Parkinson’s Law

Tony Parkinson raises an important issue as to whether the principle of not bombing civilian targets can survive conflicts like that in Fallujah. But in rightly condemning the tactics of the insurgents, he makes absurd claims on behalf of the Americans, who are already violating this principle on a massive scale. Estimates of civilian fatalities, mostly arising from American bombing range from a minimum of 15 000 (these are deaths credibly reported in news media) to 100 000 (based on a recent population survey). In this context, something like this is just absurd

The Americans, in conjunction with Iraqi officials, have steadily built up networks of informers in the Sunni cities. They have trained small, mobile units to set up sophisticated aerial and ground surveillance, and have been studying extensively the counter-terrorism methods used by the British and Israelis in urban settings. Here is perhaps where comparisons with, say, Grozny, begin to falter.

Far from having sophisticated networks of informers, the Americans have consistently shown that they lack even basic knowledge about the insurgents, even in places like Baghdad which are more or less under their control. They don’t know who the insurgents are or what their objectives might be, let alone where to find them. They had no idea how many were in Fallujah, or whether the (unidentified except for Zarqawi) leaders had stayed or fled.

Yet in the leadup to the Fallujah assault, the Americans mounted nightly bombing raids, supposedly on targets precisely identified by intelligence in a city to which they had had no access for months. The targets included restaurants and many private homes. It’s obvious that the claims about intelligence were lies, used to justify a major breach of international law. The Americans were bombing to wear down the resistance of the locals, hitting any target that might possibly have an insurgent connection, regardless of civilian casualties. There is only one word for the practice of using bombs, aimed at civilian targets, to terrify your enemies into submission.

If Parkinson had really been concerned about the principle of excluding civilian targets, he would have opposed the war from the outset, or at least from the point, some months ago when the Americans started using air raids in an occupied country, a clear breach of all the relevant laws and conventions.

48 thoughts on “Parkinson’s Law

  1. Parkinson’s mantra of self hypnosis “This is the struggle the coalistion forces must win” indicates the emotional investment he has made in supporting the Bushite adventure in Iraq.

    As a cheerleader Parkinson has relinquished most pretension of critical thinking or assessing the evidence. This is less Parkinson’s Law than Parkinson’s Disease

    Here is the view of one Pentagon official about the aim of the US in fallujah:

    “The aim is to drive a wedge between the Sunni Arab rejectionists and the incorrigibles. Many in the rejectionist group feel disenfranchised and are being intimidated. They need to be relieved of that yoke and engaged, while the extremists need to be isolated, captured or killed.”

    Parkinson demonstrates no understanding of the fact that this campaign is not directed ultimately at the insurgents. He does not grasp the fact that the reduction of Fallujah is designed to drive Sunni rejectionists to the ballot box.

    Put aside the quaintness of the notion of bombing people into democracy, there is a more subtle reason why this adventure will fail.

    Iraqi Sunnis will become more and more rejectionist because they understand what Parkinson obviiously does not. the Shiite majority comprise 60% of the population. Under Sistani they have constructed a formidable political force. It is now widely expected that the Shiites will control 75% of the proposed National Assembly. With this majority they will be able to change the Iraq Constitution unilaterally.

    This artifact of the commitment of the US to a democratic form of government terrifies Iraqi minorities. The Sunni minority are likely to become more rejectionist as they It was this latent Shiite power that caused Bush Sen. to keep Saddam in power after Gulf War I. The probability of Civil War is growing daily.

    Irony of ironies, the Idiot Son is paving the way for Iranian hegemony over the world’s biggest pool of oil.

    Unless, of course, there is a quick rewrite of the Interim Constitution to trump the imminent hegemony of Shiite Islamism. Pretty soon w’re going to discover whether this war really was All About Oil.

    I wonder what Parkinson’s exit strategy will be.

  2. Enough Already!
    Enough of our energies Have been spent on the apologists and the media machine that does the dirty mind-numbing job of the powerful…

    Sure let’s call their BS exactly that, but let’s spend that energy and resources DOING SOMETHING ABOUT IT!
    Talk is cheap…

    Thou shalt not be a victim. Thou shalt not be a perpetrator. Above all, thou shalt not be a bystander. — Holocaust Museum, Washington, DC

    Washing one’s hands of the conflict between the powerful and the powerless means to side with the powerful, not to be neutral. — Paulo Freire

    Diplomacy is to do and say, the nastiest thing in the nicest way. — Balfour

  3. In an article, over a year ago, I quoted Jack Straw’s charcterisation of Iraq-attack as a “strategic failure”. No one would quibble with that judgement now.
    In view of the Lancet report and the heavy bombing prosecution of the war in urban areas think its pretty close to time to call the war a ethical failure. And it seems to be going from bad to worse unless, per impossible, the insurgency is stopped in its tracks in Falluja.
    Parkinson’s Disease is very good. I think that there has been a pretty longer overdue conspiracy of silence amongst the majority of the “foreign policy” punditariat who supported the war. This is for reasons:
    political: no vindicated enemies to the Left
    professional: if they are no good at calling foreign policy then what are they good for?
    At this moment they are probably sitting on their pens, waiting for the US to pull out after holding “elections”. This event will be described as a “historic victory” etc and carping critics will be derided with customary vindictiveness. Iraq’s subsequent chaos, mayhem and state failure will be put down to bad luck, Arabs or the failure of will caused by carping critics…
    They should not be let off the hook so easily. The longer the wars moral enormities are left unchallenged the longer the Iraqi peoples suffering will be compounded.
    Its time that morally aware war-partisans started to call a spade a spade – or get called a spade themselves.

  4. Go jack!
    In my game we call a spade a f***ing shovel.
    It is time the same rigour was applied to the adventure in mesopotamia.
    I have heard it said in relation to Iraq,that when one is in a hole then one should stop digging.
    This simple rule seems to be beyond our american friends who continue a war of attrition against mostly civilan targets.
    Still as was said by the top brass in defence of the vietnam war-“it’s the only war we got”.

    edited by siteowner for coarse language

  5. First it was to be a quagmire in Afghanistan. After all look at the history of the place and what happened to the Russians? At the start of the Iraq war it was to be Stalingrad and millions of refugees. Then we were outrunning our supply lines in the push to Baghdad and it was time to pee our pants again. Then it was AlSadr who would turn the Shiite south into a quagmire. Now it’s a quagmire in Fallujah and it’s time to pull up stakes again.

    All I’d say at present is, I’d rather be taking our casualties in the street-fight in Fallujah at the moment, than theirs. They, being a bunch of whacko fundies from all over the ME, coupled with the hardcore remnants of Saddam’s killing machine. If you haven’t got the stomach for this fight, perhaps you’d better get a bit of carpet and start practising bending over regularly. For the majority of us it’s a case of, whatever it takes and however long it takes.

    I wonder how different our world would have been if allied troops in WWII had paused on the outskirts of Berlin and said- ‘This is all a bit hard, perhaps we’d better consult the university professors back home on what to do next.’ To paraphrase a wise man recently- ‘We’ve knocked off all the dumb ones, now there’s only the smart ones to go.’

  6. As far as I can recall, the allied troops in WWII on the outskirts of Berlin were Soviets who attemped to rape every woman in sight. Such ill-discipline – aided by not-so-subtle encouragement by upstairs – probably prolonged the war, and cost the Russians another million troops. Put it this way: the Germans had enough MOTIVATION to fight as hard as they can. Can you think of a better historical parallel, observa?

    (The Americans and British had nothing to do with the final push. One of those “Big Three” agreement gave the U.S.S.R. first dibs on Berlin, Vienna and Prague.)

  7. Jeez you talk crap sometimes Observa. For the majority of us it’s a case of, whatever it takes and however long it takes. Obviously it’s not going to take any actual intervention from you (or are you in the military?)

  8. Observa, can you point to people who predicted a quagmire in Afghanistan?

    There were quite a few critics who said, at various stages, there weren’t enough troops on the ground. I’d say the escape of OBL and the general chaos of much of the country vindicates these critics.

  9. I’m going to breach Godwin’s Law again, However, I claim partial exculpation by observing that Observa brought up the touchy subject of Berlin 1945. And Donald Rumsfeld himself opined that post-invasion Iraq would follow a similar course to post invasion Germany. I guess he regrets saying that now.

    Post -invasion Iraq is NOT analogous to post invasion Germany.

    German culture in 1945 was individualist, secular and materialist. Seventeen years of Nazism had done nothing to challenge these basic principles. Germany in 1945 was more monocultural than it had been in 1933.

    Let us consider an absurd situation. Let ‘s pretend that in 1945 the official Lutheran Church had demanded that Germans resist Allied occupation, how many Germans would have taken any notice at all?

    Now to Iraq. The Association of Muslim Clerics, the umbrella organisation for Sunni clerics, has called for all Sunnis to boycott forthcoming elections. This call was a direct response to the invasion of Fallujah and will be the most important consequence of this invasion. This is the most powerful evidence for the rise of Sunni rejectionism. The Muslim cleric fatwa is a declaration of civil war.

    Observa may well paraphrase Stalin by demanding to know how many battalions does the Association have? And inevitably no one knows yet, but I’m prepared to bet that there are enough to make Iraq ungovernable.

    On another matter. Iraq isn’t Afghanistan either.

    Things happen much slower in Afghanistan. I’ve seen colour film of the streets of Kabul where the women were all wearing summer printed cotton dresses. The whole scene looked like an out take from the movie Bonjour Tristesse. This was Afghanistan when it was governed by a Soviet puppet. The Soviets deeply outraged Islamic sensibilities and suffered the consequences.

    Do the Americans have more patience and more finesse that the Soviets? Time — a whole lot of time — will tell.

  10. I will quibble with calling Iraq a strategic failure. I can’t see how we will know whether it will be or not for 10 or 15 years at least.

    As to Afghanistan, it was regularly reported on mainstream television and newspapers that Afghanistan would be another Vietnam.

    Afghanistan is not perfect but chaos in most of the country? How did they hold elections without violence then?

    I see Zoot brings up the chickenhawk argument. That is a fair enough point, but the logical extension is that only veterans and current servicmen can vote or make policy. If that were the case, how do you think a vote on the war would go? Just how big a majority would Bush (or Howard) have with only military people voting?

  11. “As to Afghanistan, it was regularly reported on mainstream television and newspapers that Afghanistan would be another Vietnam.”

    Examples with links?

  12. John,
    There is a fairly useful precis of attitudes to the war in Afghanistan http://www.why-war.com/news/2002/09/15/peacepuz.html by one of your peers, who wouldn’t exactly be described as a RWDB.
    Zoot,
    I’m too old for the miltary even if they wanted me, which they don’t as they have all the volunteers, resources and expertise they need. However their expertise does need the democratic imprimatur of govt, as well as the electorate’s commitment of resources required. In case you haven’t noticed recently, Bush and Howard certainly have this imprimatur. We’ll see about Blair. Also you don’t need to be an expert in military tactics to criticise the progress of the war in Iraq , so feel free, but be prepared to accept like criticism if your side of politics get its calls wrong.

    As for Fallujah, it certainly isn’t a Dresden or a Hiroshima and we have been there. Horses for courses. I have faith in ‘our'(COW) military to choose its targets and tactics carefully in Fallujah. After all it would be aware that it must build the peace there too eventually, unlike WWII perhaps at the time.

    If pacification of Iraq proceeds as it has to date over the next year or two and the country settles down civilly and more democratically, a window of opportunity for peace in the ME may well open up. In this respect we should observe that Iran has been remakably subdued on COW intervention in Iraq. After all it had much to be thankful for with the removal of an old foe. Also with a mutual ally of Saddam in Arafat gone, Palestinians may come to their senses. They may be prepared to recognise Israel’s right to exist and make overtures for peace. Bush(and Blair) in a position of strength would be in the perfect position to proffer an olive branch. A democratic Palestinian state, and with the removal of Iraq as a threat to Iran, the offer of nuclear diarmament by Israel in return for a nuclear free ME.(with US security guarantees all round of course) This offer of nuclear disarmament could see a domino effect for the removal of nuclear weapons world wide. Certainly the US, Europe and Russia have little interest in their deterrence capacity now. Increasingly, neither do the Chinese, who could easily pressure NK to disarm. It would be difficult for India and Pakistan to resist this international pressure, particularly with security guarantees. None of these countries really has an interest in the availability of fissionable material for terrorists nowadays.

    Some of you have little faith in the likes of Bush and Blair to think a little more laterally and long term about overcoming long term threats to world peace. I think Putin has a better appreciation of their beacon of light theory in the ME now and the Iranians are strangely quiet. The notion that the Iraqi Shia will create a Shia superstate with Iranian mullahs is IMO fanciful. I doubt Iran’s mullahs would want to add to their problems of keeping the lid on their reformist youth, even if Iraqi Shia were prepared to let bygones be bygones over the Iran/Iraq war. Anyhow the Iranian mullahs are too preoccupied with deep philosophical debates like whether telescopes should be used to observe the new moon’s signal, to end Ramadan.

  13. Television and radio reports, especially from field reporters, often don’t have web transcripts and thus will not show up in web searches. This is especially so for news where many of the ill-informed commentary may have occurred.

    I certainly concur with wpc and observa that there was a significant viewpoint that falsely attributed an unwarranted level of military skill to opposing forces in Afghanistan, Iraq and, for that matter, East Timor.

    Some of the ignorance was quite funny. For example, a lot of reporters misinterpreted the elite appellation given to Iraq’s Republican Guard, thinking it equated to Special Forces. In fact, the Republican Guard was just a strategic reserve type of unit. They were easily brushed aside outside Baghdad.

    There were several reports predicting house-to-house fighting in Baghdad. I got the impression the reporter/s had just read their first ever book on military history.

    In Afghanistan, there was a lot of comparison with earlier Russian campaigns. Those comparisons failed to understand that the Russian forces were generally garrison troops, and they were filling garrison roles. When the Taliban formed a defensive position in the north, some TV reporters, apparently unaware of the effect of B-52’s, clearly thought they posed a significant threat. They did not have a clue as to the difference between a rag-tag army and a professional one.

    With East Timor, early on, there was a failure to understand that the ability of militia to inflict terror on unarmed civilians was quite different from posing a threat to armed soldiers.

    The last five years have seen the Australian media regain a familiarity with defence forces, operations and history that had been lost since the end of the Vietnam War.

  14. Observa, the only people cited in your link as opposing the war against the Taliban/AQ are a handful of far leftists, of whom only Chomsky has any prominence. And even these people are not cited as making any particular predictions about quagmires etc, simply as opposing the war.

    Lots of people who supported the overthrow of the Taliban opposed the overthrow of Iraq.

    “If pacification of Iraq proceeds as it has to date over the next year or two ”

    Are you seriously suggesting that the pacification of Iraq has advanced in the last year?

  15. John,
    I’ll grant you there was a lot less opposition to Afganistan than Iraq, but they often sang the same tune. I suppose it was often a case of quantitative difference rather than a qualitative one..

    “Are you seriously suggesting that the pacification of Iraq has advanced in the last year?”
    Well I prefer to view progress in Iraq from the moment the order was given to cross the borders. Otherwise we may overlook some important lessons and achievements. That said the Sunni triangle is no bed of roses. In general, the Coalition has made some giant strides, carefully consolidating and protecting its gains. The friendlier Kurdish and Shia areas were the first centres of attention, with the Sunni areas now the main focus. Pacifying and rebuilding Iraq was always going to be the most difficult task, with the Sunni triangle the hardest. Nevertheless some of us are noticeing a subtle shift by the critics from ‘strategic disaster’ initially, to ‘moral calamity’ now. Rest assured it will remain a disastrous calamity for the foreign fundies, Saddamites and lawless thugs in places like Fallujah, or wherever they choose to hide. Still, I don’t have any illusions as to what impact several thousand of these whackos would have on Bob Carr’s train timetables, if they were running amok in the the population, from Newcastle to Woollongong

  16. What?? The Fallujah Sunni’s pose a threat to the rail system of NSW? You’re confusing your terrorists with your insurgents. However, you have convinced me; we must fight them to the last drop of someone else’s blood.

  17. If any are curious about the film ‘Submission’ that cost Theo van Gogh his life, it was available (26Mb) here yesterday –

    http://www.mehrdad.org/van-gogh/

    The (few) other advertised links seem to be either choked, or dead.

    Anyone here game to host it for download in Oz – and earn a fatwa?

    I doubt it will be shown on free-to-air, but should it?

  18. Observa et al, here is what I wrote about the post-2001 Afghanistan adventure at the time it was being contemplated. You can compare and contrast how the article was written and edited too, if you like. I was more raising questions to hold up against a developing situation than providing answers. How well do you think it stands up with a little more hindsight available now?

  19. For the record, Chomsky did urge against invading Afghanistan, but not on the basis that it would become a quagmire. He opposed both invasions because of the likely effects on the invaded, not because of the costs to the invader.

  20. Posted by: John Quiggin at November 14, 2004 12:49 PM seeks the proof of broad Left anti-war sentiment:

    “As to Afghanistan, it was regularly reported on mainstream television and newspapers that Afghanistan would be another Vietnam.”
    Examples with links?

    The interesting thing about post-911-pre-Kabul fall commentary is that both Left and Right had quagmire fears and showed defeatist sentiment about an Afghan military conflict:
    Leftist anti-war – mostly the Guardian:
    Jason Burke Why this war will not work
    Polly Toynbee
    Our victory has proved the pessimists utterly wrong
    ex-SAS; In the death zone
    George Galloway; MP warns of creating ‘10,000 Bin Ladens’
    Andy Beckett
    Did the left lose the war?
    Jonathan Steele Fighting the wrong war
    Martin Kettle Ducking the intellectual challenge
    RN Apple (New York Times) A Military Quagmire Remembered Afghanistan as Vietnam
    Rightist defeatism – mostly the Washington Post:
    Pentagon Says Taliban Is Ready for Long Fight
    U.S. Shifts Gears After a Week of Setbacks
    David Hackworth; America’s ‘elite’ troops
    William Kristol; The Wrong Strategy
    Charles Krauthammer; Not Enough Might
    UK DoD; This could take four years’
    What happened after 911 was that the Anglosphere’s center of ideological gravity shited to the Right by about 4%. This immediately shift made routine Leftist reservations about the use of military force looked extremist. And extremist Leftist anti-Westernism now looked downright treacherous.
    The usual Leftist suspects – Ray Cassin; If the war aim is gone, why are we at war , Margot Kingston’s BLAH X ∞ pushed an anti-war or defeatist line in Australia. But they represented a minority of marginalised Leftists.
    Many of the DFAT Mandarins chose 911 to push an anti-American or defeatist line Follow America? That’s not leadership. This seemed in line with the Jakarta Lobby’s queer pitch during the Timor confrontation. These types have to be watched very carefully in war-time.
    One thing about the post-911 moment that should not be forgotten is the broad, mainstream (Vital Centrist?!) consensus that formed around a mulltlateral coalition assisting the US in counter-attacking terrorist bases. This transended differences in party and nation. US rallies the west for attack on Afghanistan
    The Right’s take home message from Afghanistan was that the Left was on the defensive and the Islamacists would crumble before a hi-tech military assault. So the Right thought an attack on an Islamic state would be a cake-walk in the field and allow the Right to clean up in political contests at home.
    So the Right chose to roll the die on Iraq. Unfortunately the far Right blew the mulit-lateral suppport gained from 911 and ignited Arab nationalism. In doing so the Right generally validated some of the wrong-headed or dubious criticisms of the Afghanistan operation made by the far Left.

  21. Jack, thanks for all these links, It seems to me that most are covered by my observation

    There were quite a few critics who said, at various stages, there weren’t enough troops on the ground. I’d say the escape of OBL and the general chaos of much of the country vindicates these critics.

    while others reflect the problem raised in this post, generalized denunciations of unnamed critics (eg Polly Toynbee’s piece). I have yet to see an unqualified prediction of an Afghan quagmire. By contrast, plenty of people including me are prepared to label Iraq a quagmire.

  22. The quagmire predictions were mainly on the Militarist Right, rather than the Pacifist Left. See the comment by the ex-SAS trooper and the various statements by US & UK DoD’s. I think that these statements may well have been issued in uncertainty or to hose down expectations of a quick victory.
    I broadly agree with Pr Q’s comments about the paucity of on-the ground troops and lack of peace-keeping and nation-building back-up. These deficiencies have contributed to the escape of jihadist elements to Pakistan and resurgence of war-lordism in the countryside.
    Still, I think that the Bush admin’s basic strategy in Afghanistan was fair and reasonable at the time, and in the context of the low strategic importance of that jurisdiction. Afghanistan has now reverted to the kind of place that would not have surprised Churchill a century ago, and perhaps thats the best we can hope for. War Nerd, as usual, has the definitive analysis of this subject. Afghanistan – What went right?

  23. I stand corrected. Change quagmire to ‘graveyard of empires’ or perhaps Hanrahan’s, ‘we’ll all be rooned!’

    Interestingly enough Blair is visiting Bush for a chat and Bush has made rumblings about a Palestinian state now Arafat’s no longer ruler of the rubble. Keep your eye on the grand plan.

  24. People seem to have a problem with civilian deaths in war. The first thing to remember is than no one can be defeated if they don’t want to be. They must make that decision for themselves. Analysis of modern wars suggests that this starts to happen when when casualties reach 10% the of population mark.
    So the problem with Iraq is that they don’t feel that they have been defeated yet.
    A major cause of this is the belief amongst a lot of Westerners that wars can be won with a minimum of bloodshed. Sorry can’t be done, no matter how advanced weapons become, it will always come down to who can kill the most, fastest.
    As Tolstoy said:” War is not polite recreation but the vilest thing in life, and we ought to understand that and not play at war.’
    When you decide to go to war it must be done immediately, as any delay will only increase the numbers that will have to be eventually killed. The War on Iraq was held up for months, trying to get the useless UN to come on board. (Mainly to cover Blair’s Backside).
    While the Coalition of the Willing were dithering, the Iraqis were quietly putting their war plans into place.
    They knew instinctivly what Samuel P. Huntington pointed out as reality :
    “The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact, non-Westerners never do.”
    They were not stupid. They knew that if they were to have any chance they would have to fight asymmetrically.
    General Abu Al Mu’tassin lays it all out for those who don’t understand.
    Here are a few quotes:
    “What we planned before the Occupation is being achieved on the terrain in a good way. This shows the correct political and military Iraqi leadership long-term vision, when it planned the Resistance and started its fire ”
    “There is a unified military leadership, which leads the operations in the terrain in every town of Iraq. This leadership includes the best officers of the Iraqi Army, the Republican Guard, Saddam’s Fidayyins”
    The COW is aware of this at long last (why don’t they listen to me, and stop looking at things through rose coloured glasses?)
    What people must understand is that war is about only two things, strategy and tactics.
    Although the strategy used in operation Iraqi Freedom was brilliant, it was the wrong strategy. It played directly into the Ba’ath Party hands.
    The COW should have spent all their efforts eliminating (yes killing them) all of the Iraqi Army in the field, especially the Republican Guard. Try and imagine Patton, in WWII, making a dash for Berlin and leaving all the SS divisions intact behind him. Would he have expected them to roll over with the fall of Berlin?
    Of course not.
    However reality seems to be sinking in with the COWS and their moves since the election in the U.S seems to show that they understand OODA and are getting inside the enemy’s decision cycle.
    Already the Iraqis are complaining about the troops being heartless and frightening them, as opposed to a few moths ago when these self same Iraqis were killing and burning innocents and laughing and hollering and sneering about it.
    Such is the beauty of a clue bat.

  25. How long will people continue to describe the Age as left-wing when its international affairs editor is so reactionary and right wing?

    ANd does anybody know what qualifications he has for this job, apart from being a hack?

  26. Sigh.

    Tipper, of course people can be defeated whether they collude in it or not. The reason so many do eventually collude is that both sides usually have an interest in avoiding the extreme case that arises when they do not. Compare and contrast the German acceptance of defeat in 1918 with the lack thereof in 1945. Or compare the Carthaginian backs to the wall spirit in the third Carthaginian War with the more even handed approach after the previous two wars they had with Rome.

  27. tipper,

    Iraq has a population (excluding recent immigrants…) of around 25m. Are you suggesting that the US should kill around 2.5m (the magic “10%” you just dreamed up) of them to encourage the others to surrender? I can see that playing really well in the Sunni triangle:

    “Hey, Ahmed, the US just killed the 2,500,000th civilian. Let’s surrender and become democratic!”

    “Sure thing, Ali, where do I vote for the crony of the occupying power?!!”

    It’s probably BECAUSE the Pentagon is listening to ignorant fools like yourself without a clue about counter-insurgency warfare that they’re losing this war.

  28. No Fyodor, I’m not saying they should kill 2.5 million.
    The Kurds are firmly on side and Sistani has Tater under control, so that leave around 40%. So 40% of 2.5 is only 1 million.
    Keep that figure in mind, for when the tipping point occurs.
    However you missed the whole point of the post.
    The West AKA Christendom, has to get the triangle under control. Fallujah is the centre of the corridor leading to Iran and Syria, and the Islamist know it.
    Whoever controls Fallugia eventually controls both those countries.
    Try and think hard about that and see if you can get into the picture. Maybe even get a map and study it to help you.

  29. Whatever the short to middle-term outcome in Iraq, i.e. quagmire or American “victory”, the key issue is that the terrorists’ aim for a international islamic fundamentalist jihad will be aided and greately strengthened by the military strategies being pursued in Iraq by the Bush administration. The current approach to the “war on terror” will have precisely the same impact on international terrorism as the “war on drugs” has had on the illicit drug trade, i.e. make it worse, very much worse.

  30. You can get some idea of why the COW military was carefully biting off chewable trouble spots and swallowing them one by one in Iraq here
    Follow the links to view the battleground of Fallujah and also understand the careful strategic planning that goes into such an operation. It was important to trial tactics and strategy against lesser enemies like the Mehdi army and in Samarra, particularly to give green Iraqi National Guard troops experience for tougher fights.

    Fallujah is a reasonably discrete enemy stronghold and relatively easily surrounded. Zarquawi and his leadership have reportedly fled the scene and they would have been very wise to do so. The remaining defenders are virtually committing suicide. Zarquawi and co will lose a great deal of command and control with the fall of Fallujah, as well as much weaponry and ordinance for terror related activities. Like bin Laden and Saddam he will be on the run and isolated by being afraid to use any electronic form of communications. Away from a friendly protective stronghold and with a price on his head, he will be totally preoccupied with survival rather than any acts of terror. As well, the word about what happens to ‘resistance’ fighters like those in Fallujah will travel faster than Zarquawi and co can. It is inevitable that some will begin to question the leadership qualities of their new Saddam on the run between spiderholes.

  31. tipper & Observa,

    I’ll repeat what I said earlier: this is a counter-insurgency war. Anybody who thinks that controlling territory is the key to winning it is in for a long, painful education. All the firepower and planning in the world will not defeat a highly-motivated and well-organised guerilla movement. As in all guerilla wars, the key lies in winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi population. Do you see any progress on that score? Fifty years of post-colonial guerilla wars tell us that the USA will not be able to impose its will on Iraq indefinitely. Why? Because they will give up before their enemy does.

    The USA have absolutely botched the occupation and now have no recourse but to exit as honourably as possible. However, it’s painfully obvious that the US government is hell-bent on re-enacting the mistakes of Vietnam, and more people will die before they realise their error.

  32. Observa’s Belmont Club URL is well worth a visit.

    Posters there evidently derive enormous self-gratification from ogling the smearing effects of the pointy end of the “revolution in military affairs”.

    I’m picturing a bunch of anoraks typing with one hand.

    Can’t help thinking that they might be better employed resuming their old hobby of trainspotting.

  33. Just reading a novel about the US around 1900, when they decided to start an empire with the Phillipines.The insurgents fought them for years after.

  34. The Belmont Club contains the usual smattering of trainspotters along with some experienced train drivers. Like all blogs you will have to work out for yourself who is who.

    Fyodor raises some skepticism about progress in Iraq and rightly so. It is naive to think that only Saddam, Uday and Qsay were solely capable of tyrannising and controlling Iraq. They had tens of thousands of loyal henchmen in the Sunni Triangle to do their dirty work. However that loyalty was seriously questioned when faced with COW invasion. Essentially we kicked in a rotten door and then the hard yards began in earnest. Kick starting a shattered economy and winning the peace. We have to appreciate that the Sunnis were more militaristic in being able to control a Shia majority in Iraq, if not always the Kurds. The Shia and Kurds have no vested interest in supporting the rise of any Sunni nationalism or insurgency now. Indeed they have a strong interest in manning the administration, police and army if the Sunnis want to miss the boat with other preoccupations.

    Initially the Sunnis, faced with invasion took off their boots and uniforms and ran off home to lick their wounds and consider their future options. You don’t lose your job, economic well being and social status without some serious misgivings of course. This was fertile ground for the Islamofascists that gathered from across the ME to lend them a sympathetic shoulder to cry on. With economic and social conditions in Iraq compromised immediately after the invasion, particularly for a deposed ruling elite, the current discontent fuelled by the addition of Islamofascists sympathisers, is understandable.

    In the longer term the question is whether those with a grudge in the Sunni Triangle are a significant majority and even if they are, what lengths they are prepared to go to to act upon that grudge. Most of them certainly weren’t prepared to die in a ditch for Saddam. Will they be prepared to die for the likes of Zarquawi and co? We’ll see.

    The fall of Fallujah won’t eliminate terrorist bombings, but it will deny a significant, safe, command and control fortress for many of them to be launched from. Overall the war critics need to take a step back and look at the bigger picture. Personally, I cannot recall any time in history when a country of 25 million people has been invaded and controlled for so long, with so few casualties for the invaders. You just don’t achieve that unless you are really kicking in a rotten door and there is subsequent broad support for where you are going with the end game. So far our politic and military have been proved strategically correct. Retiring and vacating the field to the Islamofascists and Saddam’s worst thugs is just not an option for me. It’s hard to know what the war’s critics are advocating these days, other than impatience.

  35. Observa, the US occupied South Vietnam with zero casualties. Apart from the original photo-op of the Marines landing by army duck at Danang, the rest of them jetted into Saigon International Airport.

    It was only when the Americans attempted to deal with the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese did things go pear-shaped.

    And US, Australian, South Korean, Filipino and New Zealand troops could enjoy the abundant pleasures and temptations of the Saigon nightlife with little danger of personal harm beyond a few nasty venereal bugs.

    I’d like to see the COWs try that in beautiful downtown Baghdad.

    Saddam was a fascist, but not an Islamofascist. The Association of Muslim clerics are Islamic, but not Islamofascist. Not until the reduction of Fallujah did the Sunni clergy openly oppose the US project in Iraq. They represent a new political force in Iraq largely untainted by association with Saddam.

  36. Observa,

    The link below shows progressive US casualties in Vietnam. In that war, the US didn’t accumulate more than 1,000 casualties (deaths) until 1965, when 1,863 Americans died from combat wounds. Even if we accept that the US only had a “heavy” commitment in Vietnam from 1964, the current Iraq casualty count of around 1,200 after 1.5 years should be a sobering reminder of the 50+K Americans who died in Vietnam in the 10 years after 1965. I think you should be less blase about how “few” casualties the US has sustained. It could get a whole lot worse.

    http://www.archives.gov/research_room/research_topics/vietnam_war_casualty_lists/statistics.html#year

  37. Katz,
    I’m as aware of the ethnic and religious tensions in Iraq as was Saddam. Even christians could worship in peace as long as they also paid due homage to Saddam. The Sunni clerics are not happy and are at odds with Shiite clerics for failing to condemn the action in Fallujah. The Sunni clerics do have a large political problem on their hands here. Do they drive their flock in the direction of Zarquawi or the US? Which direction would better suit their long term power aspirations? It could well be that without a tyrant like Saddam in control, long term Iraq fractures along broad ethnic and religious divides. I guess that’s really up to the Sunnis and their aspiring cleric leadership. Pragmatism can make for some odd alliances, although ultimately the COW won’t stay long term, if a united Iraq really is in the too hard basket.

    Imagine 10 years on, with a Shiite superstate of Iran which has turned into a latter day Vietnam, fighting the Sunnis who have gone over to the dark side, while the US quietly sits in a friendly Kurdish client state, barracking for the good guys. Certainly food for thought for the Sunni clerics I guess.

  38. There should be a fair bit of caution drawing parallels between Vietnam and Iraq. The Iraqi resistance lacks the underlying popular support that was present in Vietnam. Nor is there an adjacent nation supplying main force battalions and equipment. The American forces do not have to work with a corrupt army lacking a culture of honour and bravery among the officer class, as they did in South Vietnam.

    Most importantly, the Iraqi terrain is unsuitable for guerilla warfare, lacking mountains or jungles to hide in, or reliable water supplies to stay hidden. There will not be a sustained guerilla campaign in Iraq.

  39. Observa, I believe that you have summarised the choices open to the various sides very well. I agree that the COW is working under severe time constraint.

    The persistence of a Kurdish client state of the US is a bit questionable because its existence would infuriate Turkey and destabilise the prospects of other priorities of the US, most notably Turkey’s joining the EU.

    Tony, jungle is a good place for guerilla war. so are big cities. If Iraqi guerillas choose to make a stand in the desert, they deserve all they get. We were assured at the time that the Viet Cong lacked popular support as well.

    You’re right, the Americans are unlikely to fight a long guerilla campaign in Iraq. It seems to me that the most likely scenario will be:

    1. An incomplete ballot at the end of January produces a large majority supportive of Sistani.

    2. This majority threatens to change the constitution.

    3. The Americans seek a rapprochement with Sunni interests who form an uneasy coalition with Kurdish forces.

    4. Sunni insurgency, this time with American compliance, aimed at undermining the power of the National Assembly.

    5. Civil War breaks out between Shiites and others. Widespread chaos ensues.

    What happens next has much to do with the pain threshold of the US government and the timing of the US political cycle.

  40. Fyodor and Katz, your problem is that you are living in the past. Around 40 years or so to be exact. What do they say about generals? Always fighting the last war. Are you wannabe generals?
    Back in the sixties we lived in a Kennan world, today we live in a Lewis world. That link was a simplistic one, but I don’t want to confuse you.So all you’re comparisons are worthless, in spite of Katz’s erotic fantasies.
    Me, I’m as anti Lewis as you can get. I don’t for one moment think inbred kissing cousins can ever get their “brains”(and I use that word loosely) around the concept of nation, democracy and division of religion and state.
    So unless you can at least understand what you are on about, wouldn’t it be a good idea, as the saying goes “ it’s better to say nothing and be thought a fool , than to open your mouth and remove all doubt”

  41. Tipper, you’ve forgotten to take your little pills again, haven’t you?

    Here is a quote from that eldritch URL you recommended:

    “The Holy See clearly proposes “soft powerâ€? as a means for propagating democracy in these countries: a peaceful diffusion of democracy through the winning of consensus in favor of laws and regulations for coexistence that are shown as good and attractive in themselves. In this, the Church draws upon its two thousand years of experience as bearer of the Gospel.

    “But at the same time, it does not exclude the possibility that military forces could intervene as “missionaries of peaceâ€? when necessary. Present-day Iraq is one of these cases of necessity, in the judgment of Vatican leaders.”

    1. I guess that the voices have to be pretty loud in your head to persuade you that what we are witnessing in Iraq is an example of “soft power”.

    2. Given that the actual present, flesh-and-blood real Pope (John Paul II) has condemned Bush’s Iraq frolic, I suppose he is not to be included under the category of “Vatican leaders.”

    Are you channelling the voice of another pope Tipper?

  42. Tony Healy,

    You raised some good points on Iraq/Vietnam, but notice that the US has singularly failed to make significant inroads in undermining a predominantly urban guerilla enemy.

    Yes, there’s no jungle, but there are large cities where US soldiers cannot find hiding guerillas. Beirut and Palestine provide similar examples of successful guerilla campaigns.

    The guerillas obviously DO have the support of the populace: they have access to information, weapons, recruits, sustenance, etc.. All the evidence points to the guerillas having a strong hold over at least a sizeable minority of the population.

    The Iraqis may not have North Vietnam over the border, but that doesn’t mean they can’t continue the fight. Furthermore, it appears that resources, both human and materiel, are crossing the border into the country, notably from Syria.

    The Iraqi National Guard is an ineffectual oxymoron. It is neither national nor guarding anything. If anything, I’d say it is even LESS effectual than the ARVN, and hopelessly compromised. The US simply cannot rely upon it to enforce the law.

    The US focus on seizing and holding territory, on accumulating terrorist kills and on corraling and concentrating their opponent is precisely the wrong strategy for combating guerillas.

    Ask yourself, what is the primary objective in fighting insurgents? It is not to defeat the guerillas in the field: like Hydra, their force is endlessly replenished. No, the objective must be to win over the population providing support to the guerillas. Only when the guerilla is isolated from his place of hiding and support is he vulnerable. The US is failing dismally on this score and, worse, its tactics are exacerbating the antagonism of Iraqi civilians. They’re actually pushing uncommitted Iraqis into the arms of extremists by destroying their homes and killing their relatives.

    The US is fighting a guerilla war and losing.

    tipper,

    If you can’t be bothered to learn from history, you’re doomed to repeat it. You’re in for a steep learning curve on this issue. If you think the guerilla war in Iraq is solely about religion, you’re sorely mistaken. The guerillas don’t need Islam to motivate them in fighting a foreign occupying power – it’s just a bonus.

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