Mums and Dads

I don’t have a strong view on the hoax announcement that ANZ had withdrawn its support for the Whitehaven coal project. However, I do have some thoughts on the widespread claim that “Mums and Dads” lost significant sums of money as a result of the short-lived fall in share prices that ensued.

First, the claim is undoubtedly true. By the time they have enough money to invest in, or speculate on, the share market, the great majority of Australians have children. Nathan Tinkler, for example, is a father of four. Gina Rinehart is, at least according to her kids, a spectacularly bad mother, but she’s a mother all the same. The unremarkable fact that most owners of shares have children does not entitle them to any particular sympathy.

More importantly, this was a zero sum event. For every Mum, Dad, or childless person who lost money by selling at the bottom, another gained by buying.

Finally, what kinds of Mums and Dads lost money on this event? Anyone who left their investment portfolio unchanged over the course of the day was unaffected. So, the losers fall into two groups
(a) Unsuccessful speculators, who might be better advised to spend more time with their kids and less time playing the market
(b) A few unlucky parents who shifted their long-term investments the right way (that is, out of coal) but at precisely the wrong time

As regards Mums and Dads in group (b), I offer the consolation that, while they didn’t get the timing precisely right, a decision to sell coal stocks will very probably turn out well in the long run. And, as far as investing is concerned, getting out of coal is certainly the best thing they could do for their children.

Krugman on 2013 vs 1958 macro

At the recent American Economic Association meeting in San Diego, Brad DeLong chaired a panel on ” Stimulus or Stymied?: The Macroeconomics of Recessions“, and has posted a transcript. Paul Krugman was there and picked up my claim that macroeconomics has, on balance, gone backwards since 1958. I’ve extracted his section here. Lots of useful stuff, but I’d stress this:

the whole basis on which we constructed monetary policy during the Great Moderation, which is that stabilizing inflation and stabilizing output are the same thing, is all wrong: you can have a sustained period of low but not negative inflation consistent with an economy operating far below its potential productive capacity. That is what I believe is happening now. If so, we are failing dismally in responding to this economic crisis. This is in contrast to what some central bankers are saying—that we have done well because inflation has stayed relatively stable.

To push this a bit further, I’d argue that there will be no real recovery as long as central banks continue to treat the inflation-targeting polices of the (spurious) Great Moderation as the pre-crisis normal to which we should strive to return

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Wouldn’t even know …

… if their a**e was on fire. That’s just about literally true of Australia’s climate delusionists. As the hottest temperatures on record set off the predictable (and predicted) bushfires, they keep on with the same old stuff. This Catallaxy thread has it all, if you can stomach it – bogus statistical claims from fools too ignorant to estimate a trend line and too lazy to learn how, silly IPCC and BOM conspiracy theories, absurd economic alarmism about the allegedly catastrophic effects of the carbon price, CO2 as plant food, and so on. Catallaxy’s main rival in the lunar right stakes, the Oz, chimes in with an editorial snarking about Al Gore. Meanwhile, Christopher Monckton has teamed up with pastor, creationist and bigot Danny Nalliah, who blames the bushfires on God’s wrath, to promote an Australian version of the UK Independence Party.

There is no possible evidence or argument that can shift these guys. The only consolation is that, while ignorance is strength in the short run, a political movement that relies on delusion will fail in the end. The US Republicans, and their supporting apparatus of thinktanks, media outlets and blogs have found that out, having lost both elections and credibility. The same is happening here, particularly with respect to alarmist claims about the devastating effects of pricing carbon.

Meanwhile, back in the real world, I’m starting a long-postponed project on bushfires and climate change with a former postdoc of mine who’s been working in the US for some years and is back for a long visit, having arrived just as the Tasmanian fires started it.

How effective is fiscal policy: Guest post from Roger Farmer (crosspost at CT)

Roger Farmer, professor of economics at UCLA, has sent a response to my post on the fiscal multiplier, which is over the fold. I’ll make some substantive points in comments, but I’d like to start by saying that this is a good example of a discussion to which blogs are ideally suited. Contributions from people like Roger who have something important to say, but not the time or inclination for a regular blog, make it even better.

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The state of macroeconomics: it all went wrong in 1958

Much of the recent discussion in the “state of macroeconomics” has concerned the question

* Is macroeconomics making progress?
* If not, when did it stop?

I’m not going to survey the whole debate, but I will point to a good contribution from Robert Gordon (linked by JW Mason in comments to a previous post). Gordon argues that 1978-era New Keynesian macro is better than the DSGE approach dominant today. That implies 30 years of retrogression.

My own view is even more pessimistic. On balance, I think macroeconomics has gone backwards since the discovery of the Phillips curve in 1958 [1][2]. The subsequent 50+ years has been a history of mistakes, overcorrection and partial countercorrections. To be sure, quite a lot has been learned, but as far as policy is concerned, even more has been forgotten. The result is that lots of economists are now making claims that would have been considered absurd, even by pre-Keynesian economists like Irving Fisher.

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The big issues in macroeconomics: the fiscal multiplier

The biggest theoretical issue in macroeconomics is “what causes unemployment”. As discussed in the last post, the classical answer, that unemployment is caused by problems in labor markets, is obviously wrong as an explanation of the simultaneous emergence of sustained high unemployment in many different countries. Unemployment is a macroeconomic problem.

The central macroeconomic policy issue, then, is “what, if anything, can macroeconomic policy do to move the economy back to full employment”. If you accept that, under current conditions of zero interest rates, there’s not much positive that can be done with monetary policy[1], and you stay within the bounds of mainstream policy debate, this question can be restated as “how effective is expansionary fiscal policy” or, in Keynesian terms, “how large is the fiscal multiplier in a depression”.

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The big issues in macroeconomics: unemployment

Following up my previous post, I want to look at the main areas of disagreement in macroeconomics. As well as trying to cover the issues, I’ll be making the point that the (mainstream) economics profession is so radically divided on these issues that any idea of a consensus, or even of disagreement within a broadly accepted analytical framework, is nonsense. The fact that, despite these radical disagreements, many specialists in macroeconomics don’t see a problem is, itself, part of the problem.

I’ll start with the central issue of macroeconomics, unemployment. It’s the central issue because macroeconomics begins with Keynes’ claim that a market economy can stay for substantial periods, in a situation of high unemployment and excess supply in all markets. If this claim is false, as argued by both classical and New Classical economists, then there is no need for a separate field of macroeconomics – everything can and should be derived from (standard neoclassical) microeconomics.

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How we got to Macklin

Jenny Macklin is still dealing with the response to her terse answer “I could” to the question of whether she could live on unemployment benefit. But the policy shift that led her in front of the cameras is the product of a complicated history that might be worth explanation. I’m going to go from memory, and invite commenters to supply links or corrections for my recollecitons.

The story starts in the 1960s, at a time when unemployment was very low, and spells of unemployment very short. Whether in fact or reality, the archetypal single parent was a widow. The vast majority of income support took the form of age pensions, which were means-tested and set at a very low level. Around this time Ronald Henderson estimated a poverty line at 25 per cent of average weekly earnings (AWE), well above the basic pension.

Over the late 1960s and early 1970s, pensions were increased to approximately the Henderson poverty line. In combination with some additional concessions and the introduction of Medicare, these changes virtually eliminated poverty among the old.

The changes to the value of the old age pension, relative to weekly earnings have been sustained.[1] Initially, unemployment benefits and supporting parents benefits (which replaced the former widows pension, IIRC) rose in line with the old age pension. Both were indexed to the CPI, but ad hoc adjustments kept them broadly in line with AWE. But the Howard government replaced CPI adjustment with AWE adjustment for pensions, while retaining indexation to the CPI for unemployment benefits. The result has been that the value of UB (now Newstart or some similarly Orwellian name) has fallen relative to both pensions and incomes generally.

Around 2006, the Howard government turned its attention to supporting parents, introducing a rule that recipients would go on to UB when their youngest child turned 8. At the time, the measure was strongly attacked by Labor. Here’s Penny Wong. Existing recipients were exempted (the term “grandfathered” does not seem apposite here), with the implicit promise that they would remain under the old rules. In the search for a surplus, the Gillard government decided to abandon that promise and push existing recipients with children over 8 onto UB. The question that got Macklin into trouble was about that decision.

There is a defensible case for setting the old age pension higher than UB, particularly if the government pursues active labour market policies to help the long-term unemployed find jobs. The pension needs to be enough to live on for decades, over which time household goods have to be replaced, and other long-term expenses addressed. Most spells of unemployment last only a few months, so various kinds of expenditure can be deferred. But the gap that has emerged over the past 15 years is much larger than can be justified in this way, particularly in the case of supporting parents, who are more likely to spend long periods out of employment. Instead of completing the Howard agenda, the Gillard government ought to be looking at increasing the real value of benefits, allowing the unemployed to share in some of the growth in incomes for the community as a whole.

fn1. In other respect, showever, the generosity of the pension system peaked around 1980. Means tests, which were eliminated in the 1970s, were reintroduced in the 1980s, and the pension age has gradually increased.