, for Trump. His victory parade was an expensive sham and protestors filled every city – except Washington. which was apparently empty excepting for acolytes.
Perhaps I was a little optimistic, Trump appears to be unfazed by the protests and his quest for all the toys to be in his sandbox remains unchecked.
I think Ikonoclast, that Russia and China have quite different ambitions. Russia does want territorial expansion. China does not want to expand its territory, apart from territory it has always seen as its own such as Taiwan etc. But China does also want to have some control over states on its terrestrial and maritime borders. And it has a lot of neighbouring countries. So it shares a land border with 14 countries (tied with Russia for the most in the world): North Korea, Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam. And it has overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones with a number of other countries. If you only want some control over your neighbours, then territorial invasion is not the optimal solution. Instead you look for economic domination – which is what China is aiming for. And economic domination of Russia by China is a key part of its agenda. So I would be surprised if China allowed Russia to invade the Suwalki corridor.
The greatest likelihood of a hot war is with regard to Taiwan, (and China will work very hard to achieve reunification by non military means). I would be very surprised if there was a hot war on any other front.
China and Russia have deep links and China is supporting Russia’s war on Ukraine. It’s been a dream of the US to drive a wedge between these two but so far it hasn’t worked. Trump is almost guaranteed to expand on that failure.