Yesterday Steven den Beste was quibbling about the meaning of “unconditional”. Today, he’s proposing an all-out war against the entire Arab culture, noting “I am forthrightly proposing what some might call cultural genocide”.

Leaving aside the scary implications of all this (as his critic Hesiod
notes, try reading the post with “Jew” substituted for “Arab” at every occurrence, and some corresponding changes of cultural stereotype), this kind of wild mood swing is a caricature of the Bush administration’s stance on Iraq.

The result is that we know Bush wants war, but is it to:
(i) stop terrorism,
(ii) remove an evil dictator,
(iii) get rid of WMDs,
(iv) enforce UN resolutions,
(v) forcibly convert the Arabs
(vi) democratise the Middle East
(vii) secure a free flow of oil
(viii) stimulate the US economy
or
(ix)settle an old family feud?

All but (ix) have been seriously put forward by advocates of war within or close to the Bush Administration, and plenty of people outside the Administration suspect (ix) is the truth. If all these objectives could be pursued at once, there would be no problem, but there’s clearly a lot of conflict between them.

Warwick McKibbin has kindly supplied me with the present value calculations to permit an assessment of his model results. The idea of a present value is to reduce a series of future gains and losses to a single present day value, the amount that would have to be invested (or borrowed) at a given rate of interest to yield an equivalent flow. The rate of interest in Warwick ‘s model is 5 per cent. There are four main scenarios in the model.
The first is the Business As Usual case in which no countries ratify Kyoto or do anything about global warming. This provides a baseline, but is of no real interest since most countries have already ratified.
n the other scenarios, it is assumed that everyone except the US ratifies. The second is one in which Australia ratifies, but where no account is taken of measures the government has already taken to reduce emissions at low economic cost. The third is one in which Australia ratifies, and account is taken of existing measures. The fourth is one in which Australia does not ratify.

The crucial issue is the difference between ratifying and not ratifying

Warwick supplied me with estimates expressed in terms of US dollars of present value, but it’s more useful to convert these to percentage losses. Warwick estimates that (not taking existing measures into account), ratification will reduce the present value of income for the period 2000-2050 by 0.34 per cent, from $US14401 billion to $US14352 billion. If existing measures are taken into account, the loss from ratification falls to 0.16 per cent. I think the estimate with measures is more appropriate since the policies are already in place, but Warwick has argued that the ‘without measures’ estimate is more robust.

All of the net loss is incurred after 2020. For the period 2000-2020, the present value of income is almost identical in all three scenarios (ratification without measures comes out slightly ahead, but the difference is negligible).

To get a feel for the magnitudes, it’s useful to observe that 0.16 per cent of GDP is equal to two weeks’ economic growth. In other words, suppose that we all took two weeks off to watch the Olympics. During those two weeks the economy kept producing the same level of output but there was no growth in productivity. Suppose that after the two weeks were finished the economy returned to the previous rate of growth, but that the growth missed in those two weeks was not regained. This would be roughly the impact that Warwick is modelling. Actually, since there’s no net impact before 2020, a closer parallel would be that nothing happened until 2020 and that we missed four weeks growth then.

In current monetary terms, 0.34 per cent of GDP is around $2 billion per year, 0.16 per cent is around $1 billion per year. By contrast the Great Barrier Reef, which will almost certainly be severely damaged if global warming is not controlled, is estimated to contribute around $2 billion a year in economic benefits alone. Of course, Kyoto alone will not solve global warming, but equally the Reef represents only a fraction of the ecosystems that will be damaged or destroyed if warming is allowed to proceed, without even considering coastline shifts, increased cyclone intensity, and the huge impact on poorer countries.

Seeking to shore up support for his position on Iraq (whatever that turns out to be), Tony Blair has called for redistribution of wealth. As the Guardian notes, ‘ it was one of the first times the prime minister has used the word “redistribute” unprompted – it was previously a taboo expression in New Labour.’
As far as I can see, there is now nothing left of the Third Way other than an attachment to Public-Private Partnerships (for my take on PPPs, look here or here). Blair has now accepted the need for higher taxes to fund both improved services and redistribution of wealth. In other words, he’s now an old-style social democrat, just a very wishy-washy one.

A while ago, Ken Parish made the point that normally calm and sensible bloggers tended to get emotional and unreasonable when the topic of global warming came up. He was talking about Kyoto supporters like me and Don Arthur, but the same point can be made about Ken himself. Once this issue comes up, he is prone to misrepresentations and dodgy arguments he would never use in any other context. Consider, for example, this claim “Anyone would think from reading John Quiggin’s blog that his ANU colleague Warwick McKibbin supports Australia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.”
The post in question begins by describing Warwick as ‘a leading critic of Kyoto’, describes the results of his modelling of the impacts of ratification and concludes “Although I disagree with Warwick’s policy position on Kyoto, I compliment him for keeping his independence as a modeller. The government clearly didn’t like his results one bit.”
I’d love to see Ken’s explanation of how this can be read as saying that “Warwick McKibbin supports Australia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol”
To be as charitable as I can on this, it appears that Ken has failed to grasp the distinction between saying that Warwick’s model results support ratification, and saying that Warwick himself supports it. The model results are in the public domain and anyone competent to analyse them is free to do so and draw the appropriate inferences. The government’s decision to bury the report with a 6pm Friday release is a pretty good guide to the inferences that they drew.
The model results are ambiguous. Australia initially benefits from ratification (with existing measures) relative to nonratification, but loses from 2015 onwards. The standard way of resolving this is to reduce the flow of gains and losses to a discounted present value. There are, however, choices that must be made in terms of the scenarios that are used and the time period for the projections. I am discussing these questions with Warwick McKibbin presently, and will report soon.
Update Ken has posted a gracious concession that he hadn’t read my post carefully enough before his criticism. I’m looking forward to a resumption of constructive debate, and will have something to say before long.

Greg Sheridan] has quite a thoughtful piece on Iraq. The kicker, accurate but embarrassing, is:

“Oh, and by the way, Canberra will in the end support whatever the US does, just as it would have done if Kim Beazley were PM and not Howard.”

Having read the various warblogger and other critiques of the Iraqi offer on weapons inspection, it seems to be that the critique contains three main points, one strong, one weak and one silly

Strong: Does an offer “to allow the return of the United Nations weapons inspectors to Iraq without conditions” mean “without conditions of the kind that led to the withdrawal of the inspectors in the past” (that is, free and unfettered access) or does it merely mean “without preconditions”. This clearly needs to be resolved.

Weak: The statement “Iraq is ready to discuss the practical arrangements necessary for the immediate resumption of inspections,” can be read can be read to allow for an indefinite period of “discussion”. But the UN has already said the inspectors could be on the ground in three weeks. If the discussions drag on much longer than this, the offer will be discredited.

Silly: The letter mentions the lifting of sanctions and some warbloggers have presented this as a new demand. But the whole point of the sanctions was to compel compliance with the UN resolutions. If Iraq complies to the satisfaction of the Security Council, they sanctions must be lifted. If the Iraqi government asserts that it is ready to comply, then it is perfectly reasonable to refer to ‘ a comprehensive solution that includes the lifting of sanctions imposed in Iraq’

As far as I can see I am in agreement with John Howard at this point. The Security Council should pass a resolution demanding full and unfettered access for weapons inspectors, and full disclosure of past and present programs. If the Iraqi government doesn’t accept this, then it will be time to let loose the dogs of war. If they do accept it, then the appropriate stance is one of vigilant monitoring rather than sabre-rattling.

Janet Albrechtsen lists me as one of the top 5 left commentators in need of correction (all write for Fairfax, I note)

“Where are the attacks on commentators on the other side of the political divide ? Robert Manne, Hugh Mackay, Phillip Adams, Adele Horin, John Quiggin?”

She’s talking about Media Watch, but where are the attacks from right-wing bloggers that are so liberally handed out to Manne, Mackay and Adams? Maybe I’m safe because I publish in one of the handful of newspapers whose website requires subscription. I usually put my articles up on my site at the end of each month, but maybe that’s not immediate enough for blogging. Anyway, if anyone wants to answer Janet’s call, I’d be more than happy for a site to be established where my articles could be criticised, and would look forward to the resulting debate (Please, no TNA members or associates).

This report in the Washington Post gives yet further evidence of the failure the Edison corporation, the leading ‘for-profit’ school operator in the US. Actually, the report says that Edison has never made a profit. This is scarcely surprising. The report points out that the number of students makes Edison equivalent to one of the big US school districts, but how many of them have a $125 million dollar headquarters in Manhattan (now abandoned) or a boss with a $46 million East Hampton estate (now up for sale). It’s hard to make a profit with overheads like that.

Judging by this report in the Washington Post, I’ve overestimated the good sense of the Bush Administration. The front-page lead is

‘White House denounces the overture as a ruse and “a tactic that will fail.”‘

It’s unclear in this context what “the White House” means, and the comments reported in the body of the story are all over the shop. But it’s hard to see how the Arab League and the Saudis, who leaned heavily on Saddam to agree to inspections, taking big risks with their domestic constituencies to do so, can see this as anything but a calculated insult. There’s still time to put a new spin on the story, but the obvious interpretation is that all the US talk about inspections was meaningless, and that the real agenda is war at any price.
The correct line, I would have thought, was something along the lines of “This is a welcome development, but Saddam has reneged on commitments before and we need to keep the pressure up”, which is roughly what was attributed to Jack Straw, the UK Foreign Secretary.

UpdateColin Powell’s response to the Iraqi cave-in is closer to the mark, but, judging by the reactions in the same report, Bush has lost most of the ground he gained in the last week. The obvious inference is that drawn by an unnamed ‘Arab official’ who

‘said that Washington seemed to have made up its mind to strike, even though Baghdad had now agreed to the world’s demands.’

“If the U.S. isn’t happy with this, it means that they have already decided to attack Iraq, whatever Iraq does,” he said.

When Bush made his UN speech I suggested that the Administration was following one of two strategies – a brilliantly effective strategy to secure the elimination of Saddam’s arsenal, or a very silly strategy to secure an invasion of Iraq. Actually, I think some in the Administration are aiming at one, some the other and some don’t know. But it’s clear that the net effect of all this confusion has been to greatly weaken the case for an invasion. Having dropped the claim that Saddam is tied to Al-Qaeda, and backed away from claims of a unilateral right to impose regime change, Bush is in the process of losing the argument that an invasion is necessary to get rid of weapons of mass destruction.

According to AP, received via Salon.com News. Story is also at ABC News Online:

Iraq unconditionally accepted the return of U.N. weapons inspectors late Monday, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said.

“I can confirm to you that I have received a letter from the Iraqi authorities conveying its decision to allow the return of inspectors without conditions to continue their work.”

On past form, I’d guess that there will be some subsequent attempts by the Iraqi government to weasel out of their commitments, but the fact that they have capitulated without even waiting for a resolution from the UN suggests that they have realised the futility of their position, and will not push these attempts far enough to cause real trouble. It’s early days, but the prospects for a peaceful outcome and the destruction of Saddam’s arsenal are suddenly looking good.

This is a big win for Bush, the UN, multilateralism and the world in general. The only real losers are Saddam on one side and the unilateralist “war party” in the US, notably represented by “warbloggers” such as Steven den Beste. These will have the choice between (A) jumping behind Bush and claiming that this was the outcome they wanted all along, or (B) continuing to hope for Iraqi noncompliance down the track. Judging by his early response, it looks like den Beste is going for Plan B, but I’d guess the majority will plump for A while hedging their bets as far as possible.

Update I did a quick surf around the main American warblogger sites and could find almost no reaction to this news. (Feel free to point out on my comments page the places I’ve missed). Apart from den Beste, most either ignored it or decided to sleep on it before responding. For example, AndrewSullivan writes
” WHAT MEANS ‘UNCONDITIONAL’? If I were Saddam, I’d start playing games now. What the administration needs are clear criteria for acceptable inspections – so that they are meaningful and real and permanent. Those criteria must be adhered to. Saddam cannot be allowed to wriggle out of this again. That’s all I can say based on a single sketchy AP story. Check in tomorrow for more.
– 7:33:15 PM”

As far as I can see, the possibility of Saddam caving in had not occurred to most of these guys. Hence their failure to respond to a move that I’ve been predicting (more precisely, pointing out as a possibility) ever since Bush’s UN speech.

The fallback assumption that Saddam will harass the weapons inspectors to the point that a US invasion can in the end be justified still has some plausibility, but it ultimately rests on the belief that he loves his weapons of mass destruction more than his life. My judgement is that Saddam is evil but not crazy. The weapons may have been potentially useful in the past, but they’re a liability now, and he’ll sacrifice them with no more compunction than the many family members he’s had put to death.