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The state of nuclear power in 2026

There was a renewed burst of enthusiasm for nuclear power a few years ago. In Australia, it was confined to the political right and didn’t last long, but elsewhere support was broader. Most notable was the 2023 commitment by more than 20 countries, led by the US, UK and France, to triple global nuclear capacity by 2050. In the three countries mentioned, that would imply building 330 GW of new capacity as well as replacing retiring capacity.

So far, this commitment has produced only one final investment decision, for two reactors at Sizewell C in the UK. Construction is expected to start in 2027, with commercial operation in the late 2030s at best. After that, there are no large plants even on the drawing boards in the UK. A few sites have been identified, and there’s a proposal for some half-size reactors (called SMRs but not actually modular or very small) to be built by Rolls-Royce. These don’t even have a prototype yet.

France is a few steps behind. Three sites have been identified, each with two reactors, but none has reached final investment decision yet. The most likely to happen is at Penly, but even that is doubtful. And once Macron’s term finishes in 2027, the political push is likely to dissipate.

Nothing at all is happening with large-scale new nuclear in the US. Proposals to complete the half-finished VC Summer plant in South Carolina have gone nowhere, and even the planned restart of the Palisades plant has missed multiple deadlines. The Trump Administration recently announced an $18.7 billion loan program with the aim of building ten AP1000 reactors, but this is just theatre. There are a few pilot small reactors with construction underway, but all such efforts have failed until now.

Looking at the world as a whole, the first half of 2026 has seen

two (2) new reactors connected to the grid, both in China

three (3) construction projects reaching first nuclear concrete, all in China

zero (0) new final investment decisions outside China

one (1) new/revised export contract, probably just symbolic, between Rosatom and Uzbekistan

Generously assuming a 4:1 capacity ratio, the two new reactors would be equivalent to around 8 GW of firmed solar. That’s what China installs every week or so, and the world as a whole every four or five days.

In summary, nuclear power isn’t a vital source of energy, obstructed by politics. Outside China, it’s a zombie, animated by political imperatives. In China, it’s an afterthought, running far behind solar and wind, as well as (regrettably) new coal and gas, and about level with new hydro.

# contentMap.en
The state of nuclear power in 2026

There was a renewed burst of enthusiasm for nuclear power a few years ago. In Australia, it was confined to the political right and didn’t last long, but elsewhere support was broader. Most notable was the 2023 commitment by more than 20 countries, led by the US, UK and France, to triple global nuclear capacity by 2050. In the three countries mentioned, that would imply building 330 GW of new capacity as well as replacing retiring capacity.

So far, this commitment has produced only one final investment decision, for two reactors at Sizewell C in the UK. Construction is expected to start in 2027, with commercial operation in the late 2030s at best. After that, there are no large plants even on the drawing boards in the UK. A few sites have been identified, and there’s a proposal for some half-size reactors (called SMRs but not actually modular or very small) to be built by Rolls-Royce. These don’t even have a prototype yet.

France is a few steps behind. Three sites have been identified, each with two reactors, but none has reached final investment decision yet. The most likely to happen is at Penly, but even that is doubtful. And once Macron’s term finishes in 2027, the political push is likely to dissipate.

Nothing at all is happening with large-scale new nuclear in the US. Proposals to complete the half-finished VC Summer plant in South Carolina have gone nowhere, and even the planned restart of the Palisades plant has missed multiple deadlines. The Trump Administration recently announced an $18.7 billion loan program with the aim of building ten AP1000 reactors, but this is just theatre. There are a few pilot small reactors with construction underway, but all such efforts have failed until now.

Looking at the world as a whole, the first half of 2026 has seen

two (2) new reactors connected to the grid, both in China

three (3) construction projects reaching first nuclear concrete, all in China

zero (0) new final investment decisions outside China

one (1) new/revised export contract, probably just symbolic, between Rosatom and Uzbekistan

Generously assuming a 4:1 capacity ratio, the two new reactors would be equivalent to around 8 GW of firmed solar. That’s what China installs every week or so, and the world as a whole every four or five days.

In summary, nuclear power isn’t a vital source of energy, obstructed by politics. Outside China, it’s a zombie, animated by political imperatives. In China, it’s an afterthought, running far behind solar and wind, as well as (regrettably) new coal and gas, and about level with new hydro.