I plan to write my own thoughts on this topic soon, but I’d be interested to read yours. Usual rules apply.

Before the invasion of Ukraine, there was a clear consensus on the limitations of economic sanctions. They would take a long time to organize and even longer to have any effect. Just about every commentary I read anticipated Russian tanks in Kiev long before sanctions could have any effect.

That judgement now looks way off the mark. Despite some limited advances in the south of Ukraine, Putin’s invasion seems to have stalled. Meanwhile sanctions, both official and unofficial, have raced ahead.

With the pace of events accelerating all the time, yesterday’s hot take is today’s embarrassing blunder, to be forgotten as soon as possible. Still, so far this suggested way out of the Ukraine disaster doesn’t look too bad to me.

Even with Covid and climate change to worry about, it’s hard to pay attention to much else besides the disaster in Ukraine. It’s easy enough to imagine a scale of escalation leading to nuclear war (Putin’s army occupies Ukraine, resistance bases itself in Poland, attacks into Poland produce NATO resistance, someone makes a mistake, and that’s that). What’s harder is to think about less extreme outcomes.

Have your say

That’s the self-explanatory headline for my latest piece in The Conversation. Read there, comment here.
I should mention that The Conversation edits quite vigorously, including adding material. So, while I stand by the argument in the piece, not every turn of phrase is exactly what I would have written.