The big one

(14 Nov update) I got this badly wrong. Johnson followed the same path that doomed McCarthy, passing a short-term fix with Democratic votes. It’s hard to see why the Republicans went through all these contortions to end up where they started.

Government shutdowns, and threats of shutdown, have become routine in the US, with the result that no one much worries about them any more. Typically some kind of compromise is reached just as the deadline approaches, and government returns to quasi-normality.. Occasionally, bluffs are called and a ‘shutdown’ actually happens. Civil servants are sent home, public facilities are closed and so on. But the armed forces operate as normal, Social Security checks go out, and IOUs take the place of actual spending for various essential purposes. After a few weeks at the most, that produces enough pressure to deliver some kind of resolution. As far as I can see, that’s what most political commentators think will happen in November, when the next deadline is reached.

I foresee something more drastic and dangerous. It’s hard to imagine the Republicans in the House of Representatives agreeing on any set of demands for a spending bill, short of requiring Biden and Harris to resign and install Johnson as President* . But if they do come up with a program, it will be so extreme as to be totally unacceptable to Biden and the Democrats. And, the long history of blackmail efforts like this seems to have stiffened spines on the Democratic side.
Earthquakes: Facts, Definition, Types, Causes and Effects of Earthquake …

So, there will probably be a shutdown. But how will it end? Leaving aside the fact that Johnson is a far-right extremist dedicated to the overthrow of US democracy, cutting any kind of deal with Biden would be signing his own resignation (but see below). On the other side, capitulation would doom Biden’s presidency.

That means the shutdown has to continue past the symbolic stage of closing national parks and so on, to the point where it is doing serious damage to the US economy and society, with debt downgrades, personal and corporate bankruptcies and so on. That will still not be enough to shift the Republican extreme right, so no deal will be achieved with Republicans alone. What are the remaining possibilities? Here are a few I’ve thought about, roughly in order of probability

  • Johnson cuts a deal with the Democrats, passing a continuing resolution in return for the promise of some abstentions, or even active support, when the Freedom Caucus try to vote him out. This seems the most likely option to me, but it will be very painful on both sides
  • Biden capitulates. I still see this as unlikely, but the pressure to do so will be immense.
  • A handful of Republicans remember that they are supposed to care about the country they govern, and cross the floor, knowing they will lose their seats and face the obloquy of most of their (former) friends and supporters.
  • Biden invokes emergency powers to reopen the government and defies the Supreme Court to stop him. I’m not a lawyer, so I don’t know what these powers might be, but the issue is essentially political. Unless he is impeached or otherwise prevented from acting, emergency powers are what the President says they are, a point made by Abraham Lincoln at the beginning of the Civil War (a relevant precedent in the current state of the US).

I haven’t seen anyone else predicting such a crisis, so maybe I’m over-estimating the difficulty of reaching a resolution. IIRC, I was among the first to predict a crisis like this when the Republicans retook the House in 2010**, but I couldn’t see a resolution then either, and one was reached in the end.

  • Joking, but not really – I can imagine at least some of them demanding this, with the proviso that Johnson would then resign in favour of Trump.

** There was a debt limit crisis in 2011 and a 16-day shutdown in 2013.

Crossposted from my substack https://johnquigginblog.substack.com/p/the-big-one

Retrofuturism

(Crosspost from my Substack blog, where post includes links and images)>

I don’t think I’m the only one to notice that Marc Andreesen’s ‘Techno-Optimist Manifesto’ has a curiously dated feel, as if the author had been cryogenically frozen around the time he cashed out of Netscape. Two points particularly struck me.

First, there his paean to market processes, which are represented as “Willing buyer meets willing seller, a price is struck, both sides benefit from the exchange or it doesn’t happen”

This statement might have seemed plausible at the height of the dotcom boom, which coincided with the high point of faith in ‘turbo-capitalism’. But it’s not at all descriptive of the way in which the Internet and the World Wide Web have developed, as Andreesen himself ought to remember.

Until the mid-1990s, the Internet and the World Wide Web were products of government funded organizations, developed by academics and other users without a profit motive. The associated software, including Andreesen’s Netscape Navigator were given away free of charge (Gopher, the main rival to the WWW, failed because the he University of Minnesota tried to cash in on it). The Internet rapidly displaced commercial enterprises like AOL (who tried to buy their way back in by acquiring Netscape, and were themselves bought by Time Warner in one of the most disastrous acquisitions of all time). Even after the Web was open to commerce, much of the innovation (blogs, Wikipedia, most recently the Fediverse) came from non-commercial sources.

But even the for-profit Internet doesn’t fit Andreesen’s description. Google, Facebook and other platforms don’t rely on exchanging their services at an agreed price. Rather, they provide a service that is free of charge, and make their money by serving ads and harvesting user data for other marketers. At a stretch, one might say that advertisements in traditional media represent an agreed price “watch 20 minutes of our sitcom, and consume 10 minutes of ads”. But cookies and trackers are surreptitious – no one can really know how much they are paying. We are seeing a gradual shift back towards subscription models, both for traditional media outlets and for new entrants like Substack. But these are the exception rather than the rule.

Hardware vendors like Apple come a bit closer to the traditional market model. But even they rely critically on ‘intellectual property’, that is, laws preventing competitors from supplying equivalent products.

The result of all of this is that, in the Internet economy, there is almost no relationship between contribution and reward. Andreesen is a billionaire while Tim Berners-Lee drove a used car for years (more recently, though, he has been reported as having a net wealth of $50 million). As Rebecca Giblin and Cory Doctorow have pointed out , the crucial thing is to establish a choke-point at which wealth can be extracted. These choke points do more to hinder innovation than to promote it.

Then there’s his pitch for nuclear fission. Again, this made sense in the late 1990s. The reality of global heating, and therefore the need to stop burning coal was becoming undeniable. Alternatives such as wind and solar were prohibitively costly. So, the risks of nuclear accidents and the problem of managing waste were outweighed by the certainty of climate catastrophe under business as usual.

But in 2023 nuclear power is a dead duck, a C20 technology with a string of failed revivals in C21. New additions have barely kept pace with closures of old plants.

By contrast, solar PV is the biggest single example in support of techno-optimism. From essentially zero, it’s reached the point where annual additions are around 400 GW a year, almost as much as the total installed capacity of nuclear. Costs have plummeted and, after some generous initial support from government, most of the process is being driven by markets. There is no better case of creative destruction than the rise of solar PV

Andreesen’s failure to recognise this illustrates two points

• He’s ignorant and doesn’t choose to inform himself, instead gullibly following sources that pander to his confirmation bias

• He’s driven not by rational belief in the progress of technology but by rightwing culture war politics

Finally there’s Andreesen’s rejection of the precautionary principle, which has been endorsed by quite a few generally sensible people, including Daniel Drezner . The precautionary principle has been interpreted in all sorts of different ways, from the common sense of “look before you leap” to the absurdity of “don’t do anything that might go wrong”.

But the most sensible interpretation, and the one relevant to the current debate is that of a burden of proof on innovators (I wrote about this with Simon Grant, here). That is, the precautionary principle, as applied to any particular domain, says that innovators should have to demonstrate in advance that their proposed innovation will not be harmful.

The opposite view, summed up by aphorisms like “move fast and break things” and “better to seek forgiveness than permission”, is that innovation should not be constrained. Negative consequences can be dealt with after the event, and, if necessary, rules can be adjusted to prevent a repetition.

The precautionary principle isn’t universally applicable. There’s widespread (maybe not universal) support for applying it to new medicines, whereas not many people would want to apply it to new restaurant menus (assuming they complied with existing health standards).

Looking at Andreesen’s manifesto, three cases come to mind. First, since he’s now a financier, there is the case of financial innovation. The default here is to allow any innovation that complies with the rules covering existing financial instruments. In my view, this has turned out very badly, most obviously in the leadup to the GFC, but also with more recent innovations like Buy Now, Pay Later, not to mention cryptocurrencies, in which Andreesen is heavily invested.

Then (not mentioned in the manifesto) but maybe in the background there’s the case of genetically modified crops. Here the precautionary principle was applied early on, following the Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA. This process allowed research that established, fairly convincingly, that food produced from GM crops was just a safe as that produced using crops developed by traditional breeding and selection (also a form of genetic modification). That finding didn’t end controversy over issues like corporate control, or debate over specific innovations like Roundup-Ready (glyphosate-tolerant) crops, but it gave pretty good assurance that the nightmare scenarios floating around at the time of the initial discoveries would not materialise.

Finally, of course, there are recent developments in Artificial Intelligence, from which Andreesen hopes to make a lot of money. I’m not convinced by the apocalyptic scenarios put forward by people like William McAskill (and linked in some obscure way to the idea of ‘effective altruism’). But I also haven’t seen a clearly convincing counterargument to say that such an apocalypse can’t happen, or, at least, is less of a concern than other risks it might tend to offset, for example by generating enough prosperity to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict. And that’s also true of risks that aren’t existential such as the possibility of large-scale fraud through techniques like voice replication. Following the logic of the precautionary principle, I’d prefer (if possible) to slow down the pace of development and try to understand the consequences before they are irreversible.

None of this makes me a techno-pessimist. But, having seen lots of glowing visions of the future crumble into dust, I’m not impressed by Andreesen’s revival of 20th century tech-boosterism. Scientific progress provides us, collectively, with a range of technological options. The choice between them should be made wisely and democratically, not by the whims of venture capitalists.

Albanese likes fighting, but not for us

If you want evidence that #Albanese will never change, check out his response to a Dorothy Dixer asking whether “ea parliament dominated by progressive political forces provided structural opportunity in the event the government pursued additional legislative measure” on renewables.

Rather than saying “Yes, we will work with the Parliament” #Albo went straight on attack against the Greens, for forcing him to strengthen his pathetic Housing Fund. He’s a hopeless case. #auspol

https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/sep/28/anthony-albanese-to-accelerate-transition-to-low-emissions-after-voice-referendum?trk=public_post_comment-text

Balance or both-sidesism

It’s time for me to have my final say on a dispute with Matt Yglesias that has been going at a fairly slow pace.

A couple of weeks ago, Matt put up a post (really a Substack newsletter, but I still think in blog terms), headlined Polarization is a choice with the subtitle, “Political elites justify polarizing decisions with self-fulfilling prophesies”

I responded with a snarky but (I thought) self-explanatory note, saying “Peak both sidesism here. Republicans want to overthrow US democracy, while Democrats stubbornly insist on keeping it. Surely there is some middle ground to be found here ”

A few days ago, Matt came back to ask “I’m curious what actual things the article says you believe are wrong. You clearly didn’t like it since you choose to mischaracterize it in a mean-spirited way, but I’m not sure what you didn’t like about it.”

So, here’s my response.

I start from the position that the Republican Party is an extreme-right party, comparable to Fidesz in Hungary, which its intellectual leaders much admire. It’s anti-democratic, racist and dominated by delusional claims and conspiracy theories encompassing just about everything.

Orban at CPAC

The far-right positioning of the US isn’t new. It’s been developing over at least thirty years, notably since the launch of Fox News. But the rise of Trump has crystallised the transition from a more-or-less normal rightwing party to an organisation of the far-right.

By contrast, the Democratic party is a moderate party of the centre and centre-left: even members perceived as leftwing in the US context, such as Sanders and AOC would be unremarkable centre-leftists elsewhere.

This shift has cost the Republicans some political support. From being the unchallenged majority party in the 1980s, they have become a minority, which has accelerated their shift to anti-democratic positions. But they still command the support of nearly half of American voters, and, within that half, the majority is committed to Trump personally, and to positions that can fairly be described as fascist.

In this context, what can we make of an article headlined “Polarization is a choice: Political elites justify polarizing decisions with self-fulfilling prophesies”. My brief and snarky response was “Peak both sidesism here. Republicans want to overthrow US democracy, while Democrats stubbornly insist on keeping it. Surely there is some middle ground to be found here ”

I don’t see how my claim of both-sidesism can be denied here. The headline refers to “Political elites”, with no suggestion that one side bears more of the blame than the other (except that “elites”, while presumably intended neutrally here, is widely taken as rightwing code for “educated people we don’t like”). The article is entirely consistent with this reading. Republicans and Democrats alike are praised for compromise, and criticised for pursuing the policies preferred by their activist supporters. In this context, Trump’s actions in office are explicitly compared with the moderate reforms proposed by Biden on taking office (the Jan 6 insurrection is not mentioned).

Similarly, “polarization” is an inherently symmetrical metaphor, with the clear implication of an undesirable move away from a neutral or middle-ground position, defined by the views of the median voter. And here we come to a point which, I think, is at the core of our disagreement.

Matt’s argument, stated in the headline, is that political polarization results from the choices of political professionals to position their parties further away from the views of the median US voter (which are implicitly assumed to be moderate and sensible). In reality, the far-right radicalisation of the Republican party has involved a series of self-reinforcing interactions between Republican voters and activists and the Republican political-intellectual-media class. The core of this dynamic is the interaction between voters (particularly Republican primary voters) and the rightwing media, starting with Fox and extending to Alex Jones, Newsmax and Stormfront.

The intellectual and political classes have mostly followed rather than led, with the old establishment gradually replaced by delusional extremists of various kinds.

To sum up: an analysis of the US political scene that starts from the assumption that it involves a contest for the middle ground between two normal political parties, is fundamentally wrong. It’s less plausible even than the Republican mirror image of the view I’ve presented, in which it’s the Democrats who are plotting to end democracy and establish socialism. That view is crazy, but as long as you are willing to assume that anything you see or read from outside the Fox/QAnon bubble is part of the plot, it’s internally consistent.

Since I started writing this, I’ve been made aware of the 2025 Project, where the intention to establish a permanent rightwing dictatorship is about as clear as it can possibly be. To me, at least, its pretty clear where the “polarisation” is coming from.

Living in the 70s: why Australia’s dominant model of unemployment and inflation no longer works

I’m looking forward to the release of the government’s Employment White Paper with a mixture of hope and trepidation. The fact that the title was changed from the original “Full Employment” is not encouraging, nor is the general track record of this government. On the other hand, in setting the scene for the release, Treasurer Jim Chalmers has indicated that the government will commit itself to five main objectives

sustained and inclusive full employment; job security and strong, sustainable wage growth; reigniting productivity growth; filling skills needs and building the future workforce; and overcoming barriers to employment and broadening opportunity.

It’s hard to see how the first objective can be reconciled with the fact that the Reserve Bank remains committed to a NAIRU model in which the full employment goal is subordinated to an inflation target, and that its current policies are aimed at pushing unemployment even higher than the NAIRU level.

I’ve written a piece for The Conversation explaining why the NAIRU model isn’t supported by economic experience, except for a single inflationary episode in the 1970s.